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Editorial
Dear Readers,
I am pleased to provide you with the 50th edition of the 
Esarda bulletin, a culmination of hard work by authors 
and, sometimes strenuous but always serious, review 
process by reviewers of the papers published to an ever 
wider community covering an ever wider range of themes 
and activities. On behalf of the Editorial committee, I am 
grateful to the authors for allowing their good work to be 
published in our journal and to the reviewers for their 
most valuable and important contributions to this pro-
cess thus ensuring that good quality is maintained and 
continuously improved. Each paper has generally been 
peer-reviewed by two independent experts and in some 
rare cases three when the two opinions were opposing 
and contrasting on important issues. As in issue 49, the 
papers published in this 50th edition are predominantly 
those selected by the chairmen of the previous Esarda 
symposium in Bruges as best papers in addition to other 
papers independently submitted by their authors to us. 
The timing of the publication (i.e. issue 49 or 50?) mostly 
depended on the timing and readiness as regards the 
peer-review process. Some remaining papers will be 
published in issue 51.
In addition to peer reviewed papers section, Issue 50 con-
tains under a new section News and Synopses: 
• a summary report on the panel discussion held in Brug-
es on the topic of Disarmament Verification – a Dia-
logue on Technical and Transparency Issues
• a short editorial followed by the abstracts of two exten-
sive reports by the DA, NDA and NA/NT working 
groups (WG) which focused on the subject of mea-
surement uncertainties and reference material needs 
following two workshops organised by them and host-
ed by the IAEA and DG-ENER respectively. The full re-
ports including a list of recommendations can be 
promptly viewed and downloaded at:  https://esarda.
jrc.ec.europa.eu.
The Esarda Editorial Committee continues to strive to in-
crease the visibility and good citation and referencing of 
your publications within the Esarda bulletin which will en-
sure accessibility to a wider and more global audience. In 
order to achieve that many steps are currently being 
undertaken.
You may notice that since very recently every bulletin 
published to date (i.e. since 1976!) has been uploaded 
to the Esarda library and is accessible on the web site. 
A heading is added for each individual article in our li-
brary which will allow other authors to reference the 
source of the file correctly and in a standardised fash-
ion. Furthermore, migrating the library to a suitable re-
pository or journal management such as Google Schol-
ar thus allowing an automated and correct indexing of 
the files is also considered together with the upload of 
all existing Bulletins files in the open source indexing en-
gines. Requests for some other indexing engines are in 
progress with the benefits this would bring to both au-
thors and readers especially in terms of visibility and ci-
tation of their work.
The technical support of my colleague Andrea de Luca in 
that endeavour and for his work on the new Esarda web-
site are warmly acknowledged.
I would like to thank all authors for submitting their papers 
to the bulletin and I encourage everybody to cite the work 
published in the bulletin whenever appropriate.
I wish you all a very happy and successful new year.
Hamid Tagziria 
Editor and Editorial Committee Chairman
https://esarda.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
Esarda-bulletin@jrc.ec.europa.eu 
hamid.tagziria@jrc.ec.europa.eu 
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Particle Size Inhomogeneity Effect on Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry
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1. European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements, Retieseweg 111, B-2440 Geel, 
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2. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) - Tokai-mura, Naka-gun, Ibaraki 319-1195, Japan
E-mail: harada.hideo@jaea.go.jp
Abstract:
Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) represents a pos-
sible option to determine the heavy metal content in melted 
nuclear fuel. This method is based on the well-established 
methodology of neutron time-of-flight (TOF) transmission 
and capture measurements. In particular, NRD can meas-
ure both the isotopic and the elemental composition. It is a 
non-destructive method and is applicable for highly radioac-
tive material. The details of this method are explained in an-
other contribution to this bulletin.
The accuracy of NRD depends among other factors on 
sample characteristics. Inhomogeneities such as density 
variations in powder samples can introduce a significant 
bias in the determination of the composition. In this contri-
bution, the impact of the particle size distribution of such 
powder samples on results obtained with NRD is investi-
gated. Various analytical models, describing the neutron 
transport through powder, are compared. Stochastic nu-
merical simulations are used to select a specific model 
and to estimate the introduced model uncertainty. The re-
sults from these simulations will be verified by dedicated 
measurements at the TOF-faci l i ty GELINA of the 
EC-JRC-IRMM.
Keywords: non-destructive assay; densitometry; neutron 
time-of-flight; resonance analysis; melted fuel; severe acci-
dents; nuclear safeguards
1. Introduction
Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) can be used to 
determine the isotopic and the elemental composition of 
unknown samples [1,2]. NRD consists of a combination of 
Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [3,4,5,6] 
and Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis (NRCA) [5,6]. 
Both NRTA and NRCA are non-destructive neutron time-
of-flight measurement techniques which are based on 
well-established methods for nuclear cross section deter-
mination [7]. 
In case that the sample consists of particle-like debris of 
melted nuclear fuel formed in a severe accident, such as 
happened in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants, 
the inhomogeneity  of the sample can introduce a signifi-
cant bias in the result of an NRD measurement. In this 
contribution, the impact of the sample inhomogeneity is in-
vestigated by comparing different analytical methods with 
stochastic simulations of the neutron transport through 
powder samples. 
2. Particle Size Models
In the last decades various models have been developed 
to describe the neutron transport through stochastic me-
dia [8]. In this contribution, we consider binary stochastic 
mixtures of particles (phase  ) embedded in a matrix 
(phase ). The mixture is characterized by the volume frac-
tion of each phase i =  ,  defined as  p V V Vi i= +/ ( )   
where Vi  is the volume, and by the chord lengths 
 i iV S= 4 /  where S is the boundary surface between the 
different phases. The volume fraction of the particles is 
also referred to as packing fraction.
In sections 2.1 - 2.3, a brief overview of a number of ana-
lytical models available to calculate the neutron transport 
through a stochastic mixture is given. For detailed informa-
tion on each of the models and in particular their derivation 
we refer the reader to the original publications. In sec-
tion 2.4 two different Monte Carlo methods to calculate the 
neutron transport through the mixture are brief ly 
discussed. 
2.1 Homogeneous Limit
The homogeneous limit, also called atomic mixing, is 
based on the assumption that the neutron effectively sees 
a homogenous mixture of particles and matrix material. 
This assumption holds if the neutron passes multiple parti-
cles between interactions, i.e. if the mean free path (mfp) 
of the neutron in the particle is significantly higher than the 
characteristic particle size l : mfp l= 1/   . In this par-
ticular case the macroscopic total cross section of the par-
ticle-matrix mixture hom  is simply given by the volume 
fraction weighted sum of the particle and matrix total cross 
sections   and   : 
   hom p p= = +


 .
The transmission (T ) of neutrons through a sample of 
thickness (R ) is then:
T ehom Rhom. . .= −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2.2 Macroscopic Analytical Model
Kopecky et al. [9] developed a model to describe the 
transmission of neutrons through a Pu powder sample. 
Since this model is based on a distribution of the overall 
thickness of the particle phase rather than on particle 
properties, the model can be considered as macroscopic. 
Within this model it is assumed that the particle phase 
thickness is log-normal distributed with an additional hole 
fraction fh. The transmission through the sample is then 
given by:
T f e p x dx fKop h
n
h
x= −( ) ( ) +∫ − ′1 
where ′n  is related to the areal density n, determined from 
measurements of the mass and sample area, by: 
′ = −( )n n fh/ 1 .  is the total microscopic cross section of 
the particle phase. The variable x  is distributed as a log-
normal distribution:
p x
x s
exp
x s
s
( ) = −
+( )



1
2
2
22
2 2
2

ln /
with an average value one and the width parameter s. It is 
further assumed that the cross section of the matrix materi-
al can be neglected. In this model the width parameter and 
hole fraction are free model parameters. An advantage of 
Kopecky’s model is that both free parameters tend to be 
uncorrelated parameters in a fitting procedure. In general, 
Kopecky’s model is not restricted to a log-normal distribu-
tion of the thickness. Depending on the powder characteris-
tics, a different thickness distribution might be advanta-
geous. The model of Kopecky et al.  [9] has been 
implemented in the least squares fitting program REFIT [10].
2.3 Microscopic Analytical Models
Microscopic model are directly based on properties of the 
individual particles, such as size and shape distributions 
rather than on overall properties of the mixture. The follow-
ing models differ in particular in the underlying stochastic 
and particle shape assumptions and in complexity. Burrus 
model for example is quite simple with assumptions in-
spired from basic reactor physics while Randall’s extended 
model is too complex for practical calculations within the 
context of this contribution.
• Burrus's Model: Burrus [11,12] developed a simple 
model for the effective total cross section eff Bur, .  of a 
binary mixture neglecting the matrix cross section. The 
effective cross section is given by:
eff Bur ln p F, . = − −( )1 1


where F  is the probability that a neutron does not pene-
trate a particle. F  is related to the self-collision probability 
Pc by F Pc= −( )  1 . The self-collision probability can 
be determined using Wigner's rational approximation:
Pc = +( )     / 1 .
The transmission through the sample is then given by:
T eBur Reff Bur. , . .= −
Burrus investigated the transmission of thermal neutrons 
through boral slabs made out of a heterogeneous mixture 
of boron carbide and aluminium.
• Doub's Model: Doub's model [13] is based on the cal-
culation of a self-shielding factor fD  for the particles. The 
average transmission through a mixture of thickness R is 
then given by: 
T eDoub R p fD= −   .
In case of fD = 1 Doub's model reduces to the homoge-
nous limit with a zero cross section matrix. Doub underly-
ing assumption is the number of particles that the neutron 
passes is given by a binominal distribution. In his model 
the self-shielding factor of mono-dispersed spheres with 
radius r is:
f
y p g
ln
p
g t
D =
− −( )






1
2
3
1
1 1 
w i th  y r= 2   a n d  g = 0 740. .  t  i s  g i ve n  by 
t y y e y= − +( ) −2 1 12/ . Doub extended the model to 
polydisperse spheres using a volume averaged self-shield-
ing factor f f V VD D j jj
= ∑ /   where fD j and Vj are the self-
shielding factor and volume of spheres with a radius rj . 
Doub compared his model to measurements of transmis-
sion through a mixture of boron-carbide and aluminium 
spheres [13] with a minimum self-shielding factor of 0.86. 
He showed that the measured shape of fD  as function of 
neutron energy is well reproduces with the model. 
• Randall's Model: While Doub's model is restricted to 
spherical particles, Randall developed a more general 
model based on a stochastic description of the integral 
transport equation (for more details see Refs. [12,14,15]). 
When all particles have the same characteristics, the av-
erage transmission is given by:
T p p E eRan
N R. = + ′{ } ∑− 

with E ’ //= + ( )[ ]−[ ]1    
  
 . The particle shape is 
describe by the average chord length  and the chord 
length variance 
2. The factor N  is given by N R a= ( ) /  
with the effective linear packing factor a pf X≅ −( )[ ]−2 1 
where X l= +1 2 2/ . Values for  and X  for different 
particle shapes are tabulated in Ref. [14]. Randall further 
extended the description of the transport based on 
binominal statistics [15]. However, since the final expres-
sion involves the calculation of the confluent hyper-
geometric function, the calculation tends to be slow and 
sometimes not stable. Therefore Randall's extended ex-
pression is not considered in this contribution.
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Figure 1: Example of a stochastic geometry based 
on a  polydisperse spherical particle distribution.
Figure 2: Example of a stochastic Markovian geometry.
• LP Model: Levermore et al. [16] and Vanderhaegen 
[17] developed a model of the neutron transport 
through a Markovian statistical mixture. In this case, 
the line segments in a particular phase along a trajec-
tory of the neutron have a decaying exponential prob-
ability distribution. The LP model is therefore not 
based on spherical particles, unlike Doub's model and 
to some extent Randall's model. For a stationary pro-
cess the transmission through a sample with thick-
ness R  is given by:
T
r
r r
e
r
r r
eLP r R r R=
−
−


+
−
−


+
+ −
− −
+ −
−+ −
  
wi th   = + + +− −p p        
1 1  and the decay 
constants:
2 4
2
r± = + ± −( ) +      .
The parameter  is given by:
    = −( ) 
2
p p .
The LP model has two free model parameters:  and 
p . Both   and p can be obtained using the equa-
tions: p p + = 1 and p     = +/ ( ). This model is 
extensively used in various scientific domains dealing 
with ratiative transfer. In particular, it is applied in clima-
tology to calculate the radiation through cloud fields and 
in inertial confined fusion and to calculate the radiation 
transfer through a two-fluid turbulent mixture of liquid 
water and vapour [8].
2.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
The transmission and capture of neutrons in stochastic 
media can also be calculated by Monte Carlo (MC) simula-
tions. The idea is to generate multiple stochastic geome-
tries and to track individual neutrons through these geom-
etries. Based on a significant number of histories, the 
average transmission can be deduced. MC simulations are 
not suitable to be used in the analysis of NRD measure-
ments due to the significant calculation time. However, 
since fewer approximations are made in the MC simula-
tions, they can be used to benchmark the different analyti-
cal models. In this contribution, we explore two methods 
to generate the stochastic geometry:
• MC Method 1: Spheres are randomly placed into a 
control volume until a specific packing fraction is ob-
tained similar to the Random Sequential Addition (RSA) 
algorithm described in Refs. [18,19]. Newly placed 
spheres are not allowed to overlap with already placed 
spheres. In case of polydisperse spheres, spheres with 
a large radius are placed first. A limitation of this meth-
od is that the maximum reachable packing fraction is 
lower than the theoretical one of a closely packed mix-
ture. Figure  1 shows a cut through a polydisperes 
mixture.
• MC Method 2: The algorithm of Switzer [20] is used to 
generate a 2-dimensional geometry with Markovian 
characteristics (for details see Refs. [20,21]). Following 
the method used by Lepage et al. [21] a binary mixture is 
generated. Figure 2 shows an example of a binary sto-
chastic mixture.
5ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 50, December 2013
3. Particle Size Impact on NRTA
A bias introduced by the particle size distribution on re-
sults of an NRTA analysis was investigated by comparing 
analytical model calculations with MC simulations. The two 
MC methods described in section 2.4 are used to gener-
ate a set of synthetic transmission data. In all cases the 
particle phase consists of uranium and plutonium oxide 
with a density of 10.97 g/cm3. The particle composition is 
given in Table 1. The matrix is considered to be void. The 
packing fraction was assumed to be 30%. The sample 
thickness was chosen to be 1 cm. 
Nuclei at.%
235U 0.6667
238U 31.999
239Pu 0.6667
16O 66.667
Table 1: Assumed particle composition.
The six different analytical methods given in sections 2.1, 
2.2 and 2.3 were used to determine by χ2 minimization the 
average areal density of the U235, U238 and Pu239 content 
considering the energy range 6 – 22 eV. In addition, a 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
23
5 U
23
9 P
u
23
9 P
u
23
9 P
u
23
9 P
u
23
5 U
23
9 P
u
23
5 U
23
8 U
T
23
8 U
-10.0
0.0
10.0
 At. Mix.
 KopeckyR
es
id
ua
l
-10.0
0.0
10.0
 Burrus
 LPR
es
id
ua
l
6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
-10.0
0.0
10.0  Doub
 Randall
R
es
id
ua
l
E / eV
Figure 3: Created transmission spectrum and residual distribution in benchmark case 1.
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Figure 4: Created transmission spectrum and residual distribution in benchmark case 2.
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normalization factor has been fitted. In a transmission 
measurement, the contribution of a constant cross sec-
tion, such as the one of 18O in the considered energy 
range, leads to an energy independent reduction of the 
transmission which is equivalent to a scaling with a nor-
malization factor.
All free model parameters (Table 2) are adjusted on the 
same footing. In a real transmission experiment, the quality 
of low transmission data is very much dependent on the 
knowledge of the measurement background and mostly 
data below an experimental transmission of 0.1 are not 
considered. Therefore, in this contribution we also do not 
include data points with a transmission below 0.1 in the 
parameter adjustment. 
Model
Free  
Parameter
Fixed  
Parameter
Homogenous limit - -
Kopecky s, fh
-
Burrus , p
-
Doub r , p g = 0 740.
Randall , p X = 9 8/
LP , p
-
Table 2: Free and fixed model parameters.
3.1 Polydisperse Spheres 
Two benchmark cases were generated using MC 
 method  1. A f lat par t ic le d iameter d istr ibut ion
0 2mm d mm< <( )  and a log-normal distr ibution 
(with: d = 1 22  and the width parameter  = 0 6. ) were 
used for benchmark cases 1 and 2, respectively. Sampled 
particles were placed in a volume with a thickness of 1 cm 
and a height and width of 4 cm. About 4600 spheres were 
sampled to reach the desired packing fraction of 30%. The 
created geometry was used to evaluate the thickness of 
the particle path along 40000 different transmission paths. 
From the obtained thickness distribution a transmission 
spectrum was created. A 1% uncertainty for transmission 
T = 1 has been associated to the spectrum. The final 
transmission spectrum was then obtained by adding a 
Gaussian fluctuation to the spectrum corresponding to the 
uncertainty. 
In case of Burrus’s model all parameters were found to be 
strongly correlated, therefore an initial uncertainty of the 
packing fraction of 10% was assumed. In case of Randall’s 
model, the parameter X  was chosen to be 9/8 which is in 
principle only correct for monodisperse spheres. Figures 3 
and 4 show the created transmission spectrum for  cases 1 
and 2, respectively, as well as the residual of the parame-
ter adjustments using the different methods. By simply ho-
mogenizing particles and matrix, a significant bias is intro-
duced when adjusting the average areal densities. For 
both cases the bias is up to 5% for 235U and 239Pu and 13% 
for 238U. The other models perform more or less equally. 
They all improve the result of the adjustment significantly 
compared to the homogeneous limit.
3.2 Markovian Geometry 
Two additional benchmark cases (case 3 and 4) were 
created using the second MC method. A mean chord 
length (λA ) of 0.067 cm and 0.267 cm were assumed for 
cases 3 and 4, respectively. 400 different realizations of 
the stochastic geometry were sampled for each case. 
4000 neutron histories per stochastic geometry were 
simulated. Capture and scattering events were taken into 
account by neutron weight reduction. Figure  5 and 
6 show the two created transmission spectra. The trans-
mission deviates in particular in the region close to the 
238U resonances. The uncertainties due to sampling 
range from 0.002 to 0.006 depending on the transmis-
sion. Again, the initial uncertainty of the packing fraction 
of 10% was assumed for Burrus’s model and the param-
eter X  in Randall’s model was assumed to be 9/8. 
Theoretically, the LP model should describe perfectly the 
transmission through a stochastic geometry created by 
MC method 2. This is indeed observed for both cases. 
The nominal densities and the adjusted densities using the 
LP model agree within the uncertainty of the fit. For 
case 3, Doub’s and Randall’s model give relatively good 
results with a bias of less than 1.5%. However, the bias in-
creases for case 4 due to the increased particle size. 
Atomic mixing always leads to an under prediction of the 
areal densities. For case 3, the bias is up to 6% for 235U 
and 239Pu and 12% for 238U. For case 4, this bias increases 
up to 20% for 235U and 239Pu and to 35% for 238U. Even 
though the fitting residual distribution of Kopecky’s or Bur-
rus’s model is more or less flat, both models over predict 
the densities by up to 25% for case 4.
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Figure 5: Created transmission spectrum and residual distribution in benchmark case 3.
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Figure 6: Created transmission spectrum and residual distribution in benchmark case 4.
Sample Thickness  
mm
Solid Powder Nominal Grain Size  
μm
Packing Fraction 
Cu 0.250 x - -
x 500 31% (pure Cu)
x 500 5.1% (Cu-S mix.)
x 150 5.1% (Cu-S mix.)
0.125 x - -
x 500 5.0% (Cu-S mix.)
x 150 5.1% (Cu-S mix.)
W 0.150 x - -
x 50-250 14.5% (W-S mix.)
0.509 x 50-250 17.0% (W-S mix.)
Table 3: Transmission measurements planned at the GELINA facility of EC-JRC-IRMM.
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4.  Experimental Measurement Campaign 
at GELINA
Even though several analytical models can be used to de-
termine accurately the 235U, 238U and 239Pu content by χ2 
minimization in some of the benchmark cases, the question 
whether the MC realization reflects the transmission through 
a real powder sample remains. Therefore, several transmis-
sion measurements with powder samples are being made 
at the GELINA facility [22] of EC-JRC-IRMM. While in previ-
ous measurements of Doub [13], the transmission of ther-
mal neutrons (E < 1.23 eV) through a mixture of boron-car-
bide and a luminium spheres was studied, the 
measurements at EC-JRC-IRMM are dedicated to investi-
gate the transmission at higher energies in the resolved res-
onance range. Samples made out of Cu and W powder 
mixed with S powder are being used. Transmission spectra 
of powder and solid metal samples are compared in order 
to be independent of cross section uncertainties. Table 3 
gives an overview of the planned measurements.
5. Conclusion
Four different stochastic benchmark calculations, simulat-
ing the neutron transport through a powder sample, have 
been made to investigate the sensitivity of a NRD meas-
urement on the inhomogeneity of the sample. Different an-
alytical transport models have been used to determine the 
areal densities of 235U, 238U and 239Pu. It was shown that a 
simple homogenization of particles and matrix can result in 
a significant bias depending on the particle size. Depend-
ing on the benchmark case, several analytical models can 
be used to correctly determine the areal densities, i.e. to 
take into account the inhomogeneity of the sample. Trans-
mission measurements through powder samples are cur-
rently being made at the GELINA facility of EC-JRC-IRMM 
in order to complement the numerical benchmark calcula-
tions. Based on these results an analytical method will be 
implemented in the REFIT code. The developed model 
and code will be used to study the inhomogeneity effect 
quantitatively for various conditions of sample.
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Abstract:
Neutrons can be used as a tool to study properties of ma-
terials and objects. An evolving activity in this field con-
cerns the existence of resonances in neutron induced 
 reaction cross sections. These resonance structures are 
the basis of two analytical methods which have been de-
veloped at the EC – JRC – IRMM: Neutron Resonance 
Capture Analysis (NRCA) and Neutron Resonance Trans-
mission Analysis (NRTA). They have been applied to deter-
mine the elemental composition of archaeological objects 
and to characterize nuclear reference materials. 
A combination of NRTA and NRCA together with Prompt 
Gamma Neutron Analysis, referred to as Neutron Reso-
nance Densitometry (NRD), is being studied as a non- 
destructive method to characterize particle-like debris of 
melted fuel that is formed in severe nuclear accidents such 
as the one which occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nucle-
ar power plants. This study is part of a collaboration 
 between JAEA and EC – JRC – IRMM. 
In this contribution the basic principles of NRTA and 
NRCA are explained based on the experience in the use 
of these methods at the time-of-flight facility GELINA of 
the EC – JRC – IRMM. Specific problems related to the 
analysis of samples resulting from melted fuel are dis-
cussed. The programme to study and solve these prob-
lems is described and results of a first measurement 
campaign at GELINA are given.
Keywords: non-destructive assay; time-of-flight; reso-
nance analysis; melted fuel; severe accidents; nuclear 
safeguards; transmission; capture; GELINA
1. Introduction
The probability that a neutron interacts with nuclei strongly 
depends on the energy of the neutron. This is shown in 
Fig. 1, which compares the total cross section as a func-
tion of the kinetic energy of the interacting neutron for sev-
eral nuclides. The cross sections reveal the presence of 
resonance structures. The origin of these structures is well 
understood. The resonances are related to excited states 
of the compound nucleus which is formed by the neutron 
and the target nucleus. The resonance structured cross 
sections can be parameterized by resonance parameters 
based on the R-matrix nuclear reaction formalism [1]. Each 
resonance is characterized by a set of resonance parame-
ters, in particular the resonance energy and the partial re-
action widths. The partial widths (e.g. the neutron, capture 
and fission width) express the probability for a specific re-
action to occur. The smooth part of the total cross section 
is due to scattering from the nuclear potential and its mag-
nitude depends on the scattering radius. Since resonanc-
es are observed at energies which are specific for each 
nuclide, they can be used as fingerprints to determine the 
elemental and even isotopic composition of materials and 
objects [2,3]. The resonance structures in the total and 
capture cross sections are the basis of Neutron Reso-
nance Transmission (NRTA) and Neutron Resonance Cap-
ture Analysis (NRCA), respectively. Both NRCA and NRTA 
are non-destructive methods, which determine the bulk el-
emental composition, do not require any sample prepara-
tion and result in a negligible residual activation. In this 
contribution the basic principles of NRTA and NRCA are 
discussed, with a special emphasis on the use of NRTA as 
an absolute method to determine the amount of fissile and 
fertile materials for safeguards applications.
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Figure 1: Total cross section as a function of neutron energy for 
neutron induced reactions in 6Li, 27Al, 55Mn, 197Au, 208Pb and 241Am. 
(Figure inspired from Ref. [4]). 
2. Basic principles of NRTA and NRCA
Both NRTA and NRCA are based on the time-of-flight (TOF) 
technique, which is a standard technique for neutron reso-
nance spectroscopy. They rely on the same principles and 
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methods as those used for the determination of cross sec-
tion data in the resonance region. These principles and 
methods, including the production of full covariance data, 
have been reviewed recently in Ref. [5]. NRTA is based on 
the analysis of characteristic dips in a transmission spec-
trum that can be obtained from a measurement of the at-
tenuation of the neutron beam by a sample [2,3]. These dips 
are observed at TOF values corresponding to resonance 
energies. NRCA refers to the analysis of resonance struc-
tures in TOF spectra obtained from the detection of prompt 
γ-rays, which are emitted after a neutron capture reaction in 
the sample [2,3]. In Ref. [6] a comparison of NRCA and 
PGAA (Prompt Gamma-ray Activation Analysis), which is 
also based on the detection of prompt γ-rays, is reported.
2.1 Time-of-flight measurements
A precise knowledge of the energy of the neutron inducing 
a reaction in the sample is required to make use of the res-
onance structure in neutron induced reaction cross sec-
tions for material analysis. For a quantitative analysis cover-
ing a wide range of elements, time-of-flight measurements 
at an accelerator-based pulsed white neutron source are 
preferred. Pulsed neutron sources can be realized using 
electron- and proton-based accelerators. In electron-based 
accelerators, high-energy electrons generate Bremsstrahl-
ung in a target and neutrons are produced via photonu-
clear reactions. High-energy proton accelerators produce 
neutrons via the spallation process in a target made out of 
high mass number material. The energy spectrum of neu-
trons produced by photonuclear reactions or the spallation 
process is not directly exploitable for low energy resonance 
spectroscopy. Therefore, a moderator containing e.g. 
 hydrogen rich material is used to increase the amount of 
low-energy neutrons and to produce a broad neutron 
spectrum ranging from thermal energies up to the high en-
ergy region. 
Experimentally, the time-of-flight tm is derived from the dif-
ference between a stop (Ts) and a start signal (T0). The start 
signal is produced by the pulsed charged particle beam. 
The stop signal in a transmission experiment (NRTA) is 
provided by the neutron detector. In a capture experiment 
(NRCA) the arrival time is obtained from the detection of 
the γ-ray which are emitted in the neutron induced reac-
tion. The time-of-flight t that a neutron needs to travel a 
distance L can be related to the velocity v of the neutron at 
the moment it leaves the neutron producing target and en-
ters the detector or sample:
v L
t
L
t t tm t d
= =
− +( ) ( )1
where tt is the time the neutron spends in the neutron 
producing target and td  the time spent in the neutron de-
tector or sample. The kinetic energy of the neutron E is 
given by:
E mc= −( ) ( )2 1 2
where c denotes the speed of light, m the rest mass of the 
neutron and γ the Lorentz factor. 
The resolution Dt is a combination of the broadening 
due to the f inite width of the timing channels and 
the spread due to the time the neutrons spend in the 
source and detector. The resolution (ΔE ) can be de-
scribed by the broadening due to both the time-of-flight 
(Δt) and the distance (ΔL):

 
E
E L
v t L= + ( )1 32 2( ) .
Eq. 3 shows that the resolution improves with increasing 
distance. The use of Eq. 3 supposes that the time and 
distance follow a Gaussian distribution and that they are 
not correlated. For the analysis of the data the response 
function of the TOF-spectrometer is required. This re-
sponse function is a convolution of different compo-
nents, which are not all Gaussian distributions [5]. The 
distance L can be determined by metric measurements 
with an uncertainty smaller than 1 mm. The contribution 
Dt due to the time-of-flight depends on the broadening 
(uncertainty) of T0,Ts, tt and td. In case of a moderated 
neutron beam, the broadening in time is dominated by 
the neutron transport in the target-moderator assembly, 
i.e. the component tt. This component is mostly repre-
sented by introducing an equivalent distance Lt, as dis-
cussed in Ref. [5]. Response functions for TOF meas-
urements at a facility based on a spallation source are 
broader compared to those for measurements at a pho-
tonuclear source at the same distance as shown in Ref. 
[3,5]. In addition, a more pronounced tail at long TOF 
values is observed. This difference is mainly due to the 
geometry of the target-moderator assembly, which is 
more compact for a neutron source based on photonu-
clear reactions.
Since the neutron flux decreases with increasing distance 
a compromise between resolution and intensity has to be 
made.
2.2 NRTA
In a transmission (or NRTA) measurement the observed 
quantity is the fraction of the neutron beam that traverses 
the sample without any interaction. For a parallel neutron 
beam which is perpendicular to a slab of material, this 
fraction or transmission T is given by:
T =
∑−
e k
k tot kn ,
( )

4
where σ tot k,  is the Doppler broadened total cross section 
and nk is the number of atoms per unit area of nuclide k. 
Experimentally the transmission Texp is obtained from the 
ratio of the counts of a sample-in measurement Cin and a 
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sample-out measurement Cout, after subtraction of the 
background contributions Bin and Bout, respectively: 
T
C B
C Bexp
in in
out out
=
−
−
( )5 .
The spectra in Eq. 5 are corrected for losses due to the 
dead time of the detector and electronics chain. All spec-
tra are normalized to the same intensity of the neutron 
beam and TOF-bin width. The background is determined 
by an analytical expression applying the black resonance 
technique [5]. For this technique, samples of elements with 
strong absorption resonances (referred to as black reso-
nance filters) are inserted into the beam. The free parame-
ters in the analytical expression are determined by a least 
squares fit to saturated resonance dips observed in the 
TOF spectra, which result from measurements with black 
resonance filters. To account for the impact of the sample 
on the background, measurements are carried out with at 
least one fixed black resonance filter in the beam. A more 
detailed discussion on the background determination and 
the analytical expressions can be found in Ref. [5]. 
Eq. 5 reveals that the experimental transmission is inde-
pendent of both the detector efficiency and incoming neu-
tron flux. Therefore, a transmission measurement can be 
considered as an absolute measurement which does not 
require additional calibration experiments or any reference 
to a standard cross section [7]. In addition, the experimen-
tal observable Texp (Eq. 5) is a direct measure of the theo-
retical transmission (Eq. 4) if the measurements are per-
formed in a good transmission geometry, which is [5]:
• the sample is perpendicular with respect to a parallel in-
coming neutron beam;
• all neutrons that are detected have passed through the 
sample; and
• neutrons scattered by the sample are not detected.
The conditions of an ideal or good transmission geometry 
can be achieved by a proper collimation of the neutron 
beam at the sample and detector position. However, it re-
quires a homogeneous sample which does not contain 
holes. In case of inhomogeneous samples a special pro-
cedure is required, as shown in Ref. [5,8].
2.3 NRCA
The observable in a capture (or NRCA) experiment is the 
fraction of the incident neutron beam undergoing a cap-
ture reaction in the sample. The theoretical capture yield Yγ 
resulting from a capture reaction can be expressed as a 
sum of primary Y0,k and multiple interaction events Ym,k:
Y Y Y
k
k m k = +( ) ( )∑ 0 6, , .
The latter are due to a capture reaction after at least one 
neutron scattering event in the sample. For a parallel uni-
form neutron beam and a homogeneous slab of material 
perpendicular to the beam, the primary capture yield Y0,k 
resulting from a capture reaction by nuclide k is given by:
Y e
n
n
k
n k k
j tot jj
j tot jj
0 1 7,
,
,
, ( )= − ∑( )− ∑
 

where ,k  is the Doppler broadened capture cross sec-
tion. Only in case of very thin samples and/or small cross 
sections, the capture yield is directly proportional to the 
product of the areal density nk  and capture cross section. 
For relative thick samples, multiple interaction events have 
a substantial contribution to the yield and complicate the 
analysis as demonstrated in Refs. [2,3].
In a capture (or NRCA) experiment the prompt γ-rays, 
which are emitted after a neutron capture reaction in the 
sample are detected. The experimental quantity, which 
can be obtained from such an experiment and related to 
the theoretical capture yield, is the experimental yield Yexp. 
This yield is derived from:
Y
C B
P Aexp
=
−
( ) 
  
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where Cγ and Bγ are the observed dead time corrected 
sample and background spectra, respectively; j is the in-
cident neutron flux; A is the effective area of the sample 
seen by the neutron beam; Pγ is the probability that the 
prompt γ-rays escape from the sample; W is the solid an-
gle between sample and detector and e is the probability 
to detect at least one γ-ray created in the capture event. To 
estimate the background, additional measurements with-
out a sample in the beam and with a pure scattering sam-
ple (e.g. a carbon or 208Pb sample, which have a low cap-
ture cross section) are performed. A detailed discussion 
on the background determination is given in Ref. [5].
Eq. 8 reveals that the experimental observable in a NRCA 
experiment is much more complicated compared to the 
one obtained from a NRTA experiment. The yield Yexp can 
only be derived from the observed response once the in-
coming neutron flux and quantities which are related to 
the detection of the prompt γ-rays are known. Moreover, 
in most cases only the solid angle and effective area are 
independent of the energy of the incident neutron. The 
energy dependent neutron flux can be determined by 
measurement of a neutron standard reaction [5,7]. The 
efficiency to detect at least one γ-ray depends on the 
technique that is applied to measure the prompt γ-rays. 
Ideally, a detection system is used with an efficiency that 
is independent of the γ-ray cascade, i.e. independent of 
multiplicity and energy spectrum. Such a system can be 
realized by a total absorption detector with an almost 
100% efficiency or by applying the total energy detection 
principle, so that the detection efficiency becomes pro-
portional to the total γ-ray energy produced in the cap-
ture event [9]. More details about such systems can be 
found in Ref. [5].
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2.4 Data analysis
The areal densities of the nuclides present in the sample 
can be derived by a least squares adjustment, that is by 
minimizing the expression [5]:
 

2 1
9
= ( ) −( )
( ) −( )
−Z t Z t V
Z t Z t
exp m M m
T
Z
exp m M m
exp
( , )
( , ) ( )


where Z tM m( , )

  is a model describing the experimental 
observable Z texp m( ) . The theoretical estimate is the result 
of a folding to account for the response function R t Em,( )  
of the TOF spectrometer:
Z t
R t E Z E dE
R t E dE
M m
m
m
,
, ,
,




( ) =
( ) ( )
( )
( )∫ ∫ 10
The theoretical model Z tM m( , )

  depends on parameters   
  = ( , ) , which is a combination of resonance parame-
ters and experimental parameters, represented by the 
vectors 

 and 

, respectively. The resonance parame-
ters 

 are used to parameterize the cross sections by 
the R-matrix theory. The experimental parameters 

 in-
clude e.g. the detector and sample characteristics includ-
ing sample temperature and the areal densities of the nu-
clides present in the sample. 
The least squares adjustment can be performed by a reso-
nance shape analysis (RSA) code, such as REFIT [10]. This 
code, which has been developed to parameterize cross 
section data in terms of resonance parameters, is based 
on the Reich-Moore approximation [11] of the R-Matrix for-
malism. It accounts for various experimental effects such 
as sample inhomogeneities, self-shielding and multiple in-
teraction events, Doppler broadening, and the response of 
the TOF spectrometer and detectors. For the analysis of 
capture data special modules are included to correct for 
γ-ray attenuation in the sample and for the neutron sensitiv-
ity of capture detection systems [5]. Examples of the use of 
REFIT for NRTA and NRCA are given in Refs. [3,12,13]. 
3. NRTA and NRCA at GELINA 
The Geel Electron LINear Accelerator (GELINA) of the EC-
JRC-IRMM offers a pulsed white neutron source with an 
energy range from 10 meV to 20 MeV. A detailed descrip-
tion of the accelerator and its neutron producing target can 
be found in Ref. [14]. The main unit is a linear electron ac-
celerator delivering very short electron pulses with energies 
up to 150 MeV and a maximum repetition frequency of 
800 Hz. Electron bunches, with peak currents of 12 A in a 
10 ns time interval, are compressed by a post-acceleration 
compression magnet to a width of less than 1 ns. The high-
energy electrons generate Bremsstrahlung in a mercury-
cooled rotating uranium target, where neutrons are 
produced by (γ,n) and (γ,f) reactions. To produce a neutron 
spectrum in the low-energy region, neutrons are slowed 
down in two 4-cm thick Be-containers filled with water and 
positioned above and below the uranium disk. Using suita-
ble shielding materials in the target room, either the direct 
(fast) neutron spectrum with good time resolution may be 
used, or the moderated (slow) neutron spectrum. Most of 
the NRTA and NRCA measurements at GELINA are per-
formed with a moderated neutron beam. To reduce the 
γ-ray flash and the fast neutron component a Cu and Pb 
shadow bar is placed close to the uranium target. The total 
neutron intensity is monitored by two BF3 proportional 
counters located in the concrete ceiling of the target hall.
Transmission experiments in good transmission geometry 
can be performed at a 25 m and a 50 m measurement 
station using Li-glass scintillators as neutron detectors. 
The samples are placed in an automatic sample changer, 
which is positioned half-way between the detector and 
neutron producing target. Mostly measurements are per-
formed with the accelerator operated at 800 Hz and a 10B 
overlap filter is used to eliminate neutrons from a previous 
burst. At 25 m also measurement with a low operating fre-
quency (100 Hz or 400 Hz) and a Cd overlap filter are car-
ried out to investigate materials using low-energy reso-
nances. At 25 m a NE905 Li-glass scintillator enriched to 
95% in 6Li is used. The scintillator (110.0 mm diameter and 
12.7 mm thick) is placed in a thin-walled aluminium can 
and viewed by EMI9823-QKB photomultipliers (PMT). The 
detector at the 50 m station is a 6.35-mm thick and 101.6-
mm diameter NE912 Li-glass scintillator, which is enriched 
to 95 % in 6Li and viewed by one PMT. 
Three measurement stations at 12.5 m, 30 m and 60 m dis-
tance from the neutron target can be used for the charac-
terization of materials by NRCA. Depending on the elements 
of interest the accelerator is operated at 100 Hz, 400 Hz 
and 800 Hz using a Cd or 10B overlap filter. The moderated 
neutron beam at the stations is collimated to about 75 mm 
diameter at the sample position. The detection system 
(i.e. γ-ray detectors, neutron flux detector, electronics and 
data acquisition system) are similar. The γ-rays are detected 
by C6D6 detectors. The energy dependent neutron spec-
trum is measured in parallel with a 10B Frisch-gridded ioniza-
tion chamber placed at about 80 cm before the sample. A 
double chamber is used with a cathode loaded with two 
back-to-back layers of 10B. The chambers are operated with 
a continuous flow of a mixture of argon (90%) and methane 
(10 %) at atmospheric pressure.
NRTA and NRCA have been applied at GELINA for the 
characterization of reference samples for neutron induced 
reaction cross section measurements [12,13] and to study 
objects of cultural heritage interest [15–18]. Most of the ar-
chaeological applications so far are related to copper-alloy 
artefacts. Apart from Cu, they contain Sn or Zn as other 
major elements, and As, Ag, Sb, Co, Fe and In as minor or 
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Figure 2: Transmission through a 2.5 cm thick sample with a composition that is similar to spent fuel. The contribution of the 
 different nuclides present is illustrated by plotting separately the transmission due to the presence of only the fission products (FP); 
241,243Am; 234,236,238U; 235U; 240,242Pu; and 239,241Pu.
trace elements. In the course of several years NRCA has 
been extensively exploited to study various bronze objects 
of different origin: Etruscan statuettes [15], prehistoric 
bronze axes [16], Bronze-Age swords [17] and Roman 
metal objects like parts of water taps [18]. 
By using a position sensitive neutron detector (PSND) 
NRTA can be extended to have imaging capabilities. 
Therefore, a pixelated PSND was developed at the Ruther-
ford Appleton Laboratory (UK) [19]. The PSND consists of 
100 Li-glass crystals arranged in a 10 x 10 array. Each pix-
el is embedded in a support made of boron nitrate and 
coupled via a 0.5 mm thick glass disperser to a bundle of 
four 1-mm diameter acrylic optical fibres which transport 
the light to a 16-channel PMT. The prototype detector was 
characterized at GELINA [3,20]. When performing Neutron 
Resonance Transmission Imaging (NRTI) with a PSND, the 
ideal transmission geometry can not be fulfilled. Therefore 
special data reduction procedures have been defined 
based on measurements at GELINA. They are needed to 
assess the contribution of neutrons scattered in the sam-
ple to the background, as discussed in Ref. [20]. Examples 
of imaging measurements carried out at the ISIS facility 
are given in Refs. [3,20]. 
4.  Characterization of melted fuel by Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry
Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) is being investigat-
ed as a method to quantify special nuclear material (SNM) in 
particle-like debris of melted fuel formed in severe nuclear 
accidents [21]. Characterization of such debris will be re-
quired for safeguards material accountancy at the time of 
removal of melted fuel resulting from the accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. NRD relies on the 
use of NRTA together with NRCA combined with PGAA. 
The quantification of plutonium and uranium will rely on 
NRTA. NRCA combined with PGAA, using a well-type LaBr3 
detector, will be applied to determine the presence of impu-
rities. In contrast to fresh or spent fuel, information about 
the elemental and isotopic composition of melted fuel 
formed after a severe nuclear accident is rather scarce. It is 
expected that the melted fuel will contain water, boron, 
concrete and structural materials. However, the corre-
sponding elemental (and isotopic) composition cannot be 
predicted. The detection of specific prompt γ-rays can be 
used to identify the presence of nuclides which do not have 
resonances in the low-energy region (e.g. 10B, 28Si, 56Fe, 53Cr 
and 58Ni) and cannot be identified by NRTA.
The potential of NRTA for the characterization of fresh and 
spent fuel pins has already been demonstrated in Refs. [22, 
23]. However, an accurate quantification of the amount of 
SNM in debris of melted fuel is much more complex. It re-
quires a good understanding of the measurement process 
such that all components affecting the data are identified. 
The main sources of systematic effects are related to the 
specific characteristics of the samples, in particular, the 
sample inhomogeneity, particle size distribution, presence of 
neutron absorbing impurities, the total radioactivity and sam-
ple temperature. The complexity of the problem is illustrated 
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in Figures 2-6. For the production of Figures 2-5 the re-
sponse function of the TOF-spectrometer was approximated 
by a Gaussian distribution of the equivalent distance with a 
FWHM of 2.5 cm, independent of the neutron energy.
In Fig. 2 the theoretical transmission as a function of neutron 
energy through a 2.5-cm thick sample is given. The compo-
sition of the sample, which is typical for spent fuel, was tak-
en from Ref. [23]. The transmission is calculated for an ideal 
transmission geometry with the sample at 400 K and the 
detector placed at 10 m distance from the source. The con-
tribution of the different nuclides present in the sample is il-
lustrated by plotting separately the transmission due to the 
presence of only the fission products (i.e. 99Tc, 131Xe, 133Cs, 
145Nd, 152Sm); 241,243Am; 234,236,238U; 235U; 240,242Pu; and 239,241Pu. 
This figure illustrates that the determination of the amount of 
the fissile material is hampered by overlapping resonances 
due to the presence of the fission products, Am and the 
even U- and Pu-isotopes. Hence, the accuracy of the 
amount of fissile material will depend on the quality of the 
resonance parameters of the overlapping resonances. The 
dips corresponding to the strong s-wave resonances of 238U 
can be used to monitor the background level. However, ad-
ditional studies are required to verify if the wings of trans-
mission profiles of saturated resonances can be used to ex-
tract information about the 238U content. 
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Figure 3: Transmission through a 2.5 cm thick sample with a 
composition that is similar to spent fuel. The transmission is given 
for the sample at 0 K, 300 K and 400 K. 
70 75 80 85 90
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
    5 m
  10 m
  60 m
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
Neutron energy / eV
Figure 4: Transmission through a 2.5 cm thick sample with a 
composition that is similar to spent fuel. The transmission is given 
for the detector at a distance of 5 m, 10 m and 60 m. 
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Figure 5: Transmission through a 2.5 cm thick sample with a 
composition that is similar to spent fuel and with different amounts 
of 10B (0, 0.1, 1 and 10 wt%).
For a correct quantitative interpretation of the data, the 
broadening of observed profiles due to both the Doppler 
effect and the response of the TOF spectrometer has to be 
taken into account. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 where the 
transmissions are shown for the sample at 0 K, 300 K and 
400 K and in Fig. 4 where the transmissions recorded with 
a detector at 5 m, 10 m and 60 m distance from the neu-
tron source are compared.
Due to the large absorption cross section of the 10B(n,a) 
reaction in the low-energy region, the presence of boron 
will strongly influence the observed transmission. The at-
tenuation of the neutron beam due to the presence of 10B 
is illustrated in Fig. 5 for different relative amounts of 10B 
in the sample. This additional attenuation does not only 
affect the base-line but also the area of the resonance 
dip. Therefore, it has to be taken into account in the anal-
ysis. Unfortunately, light elements such as 10B do not 
have resonances in the low-energy and special proce-
dures are required to account for the presence of light 
matrix material. 
One of the main difficulties for a correct interpretation of 
the transmission is the variety in size and shape of the par-
ticle-like debris. This can be concluded from results of 
transmission measurements using a PuO2 pressed pow-
der sample enriched to 99.93 wt% in 242Pu that was mixed 
with carbon powder and canned in a cupper container [8]. 
The measurements were performed at GELINA with the 
sample at 77 K and 300 K. In Fig. 6 the experimental 
transmissions are shown together with the results of a res-
onance analysis. In the analysis the areal density was ad-
justed and the resonance parameters were fixed to those 
recommended in the JEFF 3.1.2 evaluated data library. The 
areal density was derived in a fit to the experimental data 
supposing that the sample was completely homogeneous 
and by introducing an empirical macroscopic model that 
accounts for the sample inhomogeneities. This model, 
proposed by Kopecky et al. [8], includes a log-normal dis-
tribution describing the variation in areal density and a pa-
rameter reflecting the fraction of holes in the sample. The 
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Figure 6: Transmission as a function of neutron energy for a PuO2 powder sample enriched in 
242Pu and mixed with carbon powder. The 
transmission is given for the sample at 77 K and 300 K. Results of a fit to the data to determine the areal density of 242Pu are given in case 
of a homogeneous sample and of a inhomogeneous sample. 
results are given in Table 1 and should be compared with 
the areal density 2.51 10-5 at/b that was derived from 
weighing and a measurement of the area of the pressed 
pellet. The data in Table 1 show that there is a strong dif-
ference between the areal density which is derived from a 
fit with and without accounting for the sample inhomoge-
neities. Supposing a homogeneous sample the areal den-
sity resulting from NRTA is biased to lower values. The val-
ues at 77 K and 300 K derived by including an areal 
density and a holes fraction are fully consistent with 
2.51 10-5 at/b. In addition, the residuals in Fig. 6 demon-
strate that the quality of the fit improves significantly when 
the powder grain size and fraction of holes in the sample 
are included. The improved quality is observed for both 
the 77 K and 300 K data. 
Areal density 242Pu  
at/b
77 K 300 K
Homogeneous 1.65 10-5 1.79 10-5
Inhomogeneous 2.49 10-5 2.47 10-5
Table 1: Areal density of 242Pu in a powder determined by NRTA 
for a homogeneous and inhomogeneous distribution of the areal 
density (uncertainty due to counting statistics: 4 10-8 at/b) 
5. NRD development at GELINA
To study the systematic effects mentioned in section 4, 
the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the Joint 
Research Centre of  the European Commiss ion 
(EC - JRC) started a collaboration. In this collaboration 
various aspects in the development of NRD, from basic 
measurement principles up to detector and accelerator 
development, are included. One of the most important 
activities is the study of the influence of the sample 
characteristics in order to improve the analysis proce-
dures and to define target values with realistic uncer-
tainties. This study includes the development of theoret-
ical models to account for sample inhomogeneities and 
strongly relies on measurements performed at GELINA. 
The experimental data will be used to validate theoreti-
cal models, to improve relevant nuclear data if needed, 
to determine reference spectra and to define perfor-
mance values. In addition, the resonance shape 
analysis code REFIT [9] will be modified and adapted to 
the needs of NRD. 
Several measurement campaigns are scheduled at GELI-
NA using samples which are dedicated to a specific part 
of the problem. Measurements on pure Cu metal discs 
with different thicknesses at the 25 m station will be per-
formed to study the accuracy of NRTA in case of homoge-
neous samples. The results of these measurements will be 
used to study the influence of the resonance characteris-
tics (i.e. resonance strength) and to verify if from the wings 
of transmission profiles of saturated resonance reliable in-
formation can be extracted. In addition, measurements 
with boron and lithium samples added to the Cu discs will 
be carried out to define a method to account for the pres-
ence of matrix material which does not have resonances in 
the low-energy region. These measurements have already 
been completed and the analysis of the data is in pro-
gress. Parts of the data are shown in Fig. 7 and 8. 
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In another contribution to the 2013 ESARDA Symposium 
different models to account for the density variation in 
powder samples are described [24]. The performance of 
the models has been compared using results of stochastic 
numerical simulations as a reference. This comparison will 
be complemented with experimental data. The data result 
from transmission measurements using pure metal Cu and 
W samples and samples made out of Cu and W powder 
mixed with S powder. The experiments are in progress 
and will be finished by July 2013. 
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Figure 7: Experimental transmission around the 580 eV reso-
nance through Cu discs with different thickness.
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Figure 8: Experimental transmission around the 580 eV and 230 
eV resonance through a 0.7 mm thick Cu disc with and without a 
2.3 mm thick B4C disc. 
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Figure 9: Theoretical transmission through a Ag-In-Zr-Fe-Cr alloy 
sample (1 mm and 5 mm thick).
Element at. % wt. %
Ag 55.0 59.7
Zr 39.9 36.6
In 1.4 1.7
Fe 2.7 1.5
Cr 1.0 0.5
Table 2: Elemental composition of the alloy used as non-radio-
active alternative for a melted fuel sample. 
For a final validation of the models an alloy consisting of 
Ag, In, Zr, Fe and Cr has been defined and is being pro-
duced. The elemental composition of the alloy is given in 
Table 2. Considering the resonance characteristics and 
material properties, Ag and In have been chosen to re-
place the role of U and Pu, respectively. Two homogene-
ous discs with a nominal thickness of 1 and 5 mm will be 
made. In addition, the remaining cast material will be used 
to produce samples that are similar in shape as the debris 
of the melted fuel. A simulation of the transmission through 
the 1 mm and 5 mm homogeneous disc is shown in Fig. 9. 
The transmission measurements will be performed at dif-
ferent sample temperatures.
6. Summary
A method, referred to as Neutron Resonance Densitome-
try, has been presented. The method, which relies on the 
appearance of resonance structures in neutron induced 
reaction cross section, is being developed for the charac-
terization of melted fuel that is formed after a severe nucle-
ar accident. The basic principles have been explained and 
special problems related to measurements of particle-like 
debris have been presented. In addition, the programme 
to study these problems, to develop dedicated analysis 
procedures and to assess the performance of NRD has 
been discussed. This R&D programme, which is part of a 
collaboration between JAEA and EURATOM, strongly re-
lies on measurements at the time-of-flight facility GELINA 
installed at the EC-JRC-IRMM.
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Abstract:
Neutron multiplicity measurement techniques are a power-
ful nondestructive assay tool for the quantification of pluto-
nium and uranium. One of the main limitations of this tech-
nique is the ability to quantify the content of a sample 
which contains more than one actinide. The ability of in-
spection agencies and facility operators to measure pow-
ders containing several actinides is increasingly necessary 
as new reprocessing techniques and fuel forms are being 
developed. These powders are difficult to measure with 
current techniques because neutrons emitted from in-
duced and spontaneous fission of different nuclides are 
very similar. Over the past four years at the Nuclear Securi-
ty Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI), at Texas A&M Uni-
versity, a neutron multiplicity technique based on first prin-
ciple methods was developed to measure these powders 
by exploiting isotope-specific nuclear properties, such as 
the energy-dependent fission cross sections and the neu-
tron induced fission neutron multiplicity. This technique 
was tested by three measurement campaigns using the 
Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and Epithermal 
Neutron Multiplicity Counter (ENMC) with various (α,n) 
sources and measured materials. To complement these 
measurements, extensive Monte Carlo N Particle eXtend-
ed (MCNPX) simulations were performed for each meas-
ured sample, as well as for samples which were not availa-
ble to measure. Four potential applications of this 
technique have been identified: measurements of U, Np, 
Pu, and Am materials, mixed oxide (MOX) materials, and 
uranium materials, as well as weapons verification in arms 
control agreements. This technique still has several chal-
lenges which need to be overcome, the largest of these 
being the ability to produce results with acceptably small 
uncertainties.
Keywords: Neutron Multiplicity Counting; Epithermal Neu-
tron Multiplicity Counter (ENMC); Monte Carlo N Particle 
eXtended (MCNPX); First Principle Methods; Nondestruc-
tive Assay
1. Introduction
Neutron multiplicity counting is a well developed technique 
which is commonly used to quantify nuclear materials. The 
three primary materials that are measured with this 
technique are: plutonium in plutonium samples, plutonium 
in mixed oxide (MOX) samples, and 235U in uranium sam-
ples. Although these materials currently represent the ma-
jority of unirradiated nuclear materials which are safe-
guarded, there is a growing need to develop techniques to 
measure more complex materials. As new reprocessing 
methods [1][2] and fuel forms [3-8] are developed, the abil-
ity to perform neutron multiplicity measurements on mate-
rials which contain other actinides, including neptunium 
and americium, are becoming increasing important. In ad-
dition to measuring more complex materials, there is an 
additional need to redevelop the equations and theory of 
active neutron multiplicity counting to increase the possi-
ble applications for this technique. By moving from an ac-
tive measurement technique which requires known stand-
ards of similar composition and geometry to a method 
which is based on first principles, a wider range of materi-
als can be measured.
2. Theory
Active neutron coincidence counting is currently per-
formed by interrogating the measurement sample with 
neutrons from an (α,n) source, such as americium-lithium 
(AmLi) [9]. Because neutrons created from (α,n) reactions 
are created individually they have a minimal impact on the 
doubles count rate. Instead of using the detector’s corre-
lated count rates to solve for sample related variables, 
the doubles count rate is often compared to doubles 
count rates of similar known standards. Through interpo-
lation the mass of the measured sample can be estimat-
ed. The main disadvantage of this technique is that it re-
quires known standards of similar composition and 
geometry, which may not always be available. Methods 
have been developed, such as the coupling method, to 
move from a known standards approach to one which in-
corporates first principle equations, however, these meth-
ods still rely on known standards [9][10]. The reason why 
the point-model equations do not work for active meas-
urements is that with current measurement systems the 
point-model assumptions are violated. In particular, the 
assumption that the source of neutrons from the sample 
can be modelled as a point in space is not rigorously cor-
rect. Although neutrons with high energies can penetrate 
thick actinide materials, thus creating homogeneous 
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fission rates within them, neutrons which have been 
slowed down to epithermal energies are absorbed in ac-
tinide materials due to capture and fission resonances. 
These fission resonances cause the majority of fissions 
to occur on the surface of the measurement sample, [11], 
thus creating a heterogeneous fission rate and violating 
the point-model assumptions.
One solution to the problems caused by epithermal neu-
trons is to prevent them from entering the measurement 
sample. This can be achieved by surrounding the meas-
urement sample in high content 10B material, such as bo-
ron carbide (B4C). After ensuring that the fission rate in the 
sample is homogeneous the following first principle equa-
tions can be used:
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where DLi is the doubles count rate from the AmLi meas-
urement, DPassive is the doubles count rate from the passive 
measurement, 239Pueff_Li is the effective mass of 
239Pu in the 
sample that would produce the same AmLi doubles count 
rate as the complete sample, ε is the detector efficiency, fd 
is the doubles gate fraction, ML is the leakage self-multipli-
cation of the item, νLi1 is the first moment of induced fission 
for neutrons with an AmLi energy spectrum, νLi2 is the sec-
ond moment of induced fission for neutrons with an AmLi 
energy spectrum, νFis1 is the first moment of induced fis-
sion for neutrons with a fission energy spectrum, and νFis2 
is the second moment of induced fission for neutrons with 
a fission energy spectrum. Equation 1 is analogous to 
spontaneous fission, but acknowledges that the initiating 
fission source is induced fission from an AmLi neutron 
source.
Because Fo, the specific fission rate, is based on the in-
duced fission rate and not the spontaneous fission rate, it 
cannot be treated as a constant. Fo can instead be solved 
for using: 
 F0 =
 Li f Li A
molar
N
M
_  (2)
where ϕLi is the neutron flux within the sample during an 
AmLi measurement, σf_Li is the average 
239Pu microscopic 
fission cross section for neutrons with an AmLi energy 
spectrum, NA is Avogadro’s Number, and Mmolar is the mo-
lar mass of the effective mass isotope (approximately 239 
amu in this example).
The neutron flux, ϕLi, and the average fission cross section, 
σf_Li, can be approximated as constants and determined 
through computer simulations, for a given detector system. 
Because these values are fairly independent of the sample 
being measured, a generic geometry and sample compo-
sition may be used in the simulations.
Similar to the point-model equations, Eq. (1) is not directly 
useable. By combining Eq. (1) and (2) and rearranging 
terms we acquire:
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Analogous to passive neutron coincidence counting, an 
equation relating the 239Pueff mass to elemental masses 
can be created. This equation includes not just those iso-
topes of plutonium and uranium, but of neptunium and 
americium as well:
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where Ck_Li is an equivalent worth constant for a AmLi 
measurement for isotope k and mk is the mass of isotope k 
in the sample.
The constants, Ck_Li, can be determined by using a ratio of 
nuclear properties of the effective isotope [12]:
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where k represents the isotope of interest.
3. Measurements and simulations
In order to test the first principle measurement method 
a series of measurement campaigns were conducted at 
the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy and Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico, 
USA. These campaigns included measurements with 
the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) [13] and 
Epithermal Neutron Multiplicity Counter (ENMC) [14][15] 
in both passive and active modes. Americium-beryllium 
(AmBe), plutonium-boron (PuB), and AmLi were all con-
sidered as (α,n) interrogation sources, with AmBe being 
rejected due to its significant internal (n,2n) reaction 
rate. A wide variety of nuclear materials were measured 
including: metals, powders, and ceramics; masses in 
the range of 5g – 170g; and isotopic compositions rang-
ing from depleted uranium to High Enriched Uranium 
(HEU) and reactor grade to weapons grade plutonium 
[16-21]. Each measurement consisted of 60 – 90 cycles 
at 60  seconds per cycle. The detector response for 
each measurement was analyzed using the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Neutron Co-
incidence Counting (INCC) software program in rates-
only mode to determine the singles, doubles, and triples 
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Item
Pu  
[g]
238Pu  
[wt.%]
239Pu  
[wt.%]
240Pu  
[wt.%]
241Pu  
[wt.%]
242Pu  
[wt.%]
241Am  
[g]
STDIS03 10.96 0.0053 96.3504 3.5566 0.0328 0.0182 0.010
STDIS09 11.85 0.0175 92.7957 6.8863 0.1216 0.0734 0.036
STDIS12 20.09 0.0481 87.4464 11.8503 0.2787 0.2228 0.158
CBNM-Pu61 5.45 1.0319 65.7930 26.6912 2.0697 4.4143 0.344
STD11 59.74 0.0228 92.7048 6.6156 0.0741 0.5827 0.202
LAO250C10 59.36 0.0470 82.9792 16.3044 0.3318 0.3376 0.621
Table 1: Mass and isotopic composition of the plutonium standards measured at LANL.
count rates with statistical uncertainties [22][23]. Each 
measurement performed was simulated in Monte Carlo 
N Particle eXtended (MCNPX) to validate the MCNPX 
models. The AmBe neutron spectrum used was that of 
Cody Peeples [24], the PuB spectrum was determined 
from Sources4C [25], and the AmLi neutron spectrum 
was that of Geiger and Van der Zwan [26]. The number 
of histories run in each MCNPX simulation varied from 
20 MegaHistories (20 MH or 20 million active histories) 
to 300 MH, depending on the measurement type being 
modelled. Both F4 and F8 MCNPX capture gated tallies 
were used to determine the neutron flux in the measure-
ment sample and the correlated count rates in the 3He 
tubes. MCNPX pulse train p-track data was not used for 
the simulation calculations. 
In order to prevent epithermal neutrons from entering the 
measurement sample, a B4C cylinder was manufactured 
with two cylindrical plates for the top and bottom. The B4C 
had an inner diameter of 130 mm, inner height of 170 mm, 
and a thickness of 25 mm on all sides. These dimensions 
were chosen based on (1) the size of the ENMC measure-
ment cavity, (2) the size of the nuclear standards to be 
measured, and (3) the epithermal absorption capabilities of 
the B4C. The boron isotopic composition was that of natu-
ral boron.
Measurements of various plutonium standards, shown in 
Table 1, were performed using the ENMC in a passive, ac-
tive AmLi, and active PuB mode. The 239Pueff values calcu-
lated from Eq. (3) and (4) were determined for the meas-
ured, simulated, and declared data.
The AmLi and PuB results had similar trends, with excel-
lent agreement between the simulated and declared, 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. This implies that the assay 
methodology could be both accurate and precise. The re-
sults from the measured data are harder to interpret due 
to the large measurement uncertainties. The large uncer-
tainties come from Eq. (3) in which the passive and active 
doubles count rates are subtracted from each other. Be-
cause these two count rates are of similar magnitude their 
resultant subtraction is a small value with a large uncer-
tainty. The uncertainties in Dpassive and DLi were both calcu-
lated by INCC which compares mean values for each cy-
cle in the measurement to estimate a 1-σ (68% confidence 
interval) uncertainty. Performing longer measurements is 
not an ideal practical solution since this data was ac-
quired with 1 hour measurements of the samples and 
overnight measurements of the background. A potential 
solution would be to increase the difference between 
these two count rates by increasing the AmLi source 
strength. Active measurements which have a large back-
ground source, such as the spontaneous fission neutrons 
from plutonium, can benefit from a stronger interrogation 
source [13]. Simulations were performed to quantify this 
potential solution. The AmLi source strength was varied 
over the ranged of 5x103 to 1x107 n/s per AmLi source. 
The AmLi source strength used in the measurements was 
5x104 n/s for each AmLi source. From the results shown in 
Table 2, it can be seen that for the larger mass plutonium 
standards, STD11 and LAO250C10, there is a significant 
reduction in the expected 239Pueff_Li mass uncertainty [27] 
for active measurements using stronger AmLi interroga-
tion sources. Simulations using a PuB source had similar 
results. It should be noted that AmLi sources with source 
strengths larger than 5x104 n/s are currently uncommon 
and sources with strengths in the range of 106 n/s may 
pose operational difficulties.
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Figure 1: Measured, simulated, and declared 239Pueff_Li values.  
Uncertainties stated at the 1-σ (68% confidence interval) level.
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Figure 2: Measured, simulated, and declared 239Pueff_B values.  
Uncertainties stated at the 1-σ (68% confidence interval) level.
Plutonium
standards
AmLi strength [n/s each]
5x103 1x104 5x104 1x105 5x105 1x106 5x106 1x107
STDIS03 205 113 50 44 40 40 40 40
STDIS09 337 176 61 49 41 40 40 40
STDIS12 715 365 97 67 45 42 40 40
CBNM-Pu61 637 327 90 63 44 41 40 39
STD11 671 342 84 54 30 28 25 25
LAO250C10 1233 625 142 83 36 31 26 25
Table 2: Source strength optimization for measured plutonium standards using the active configurations of the ENMC. Values shown are 
expected 239Pueff_Li [g] uncertainties at the 1-σ (68% confidence interval) level.
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Sample name
Uranium  
mass [g]
Neptunium  
mass [g]
Plutonium  
mass [g]
Americium  
mass [g]
235U  
fraction [%]
UREX1.27 210 0.14 2.46 0.10 0.90
UREX50 106 5.61 96.60 4.04 0.90
UREX10 191 1.12 19.32 0.81 0.90
UREX10_NoNp 191 0.00 20.40 0.85 0.90
MOX50 106 0.00 106.25 0.00 0.25
MOX5 204 0.00 10.22 0.00 0.25
U93 213 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.00
U50 213 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00
U20 213 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00
U5 213 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00
U0.72 213 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72
U0.25 213 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25
Table 3: Simulated samples along with their name, actinide masses, and 235U isotopic fraction. The 235U mass fraction is relative to total 
uranium mass.
4. Results of simulated samples 
In order to test the full measurement methodology, sim-
ulated samples containing various actinide mixtures 
were created using the Oak Ridge Isotope Generation 
and Depletion Automatic Rapid Processing (ORIGEN-
ARP) Code and their neutron signatures determined us-
ing the ENMC MCNPX model. These samples can be 
organized into three categories: uranium extraction 
(UREX) type samples which contain U, Np, Pu, and Am 
at used fuel isotopic compositions [1]; MOX type sam-
ples which contain depleted uranium and weapons 
grade plutonium [28]; and uranium samples of varying 
enrichments. Each sample, seen in Table 3, consisted of 
212.5 g of heavy metal mass at a density of 2.5 g/cc in a 
dioxide matrix. The sample geometry is a cylindrical 
shape (D=45 mm, H=62.88 mm) located inside a thin al-
uminium can of thickness 6 mm. The nomenclature on 
the sample names for the UREX and MOX samples cor-
responds to their isotopic composition (UREX or MOX) 
and their non-uranium heavy metal fraction (Np, Pu, and 
Am). The uranium samples are designated by the letter 
“U” followed by the 235U isotopic fraction. All the MCNPX 
simulations were run for 250 MH, with the exception of 
spontaneous fission simulations which were run for 
790 MH.
4.1 UREX and MOX results
Simulated assayed mass estimates for the plutonium and 
americium were within ±7% of the stated (exact) values. 
The 235U and neptunium results, shown in Figures 3 and 4, 
were less accurate. Although the difference between the 
assayed and exact values is often good, it is difficult to 
draw conclusions from the data due to the large uncertain-
ties. In particular, UREX50 has big uncertainties due to the 
relatively large amount of reactor grade plutonium in it, 
which creates a large doubles count rate. It is suspected 
by the authors that the uncertainty estimates are larger 
than they statistically should be, although the exact cause 
of the inflated uncertainties is not yet known. The uncer-
tainties shown are from the DPassive and DLi count rate un-
certainties which were then propagated through all the 
calculation in Eq. (3) and (4).
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Figure 3: Simulated and exact 235U masses of simulated UREX and MOX samples.  
The uncertanty shown at 1-σ (68% confidence interval) is due to statistical uncertainties in the MCNPX results.
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Figure 4: Simulated and exact 237Np masses of simulated UREX and MOX samples.  
The uncertainty shown at 1-σ (68% confidence interval) is due to statistical uncertainties in the MCNPX results.
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Figure 5: Simulated and exact 235U masses of simulated uranium samples. The uncertainties are too small to be plotted.
4.2 Uranium results
The 235U assay results, shown in Figure 5, matched very 
well with the exact values for the uranium samples. The 
percent differences are approximately -3% for the HEU 
samples and more negative for the low enriched uranium 
(LEU) samples.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Current non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques have 
been developed to quantify uranium, plutonium, or 
MOX, but not samples which contain more than these 
two actinides. There are applications of more complex 
fuel materials, including neptunium and americium, 
which are currently being developed. It is important to 
develop a method of quantitatively measuring these 
more complex materials before they become commer-
cially common.
The approach taken to quantify a mixture of several acti-
nides was to use a first principle neutron multiplicity 
counting approach. This technique has the added bonus 
of being applicable to measurements of shielded or het-
erogeneous MOX and uranium samples, as well as po-
tentially weapons verification. It is postulated that weap-
ons verification would be possible by analyzing the 
240Pueff and 
239Pueff values. These values can distinguish 
weapons useable materials from fission sources without 
revealing detailed information about the weapon. The re-
quired modifications to existing neutron multiplicity coun-
ters to allow for first principle methods to be applied is 
relatively minor and inexpensive, consisting of a cylindri-
cal can of natural B4C and a high-energy (α,n) neutron 
source.
The main challenge of this technique is the ability to make 
precise measurements. As seen in the measured and sim-
ulated data, the slight differences between the passive 
and active doubles count rates can cause the results using 
current detector technology to be statistically irrelevant. 
Potential solutions to this challenge exist, such as more in-
tense interrogation sources, but they have not been thor-
oughly tested.
The ability to quantify mixed actinide materials would cur-
rently be useful, and in the future may be a necessity. Fur-
ther research is needed in developing this technique, in 
particular the ability to reduce uncertainties. Other aspects 
of this research should be investigated as well, such as re-
sults of kilogram sized, non-powder, non-oxide, and vary-
ing isotopic composition samples. It is suspected by the 
authors that this technique’s full capabilities can only be 
utilized with advanced neutron multiplicity detectors, such 
as future fast neutron detectors.
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Abstract:1
241Pu has the shortest half-life of the abundant plutonium 
isotopes present in reprocessed irradiated nuclear fuel 
with a value of approximately 14.3 years. It is important to 
know the half-life of 241Pu with a higher fractional accuracy 
than that of the other plutonium isotopes because the half-
life of 241Pu and its associated uncertainty affects the esti-
mation by decay calculation of both the total amount of 
separated plutonium in storage and the determination of 
the total plutonium mass by non-destructive assay. This 
paper addresses the determination of the 241Pu half-life us-
ing nuclear calorimetry by the measurement of the thermal 
power as 241Pu evolves in time from a sealed plutonium 
source, ideally initially rich in 241Pu and chemically stripped 
of 241Am. The absolute accuracy of nuclear calorimeters 
can be ensured over long periods of time (many years) us-
ing long-lived nuclear reference materials and/or traceable 
electrical heat standards. One can, therefore, expect nu-
clear calorimetry to offer an accurate way to determine the 
half-life of 241Pu, which is comparable in quality and inde-
pendent, yet complementary, to other approaches. Tem-
poral analysis of the power-versus-time data also yields an 
estimate of the specific power of 241Pu, which other meth-
ods do not.
After describing the principle of the method and develop-
ing the pertinent mathematical expressions, we outline the 
approach by drawing on some unpublished notes of Ken-
neth C. Jordan who carried out such experiments at the 
Mound Laboratory over 40 years ago. Today, Jordan’s 
work remains possibly the most significant experiment of 
its type to the 241Pu nuclear data evaluator. However, ob-
jectively assigning confidence to his results is problematic 
because the details of the experiments and data reduction 
have never been adequately reported. This work goes 
some way to that end but, without the raw data and first-
hand knowledge, cannot provide a complete record. We 
conclude that a new high-accuracy nuclear calorimetry 
campaign to re-measure the 241Pu half-life and specific 
1 This manuscript has been authored by UT-Battelle, LLC, under Contract No. 
DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the US Department of Energy.  The United 
States Government retains and the publisher, by accepting the article for 
publication, acknowledges that the United States Government retains a 
non-exclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or repro-
duce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for 
United States Government purposes.
power is needed as a means to confirm that systematic bi-
ases are under control, to support international safe-
guards, and to improve fundamental metrology and nucle-
ar data – for instance, the mean beta-particle energy 
emitted by 241Pu and whether the soft beta decay mode 
rate is influenced by chemical form or other factors.
Keywords: 241Pu; half-life; specific power; calorimetry; nu-
clear data
1. Introduction
On the time scale of years to decades, the mass of sep-
arated plutonium in storage falls with time primarily as a 
consequence of the radioactive decay of 241Pu. There-
fore, over time, uncertainty in the 241Pu half-life leads ini-
tially to a growing apparent uncertainty in the mass of 
plutonium under safeguards. After many decades, the 
uncertainty drops again because one can be confident 
that all the 241Pu has decayed. The predominant decay 
mechanism of 241Pu is low-energy beta-particle emission 
leading to an in-growth of the alpha-emitter 241Am. Nei-
ther 241Pu nor 241Am exhibits appreciable spontaneous 
fission, but 241Am has about 2000 times greater specific 
O(α,n) yield than 241Pu, about 33 times greater specific 
heat output than 241Pu, and also contributes more 
strongly than 241Pu to the surface dose rate for lightly 
encapsulated materials via its intense 60 keV gamma-
ray emission. This affects non-destructive assay meas-
urements by both neutron coincidence counting (adding 
random background neutrons that contribute to acci-
dental coincidences and increasing the gamma-to-neu-
tron ratio) and calorimetry (introducing an age-depend-
ent item power). As a consequence, the thermal output 
from 241Pu and its daughter 241Am, changes at a much 
faster rate (roughly 0.45% per day initially) than any of 
the other plutonium isotopes, including 236Pu and its 
daughters. This effect, in turn, changes the thermal 
power output of storage cans containing plutonium. 
Confirmatory nuclear safeguards checks of stored items 
using nuclear calorimetry must, therefore, be corrected 
for the decay of 241Pu (usually either by calculation or by 
gamma-ray spectrometry) and compared to a fixed ref-
erence time. Again, as the time between measurements 
increases, the uncertainty in the comparison based on 
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decay-corrected relative isotopic content grows larger 
due to the propagation of the uncertainty in the 241Pu 
half-life. A point will be reached when decay-corrected 
mass spectrometer values are less well known than 
gamma-ray spectrometry estimates where they are 
feasible.
In the 1970’s, it was recognized that if a concerted effort 
was applied to determining the half-life of 241Pu more accu-
rately, the associated uncertainties could be reduced con-
siderably and would essentially no longer be of concern, at 
least for the application of routine international nuclear 
safeguards. At that time, strikingly large differences existed 
in the scientific literature [1]. In fact, until recently, the 241Pu 
half-life uncertainty was the major source of uncertainty in 
the calorimetric analysis of aging plutonium sources initial-
ly characterized by mass spectrometry, and especially in 
the long term prediction of 238Pu heat standards used for 
the direct calibration and quality assurance monitoring of 
nuclear calorimeters.
To date, the situation has improved dramatically be-
cause of the use of the double ratio mass spectrometry 
technique applied to determine the abundance of 241Pu 
relative to the long-lived plutonium isotopes, over a 
roughly three decade period (more than two half-lives), 
of a homogenized stock of plutonium initially rich in 241Pu 
[2]. This data provides a robust estimate of the half-life 
and supports a relatively low (with respect to historic 
norms) uncertainty [3]. On this basis, a value for the 
241Pu half-life of about 14.325 ± 0.015  years can be 
claimed [2, 3], where the uncertainty is estimated at 
about the one standard deviation confidence level and 
is dominated by the challenge of maintaining instrument 
and procedural consistency over decades. The details 
are beyond the present scope and the reader is directed 
to [2, 3].
In the ASTM international consensus standard on nucle-
ar calorimetry [4] reliance has for many years been 
placed on earlier results (the standard was first docu-
mented prior to [2]) and, in particular, great emphasis 
was placed on the unpublished results of Kenneth C. 
Jordan of Mound Laboratory. In subsequent sections of 
this paper we shall review the ASTM recommendations. 
We can find no trace of Jordan’s original work. However, 
some of Jordan’s notes were included in the records 
transferred from Mound to Los Alamos National Labora-
tory during the relocation of the calorimetry effort. Al-
though Jordan’s notes were clearly not exactly those 
used by the ASTM and the ANSI [5] committees (prior to 
ASTM), we shall draw on them here to report on the sa-
lient features of Jordan’s approach and to establish a 
sense of the care taken to provide quality measurement 
results. Additionally, we provide the derivation of the 
equations needed to interpret the evolution of thermal 
power form 241Pu rich items.
2. Mathematical framework
The in-growth of 241Am from the decay of 241Pu is governed 
by the following differential equations:
 
dN
dt
Na a a= −  (1)
 
dN
dt
N Nb a a b b= −    (2)
where Na and Nb represent the number of 
241Pu and 241Am 
nuclei present at time t; λa and λb are the corresponding 
nuclear decay constants (the probability that a nucleus will 
decay per unit time, assumed constant); and β is the 
branching ratio for beta decay of 241Pu.
Re-arranging the relation for Nb and solving by the well 
known Integrating Factor method yields the explicit time 
dependence of the number of 241Am nuclei:
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where Na(0) and Nb(0) are the number of 
241Pu and 241Am 
nuclei, respectively, present at time t = 0.
Because λa < λb for the 
241Pu/241Am system, as 241Pu decays 
the amount of 241Am rises to a peak before beginning to drop.
In terms of atomic mass, rather than nuclei number, we have:
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where we have introduced the symbols Aa and Ab to repre-
sent the molar masses of 241Pu and 241Am respectively.
The total thermal power, W(t), from a plutonium item, cor-
rected for all other heat contributions other than 241Pu and 
241Am (for example 238Pu, if present in an appreciable 
amount, may be the only other contributor with a signifi-
cant time dependence over a period of experimental ob-
servation of a few years or so) may now be written as the 
sum of the contributions coming from the decay-corrected 
initial masses plus the contribution of 241Am in-growth:
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where Pa and Pb are the specific thermal powers of 
241Pu and 
241Am respectively. We are assuming time t = 0 is known for 
the purposes of these expressions and is not measured from 
some arbitrary moment or from the time of chemical separa-
tion, but from the instant ma = ma(0) and mb = mb(0).
The time dependence is seen to be the sum of two decay-
ing exponentials terms. Explicitly, re-arranging the expres-
sion for W(t) gives:
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which, in a convenient and obvious short-hand notation, 
we write as:
 W t C e C eb
t
a
tb a( ) = −− −   (7)
Let us now place these expressions explicitly in the con-
text of the 241Pu-241Am system. The branching ratio β and 
the ratio Aa/Ab are both close to unity and so the term 
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 where we have introduced τa and τb 
to denote the half-life of 241Pu and 241Am respectively, and 
which have values of roughly 14.3 years and 432 years. 
Thus, the term 
A
A
b
a
a
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 is close to unity with a value of 
about 1.03. In the special case of complete chemical 
stripping of 241Am at time t = 0 we have 
m
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~ . . Therefore, we expect 
the term Cb to be about 3% larger than Ca, which we shall 
later see confirmed in Jordan’s calorimetry data. With the 
stated initial conditions we also have the relation:
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From this expression, we see that if Pb is well known we 
can extract Pa given the branching ratio and half-lives com-
bined with the measured ratio of the temporal fitting pa-
rameters Ca/Cb. To first order, and as we shall see later, the 
ratio Pa/Pb is about 0.03.
Another and more direct approach to estimating Pa for cal-
orimetric data over time is to note that at time t  =  0, 
W(t) = W(0) = Pama(0) from which we have:
 P
C C
ma
b a
a
=
−
( )0
 (9)
The use of this result does not require Pb nor does it 
need any other nuclear data parameters to be known. 
The fitting parameters Ca and Cb are, of course, corre-
lated through the f i t t ing procedures and so, in 
propagating the experimental uncertainty, we have for 
the variance σ2[Pa] in Pa the following first order estima-
tor in terms of the contributory standard deviations and 
covariance:
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For purposes of illustration only, suppose we start with 
1 g of pure 241Pu at time t = 0 then, adopting the following 
values [4, 6]: 1  year = 365.25  days; β  =  0.9999755; 
τa = 14.348 years; τb = 433.6  years; Pa/Pb ≈ 0.02988, Cb/
Ca ≈ 1.03185, we find by numerical calculation that the 
power output increases almost linearly initially, before 
peaking (at ~95.2 mW) after about 72.3 years. The be-
havior over a five year period of observation is shown in 
Figure 1, this puts into context the measurements of Jor-
dan, which will be discussed in the next section. We note 
that increasing the half-life of 241Pu in this calculation from 
14.348 years to 14.448 years results in a power drop of 
only 0.57% at the end of five years. Although apparently 
only a relatively small change, nuclear calorimetry is ca-
pable of an accuracy (combined precision and bias) of a 
fraction of 0.1%, and so in principle this change is ten or 
more standard deviations and is, therefore, a quite signif-
icant  increment  to h igh accuracy ca lor imetr y 
measurements.
For the present discussion we focused explicitly only on 
the heat generated by 241Pu and 241Am, as this is the nor-
mal safeguards view point. However, for completeness we 
have also used decay tables to estimate the decay heat 
and the temporal evolution of the entire decay chain when 
one starts with pure 241Pu. We find that the only other nu-
clide of significance is 237U. In Figure 2 we show that the 
contribution is small (<0.1% after 0.3 years) but, in the con-
text of high accuracy nuclear calorimetry measurements, 
should not be ignored. We cannot address this problem 
further with the limited data, which we are about to dis-
cuss, but it is something to take note of for future stand-
ards work. The impact would be amenable to numerical 
simulation if the detailed structure of the data set was to 
become available.
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3. Jordan’s general approach
In this section, we draw heavily on Jordan’s unpublished 
notes [7] and supporting work [8] to outline his approach 
to determining the half-life of 241Pu. The period covered is 
April 1969 to 24 June 1974. Two items and three calorime-
ters (designated 58, 91 and 116) were used. Details of the 
items are listed in Table 1. The second item was loaned 
from AEC and returned in 1973.
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Figure 1: The temporal variation of the total power output for a 241Pu-241Am system, starting at time t = 0 as pure 241Pu,  
calculated for illustrative purposes using the assumed nuclear data values discussed in the main text.
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Figure 2: Ratio to the total of the thermal power from nuclides other than 241Pu and 241Am  
as a function of time starting out with pure 241Pu.
Source 241Pu abundance,  
%
241Pu mass,  
g
Separation date
1 84.11 1.511 21 March 1969
2 94.65 13.295 17 June 1969
Table 1: Summary of the 241Pu samples used by Jordan [7].
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From each power measurement the thermal power (watt-
age) of the other isotopes of plutonium were subtracted 
based on the known total mass of plutonium and isotopic 
composition. The remainder, which is the sum of the power 
from 241Pu and 241Am as discussed in the Mathematical 
Framework section, was fitted by least squares to the sum 
of two decaying exponentials where Ca, Cb and λa are the 
unknown parameters and λb, the decay constant of 
241Am 
was set at 0.0000043738 per day, which is equivalent to a 
half-life of 433.9 years. The tools and techniques used by 
Jordan to review and fit his data are not known to us. Data 
analysis remains a powerful scientific art today, but the sci-
entific literature tells us that uncertainty estimates are often 
overly optimistic. Workers should be encouraged to archive 
and report sufficient data to allow data reduction to be re-
visited. However, as in the historical case we are reviewing 
here, such information is sadly not always available.
After more than 600 individual power measurements, over 
a period of more than four years, the results summarized 
in Table 2 were obtained.
Sample Calorimeters Half-life, years
2 116 14.344 ± 0.0023
2 58 14.380 ± 0.010
1 91 & 116 14.356 ± 0.011
Table 2: Summary of the half-life results obtained by Jordan. The 
uncertainty quoted is the ‘internal probable error’ (50% confi-
dence limits).
After analyzing the data in many different ways, Jordan 
concludes that the ‘best’ half-life supported by the meas-
urements is (14.355 ± 0.005) years, where the uncertainty 
quoted is the ‘probable error’ expanded to include some 
possibility of external (which we take to mean non-random) 
uncertainty. It is our understanding that the probable error 
corresponds to a confidence interval of 50%. For a ran-
dom sample from an infinite normally distributed ‘universe’ 
this would correspond to 0.6745 times the standard devia-
tion (68.26% confidence). Jordan comments [7] that even 
extreme errors of 100% in the mass spectrometry values 
of the other isotopes (238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu and 242Pu) have 
very little impact, only changing the 241Pu half-life extracted 
by a maximum of 0.003 years. An uncertainty of three 
years in the assumed value of the half-life of 241Am causes 
a shift in the 241Pu half-life of only 0.0033 years. At the time 
of Jordan’s work, the half-life of 241Am was well determined 
from power measurements to be about 432.6 years with 
an uncertainty of about 0.7 years [9], and so a three year 
allowance is considered generous. Likewise, the Mound 
group [10] knew the half-life of 238Pu (87.77 ± 0.02) years, 
the only other nuclide present with a short period, from 
studies to evaluate the suitability of various radionuclides 
for use as heat sources [8], and the group were estab-
lished masters of applying the nuclear calorimetric method 
to determine half-life and specific powers.
Based on this discussion, it is clear that the major source 
of uncertainty in Jordan’s determination of the half-life of 
241Pu is the calorimetric precision and bias. This is a con-
sequence of the fact that, in a sense, the half-life of 241Pu is 
determined mainly by the rate of in-growth of 241Am. Fur-
thermore, over a few year time period, this rate of change 
is affected very little by the other isotopes, which have rel-
atively long half-lives compared to 241Pu. In the case of 
238Pu (the next shortest lived) it is also important that it is 
not very abundant. Another factor is that the method of ex-
tracting the half-life of 241Pu does not require the date of 
separation, nor the degree of separation, to be known.
In addition, from the fitted coefficients Ca and Cb and the 
weight and isotopic composition of the plutonium items, 
Jordan was able to calculate the quantities listed in Ta-
ble 3. These are presented here without justification be-
cause adequate detail is not available in Jordan’s surviving 
notes for the uncertainty analysis to be repeated, and un-
fortunately covariance information is not provided along 
with the fitted parameters.
Writing in June 1974, after the larger of the two sources 
had been returned to AEC, Jordan states that the intention 
was to continue making calorimetric assays of source 
number 1, the smaller of the two studied, but that no sig-
nificant reduction in the experimental uncertainty could be 
expected for several years. We do not know whether this 
follow-up work was done or not from the records we have 
access to.
Quantity Value
241Am half-life (434.9 ± 0.04) years
Specific thermal power of 241Pu (3.390 ± 0.002) mW.g-1
Mean beta energy from 241Pu decay (5.53 ± 0.04) keV
Ca / mass (with time t = 0 being 
the known time of chemical 
 separation of 241Am)
0.114830 W.g-1
Cb / mass (with time t = 0 being 
the known time of separation)
0.118220W.g-1
Table 3: Additional quantities extracted from Jordan’s analysis of 
the 241Pu sample power measurements
4. Review of the ASTM recommendations
The ANSI N15.22-1987 standard on calorimetric assay of 
Pu-bearing solids is no longer updated and ASTM now 
maintains the consensus international standard test meth-
od on nuclear calorimetry for plutonium, tritium, and 241Am 
materials. The two data sections are similar. The specific 
power of 241Pu cannot be calculated accurately and must 
be measured directly because the mean beta-particle en-
ergy is not well known. The value of the specific power of 
241Pu adopted in ASTM C1458 is credited to Jordan [un-
published 1982] and is (3.412 ± 0.002) mW.g-1, where the 
uncertainty is estimated at 1σ. By way of independent ver-
ification, the calorimetric result of Oetting [11] can be cited 
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which makes use of the assigned half-life and is corrected 
for 241Am. The value adopted by Oetting is (3.407 ± 
0.034) mW.g-1. The two values agree, but, because Oet-
ting’s uncertainty estimate is 17 times larger, it is inconse-
quential when forming a weighted mean. Thus, in effect 
Jordan’s value stands alone and unchallenged.
The situation regarding half-life is summarized in Table 4. 
The adopted value is the un-weighted mean stated to be 
(14.348 ± 0.022) years. Upon closer inspection, however, 
we find that the standard deviation is 0.021 years (not 
0.022) and what we really require is the ‘standard error’ 
(that is the uncertainty on the population mean quoted at 
the 1σ level) rather than the standard deviation on an indi-
vidual determination. This is a factor of two smaller at 
about 0.011 if we assume equal weighing for each of the 
four measurements. However, to get a (double-sided 
Gaussian) 68.26% confidence interval we should also ap-
ply a coverage factor based on the Student’s t-distribution 
for three degrees of freedom. This is a multiplier of 1.197 
which leads to a 1σ estimate of about 0.013. Note for a 
95% confidence level the multiplier is about 3.2 compared 
to about 1.96 when the number of degrees of freedom ap-
proaches infinity.
Value (years) Method Reference
14.379 ± 0.013 Mass Spectroscopy LANL: March’80
14.34 ± 0.02 Mass Spectroscopy NBS: Garner’80
14.328 ± 0.018 Mass Spectroscopy Geel: DeBievre’81
14.345 ± 0.003 Thermal Power vs. 
Time
Mound: Jordan’82 
(unpublished)
14.348 ± 0.022 Adopted
Table 4: 241Pu half-life data taken from ANSI N15.22-1987 and 
ASTM C1458.
On the other hand, if we take each entry in Table 4 at face 
value and apply an inverse variance weighted fit, we obtain 
a markedly different view because Jordan’s value is then 
very heavily weighted compared to the rest (accounting for 
about 91% of the fractional weight). In this case, we obtain 
a half-life estimate of 14.3461 years with an internal stand-
ard uncertainty (formed solely from the input (known) vari-
ances on each experiment) of 0.0029 years, and an exter-
nal standard uncertainty (based on the weighted square of 
the deviations from the weighted mean) of 0.0046 years.
These are two very different conclusions, particularly with 
regards to the uncertainty statements. This reflects the 
procedural differences in how the data is being used. Put 
another way, there is likely a sizable uncertainty in our esti-
mate of the uncertainty. Adopting one rather than another 
is based on the subjective belief about the relative quality 
of the measurements and especially on whether the re-
ported uncertainties are actually reasonable and fair. The 
value of Jordan has by far the lowest reported uncertainty 
and yet suffers from not being published and open to full 
scientific scrutiny. In this work we have revisited some of 
Jordan’s unpublished notes leading to a half-life estimate 
of (14.355 ± 0.0074) years (uncertainty reported at 1σ) in 
June 1974. Presumably the 1982 value includes additional 
data and analysis to account for the shift in value and the 
reduction in quoted uncertainty – but we do not know. The 
1982 value is very close, however, to that reported in Ta-
ble 2 for item 2 measured using calorimeter 116, but with 
the uncertainty reported at 68.26% confidence (rather 
than at the ‘probable error’ (50% confidence interval)). So it 
could be that the 1982 choice was simply a selected val-
ue. In any case it is long overdue to overhaul the nuclear 
data parameters included for information in ASTM C1458. 
The widely used 1996 Table of Isotopes [6] value of (14.35 
± 0.10) years (uncertainty quoted at 1σ) certainly seems 
conservative in its uncertainty statement compared to ex-
perimental capability. The value based on Wellum et al [2, 
3], which is approximately (14.325 ± 0.015) years, and that 
of ASTM (based on the above discussion) which is (14.348 
± 0.013) years are in agreement within the combined un-
certainties. But whether reported uncertainties, which are 
substantially lower, for instance as claimed in Jordan’s un-
published work, can be reliably achieved remains open to 
question. This is important because several well docu-
mented measurements of such quality will be needed to 
convince data evaluators and before we see a substantial 
reduction in the recommended uncertainty.
5. Conclusions
In recent years, the double-ratio mass spectrometry meth-
od has emerged as a powerful and accurate way to deter-
mine the 241Pu half-life. The double-ratio technique is be-
lieved to be almost independent of mass spectrometer 
instruments, and hence enables measurements to be 
made on the same batch of homogenized material over a 
long time period, even though the particular instruments 
being used may change. It is also clear that the recom-
mended value for the 241Pu half-life in the ASTM standard 
was never robust and needs revising in the light of current-
ly available and fully documented data [e.g. 2, 3]. Precise 
half-life determinations with a low bias should also be pos-
sible using nuclear calorimetry. In this case, electrical 
standards or long-lived radionuclide heat sources can be 
used to maintain absolute power level calibration over 
many years for a given calorimeter and also between dif-
ferent instruments. However, it is not experimentally estab-
lished whether nuclear calorimetry is capable of approach-
ing consistent results with a similar overall accuracy to the 
double-ratio mass spectrometry approach, or, if unrecog-
nized bias in the analysis remains to be discovered (in one 
or the other or both approaches). We identified the contri-
bution from 237U, which is usually ignored, as an example 
of a source of possible calorimetric bias. Within the US 
DOE complex, nuclear calorimetry is primarily used as a 
routine assay tool. From a radiometrology perspective, as 
our discussion on the 241Pu half-life and specific power 
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determination has highlighted, calorimetry can also contin-
ue to support nuclear data. In particular, to the benefit of 
both the double-ratio and calorimetry techniques, we sug-
gest an inter-comparison exercise. A batch of plutonium 
rich in 241Pu should be made, and sealed 241Pu heat sourc-
es made for long term (decades) calorimetry. A portion of 
the same material should be kept and periodically sam-
pled and distributed to various laboratories for mass spec-
trometry analysis. A program of this kind would also be an 
important step to maintaining and enhancing vital exper-
tise in these techniques which underpin safeguards meas-
urements. We also see an opportunity to introduce mod-
ern curve fitting techniques and approaches to the 
uncertainty quantification. We strongly urge the communi-
ty to investigate this possibility with a well-planned interna-
tional campaign. The same sealed sources can be tracked 
using high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry. The nucle-
ar calorimetry data will also yield an estimate of the 241Pu 
specific power and hence also improve the experimental 
estimate of the mean energy of the soft beta-ray emitted in 
the decay, which remains quite poorly known and of inter-
est (along with tritium) to the nuclear physics community, 
for instance, as a test of nuclear models and as a candi-
date to study possible variation in specific decay rates to 
changing environments (chemical, physical, and as the 
earth moves through space). The full beta-particle spec-
trum may also be accessible to a suitably designed cryo-
genic micro-calorimeter (a superconducting, transition-
edge, sensor-based, high-resolution spectrometer). The 
mean energy, power, and half-life are related, so given any 
two, the third can be calculated.
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Abstract:
The field of applied neutrino physics has shown new 
 developments in the last decade. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed its interest in the po-
tentialities of antineutrino detection as a new tool for reac-
tor monitoring and has created a dedicated ad-hoc Work-
ing Group in late 2010 to follow the associated Research 
and Development. Several research projects are on-going 
over the world either to build antineutrino detectors dedi-
cated to reactor monitoring, either to search for and devel-
op innovative detection techniques, or to simulate and 
study the characteristics of the antineutrino emission of 
actual and innovative nuclear reactor designs.
The European Safeguards Research and Development 
 Association, ESARDA, has created in late 2010 a group 
devoted to Novel Approaches and Novel Technologies 
(NA/NT) allowing to create contacts between the research 
community and agencies. The ESARDA NA/NT working 
group has decided one year ago to create a sub-WG ded-
icated to the detection of antineutrinos. At this 35th ESAR-
DA meeting, we propose to give an overview of the most 
recent progresses made in the field of antineutrino detec-
tion for reactor monitoring, including the actual possibilities 
and limitations of their detection and the status of various 
developments towards compact antineutrino detectors for 
reactor monitoring considered in perspective of the anti-
neutrino emission from various reactor designs. We will 
then present the objectives of the ESARDA sub-WG 
 devoted to the antineutrino probe.
Keywords: safeguards, non-proliferation, antineutrino 
 detection, nuclear reactors
1. Introduction
The research and Development (R&D) associated to reac-
tor antineutrino detection is very lively. This 35th ESARDA 
annual meeting has been an opportunity for the antineutri-
no community to meet in the frame of the NA/NT Working 
Group (WG) [1]. At this meeting, the proceedings of the last 
antineutrino detection ad-hoc WG of IAEA (Oct. 2011) has 
been presented to the attendees, giving the directions that 
were foreseen by then. After this first part, overview talks 
focussed on several topics of importance in the field: a 
review about each main actual detection technique, a re-
view about reactor simulations, and reviews making the 
links with other fields strongly connected to the topic: re-
actor antineutrino detection for fundamental neutrino phys-
ics, nuclear physics experiments for reactor antineutrino 
energy spectra and neutron detection techniques. 
In these proceedings we will present the motivations for 
such a structure of the sub-WG meeting, explaining the 
context and presenting briefly the different topics of the 
talks.
Let us first recall briefly the principle of reactor monitoring 
with antineutrino detection.
Large quantities of antineutrinos are produced in the reac-
tor due to beta decays of the fission products and about 
1021 antineutrinos/s are emitted by a 1 GWe reactor core. 
The distribution of fission fragments depends on the fissile 
isotopes (235U, 238U, 239Pu and 241Pu) and on the energy of 
the neutrons in the core. The released energy per fission, 
the average number of emitted antineutrinos and their av-
erage energy depend also directly on the fissile isotope 
that undergoes fission (see Table 1). Consequently, an anti-
neutrino spectrum measured at a reactor will reflect the 
thermal power emitted by the core and its composition. 
Adding to these features the intrinsic properties of antineu-
trinos which are weakly interacting particles, impossible to 
shield, the antineutrino detection may then become an in-
teresting tool for reactor monitoring. 
235U 238U 239Pu 241Pu
Released energy per 
fission (MeV)
201.7 205.0 210.0 212.4
Mean energy of 
antineutrinos (MeV)
1.46 1.56 1.32 1.44
Number of antineutrinos 
per fission (E>1.8 MeV)
5.58
(1.92)
6.69
(2.38)
5.09
(1.45)
5.89
(1.83)
Table 1: Differences in the 235U, 238U, 239Pu and 241Pu fission 
properties given in [2] and a calculation of P.  Huber and 
Th. Schwetz [3].
Considering these properties, the IAEA asked to its mem-
ber states to perform a sensitivity study. The agency or-
ganized several meetings between experts and inspector-
ates since 2003, and created in 2011 an Ad-Hoc Working 
Group devoted to the antineutrino detection. This WG 
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meeting was associated to an Antineutrino Applied Phys-
ics Workshop [4] and a proceedings was written and cir-
culated [5]. The content of the proceedings has been pre-
sented by A. Bernstein for the first time to the R&D 
community and to ESARDA and IAEA members at our 
next ESARDA NA/NT WG meeting on May 27. The pro-
ceedings give indications of directions for the research to 
come on the path to use antineutrino detection for reactor 
monitoring and potentially for safeguards. 
An antineutrino detector should be as compact as possi-
ble, cheap, safe, unattendedly and remotely operated and 
the data analysis should be performed in a nearly auto-
mated way in order to be usable by inspectorates. The op-
timum situation of an antineutrino detector would be above 
ground just outside a reactor building. 
These requirements remain a challenge for physicists. A 
cubic meter size footprint for an antineutrino detector 
placed at about 25m from a reactor core is feasible, but 
one has up to now to add shieldings around the detector 
in order to get rid of cosmic ray or reactor induced back-
ground, and the shielding may enlarge a lot the footprint, 
though efforts have been made to include passive shield-
ing into a container so as to leave unchanged the overall 
footprint. At the moment eliminating the shielding seems to 
be very challenging in the case of a detector located above 
ground. But as you will see in the following, the on-going 
developments show promising improvements in back-
ground rejection efficiency by an antineutrino target. 
2. Main antineutrino detection techniques
The most common interaction used to detect reactor anti-
neutrinos is the inverse beta decay (IBD) process on pro-
ton: e p e n+ ° ++  (threshold: 1.8 MeV). Up to now liquid 
scintillator targets were used as the standard detection 
technique, usually doped with Gd in order to capture the 
emitted neutron. The positron energy is directly related to 
the antineutrino energy. After a neutron capture, the excit-
ed Gd isotope emits a gamma cascade of total energy 
8 MeV detected in a delayed coincidence (delayed signal) 
(in average 30 µs) with the positron signal (prompt signal). 
This technique was used extensively by numerous funda-
mental neutrino physics experiments. The quality of the 
liquid scintillator doped with Gd has been the object of an 
important R&D and the new generation reactor experi-
ments Double Chooz, Daya Bay and Reno use this meth-
od [6-8]. But one could replace Gd with other nuclei exhib-
iting large neutron capture cross-sections such as 6Li and 
10B. The advantages of these nuclei is that neutron capture 
gives birth to heavy nuclei which can be distinguished 
from gamma rays through Pulse Shape Discrimination 
techniques (PSD): n + 6Li => α + 3H and n + 10B => 7Li + α 
(6%) and 7Li + α + 0.48 MeV (94 %). These neutron cap-
tures occur for neutrons less thermalized than in the case 
of neutron capture on Gd isotopes leading to a shorter 
path of the neutron in the detector. This opens the possi-
bility of more compact detectors and maybe to relate with 
a better accuracy the neutron direction to the impinging 
antineutrino direction [9]. Unfortunately liquid scintillators 
doped with 6Li are not yet stable enough and R&D is on-
going to develop new liquids [10]. The actual alternative is 
to use solid plastic detectors using 6Li:ZnS layers as we 
will see in the next section.
In order to comprehend the interests of the various detec-
tion media, one has to understand the possible back-
ground signals that could blur the antineutrino one. Cos-
mic rays constitute a recurrent background source, 
independently of the type of reactor to monitor. Usually 
fundamental neutrino physics experiments eliminate an im-
portant part of this background with underground deploy-
ments, allowing large overburdens. Even at shallow depth 
the hadronic part of the background is eliminated, while 
remain cosmic muons mainly. These cosmic muons are at 
the origin of Michel electrons, fast neutrons and cosmo-
genic nuclei i.e. radioactive nuclei, both created through 
electromagnetic spallation or muon capture processes in 
the matter. Let’s classify the backgrounds in two catego-
ries: the accidental background which mimics the antineu-
trino signal through random coincidences between for in-
stance gamma rays from natural radioactivity of the rock 
or materials and fast neutrons arising from the cosmic mu-
ons; and the correlated background which mimics the an-
tineutrino signature with a prompt and a delayed signal 
arising from the same physics event. Fast neutrons can 
constitute a correlated background if they are moderated 
in the detection medium on protons which recoil limit the 
positron energy loss before being captured on the chosen 
absorbant (Gd or else). Cosmogenic isotopes which are 
beta-delayed neutron emitters can also be a source of 
correlated background. With above ground deployments, 
one has in addition to cope with the hadronic part of the 
cosmic rays i.e. mainly neutrons. 
Different methods can be developed to help distinguishing 
between the background and antineutrino events. Antineu-
trino detectors should use low radioactivity materials to 
minimize accidental background. Lead shielding is also 
used around the antineutrino target to decrease the gam-
ma ray background, which can be very strong at very 
short distance of a research reactor. Borated polyethylene 
shielding is used to decrease the neutron background 
reaching the target. Then usually the target detectors are 
complemented with an active cosmic muon veto detector, 
allowing to tag a muon interaction and preventing to meas-
ure events in a definite time window following the muon 
signal in the veto. In addition Pulse Shape Discrimination 
technique is used, especially with liquid scintillator targets, 
with the goal to distinguish neutron from gamma signals. 
Different target media can also be used to eliminate some 
background components. 
36
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 50, December 2013
The actual main techniques use these different methods at 
a different level: liquid scintillator based detectors, solid 
plastic based detectors and water based detectors [11]. 
2.1 Liquid scintillator based detectors
The liquid scintillator technique doped with Gd is the most 
mature detection technique employed for several decades. 
The properties observed in large detectors designed for 
fundamental physics are nevertheless hard to transpose to 
small scale detectors as edge effects combined with a lim-
ited number of PMTs affect the energy and spatial resolu-
tion one can obtain. The first demonstration of antineutrino 
detector for reactor monitoring was made by the SONGS 
experiment [12] with a very simple detector of modest de-
tection efficiency that took data unattended for about one 
year. Since then, efforts have been concentrated towards 
an optimization of the detector performance with different 
designs. According to the simulation work developed to 
design small scale detectors, the energy resolution can be 
very good and the detection efficiency as well, depending 
on the size and number of PMTs used. In order to optimize 
the background rejection, the use of PSD is mandatory, 
especially for above ground deployments. Up to now high 
performance detectors still require shieldings and a cos-
mic muon veto around the target which increase a lot the 
detector footprint. There are several on-going efforts 
worldwide with different goals; SONGS2 (3.6 t detector) at 
a CANDU reactor in Point Lepreau Canada [11,13], the 
KASKA prototype first installed at the JOYO fast reactor 
and now installed above-ground at a PWR (with an on-go-
ing PSD R&D) [14], the Nucifer detector at the OSIRIS re-
search reactor in France [15] (with an on-going PSD R&D 
and the goal of an optimized efficiency). 
2.2 Solid plastic based detectors
An alternative to liquid scintillator target detectors is the 
use of solid scintillators. The use of solid scintillators pre-
vents the safety problems that could arise from the use of 
liquids of rather low flash points. Another advantage is the 
possible segmentation of the detector. The segmentation 
ensures naturally a very good spatial resolution and allows 
further background elimination thanks to multiplicity cuts. 
A set of projects develops segmented plastic concepts 
with Gd layers on slabs, either read by PMTs or MPPCs 
with fibers: the DANSS (Russia) [11,13], CORMORAD (Italy) 
[16] and the PANDA (Japan) [11,13] experiments. All three 
experiments have deployed prototypes at reactors. In 
these designs, the searched prompt and delayed signals 
are still produced by photons (use of Gd sheets) and dis-
tinguished with an energy cut helped by the topology of 
the events. If we refer to the DANSS collaboration predic-
tions for their design [11,13], the energy resolution is not as 
good as in liquid scintillator designs, but the spatial resolu-
tion is much better and the detection efficiency could be 
quite high. No full scale detector has taken data yet, so 
these figures should be confronted to experimental 
measurements before drawing any conclusions. The full 
scale DANSS detector is under construction and should 
bring new results in the very next years. Results will be 
presented at the ESARDA NA/NT meeting in Bruges [11].
Another possibility is the use of solid segmented plastic 
detectors with 6Li:ZnS layers instead of Gd sheets. The 
use of 6Li allows the identification of the neutron through 
PSD information and the segmentation gives a precise lo-
cation of the interaction. The neutron is captured after a 
lower energy loss in 6Li than in Gd, its range is thus short-
er. This opens a potentiality for more compact detectors, 
and direction sensitive measurements. 
The Sandia lab. in collaboration with LLNL have already 
tested a 4-cell prototype with organic scintillator and 
ZnS:Ag/6LiF screens on outer surface at the San Onofre 
power station in 2011. The ability of such a design to re-
duce background thanks to the topology of the events was 
demonstrated. In Europe, the SOLiD collaboration has de-
veloped a different design using fibers for the light collec-
tion and MPPCs with electronics inherited from T2K 
[15,17]. A small prototype is being deployed at the BR2 re-
actor in Mol (Belgium), and the full scale detector should 
be built during the upcoming years. These developments 
will allow to appreciate the real quantitative improvements 
of this approach which seems to be very promising.
2.3 Water based detectors
Another way to eliminate background is to choose another 
detection medium, like water detectors in which GdCl3 is 
dissolved. In these detectors, the detection reaction is still 
the IBD process. The prompt signal is provided by the 
Cerenkov light of the created positron in the water, and the 
delayed signal by the photons coming from the deexcita-
tion of the Gd isotope after neutron capture. Only the parti-
cles generating a Cerenkov signal can be detected. This 
induces a quite high energy threshold on the reactor anti-
neutrino detection [18] but also allows to eliminate a large 
part of the fast neutron background as neutrons of energy 
lower than 500 MeV cannot be detected (because of the 
recoil proton Cerenkov threshold).
R&D is on-going as there are plans to fill in large detectors 
for fundamental neutrino physics [18]. Two initiatives of 
such detectors developed for safeguard purposes exist; 
the Brazilian project ANGRA and the water detector de-
ployed by LLNL at the San Onofre power station.
The construction of the ANGRA detector is nearly finished 
and the detector should be deployed above ground before 
the end of this year [11,13]. The detector of the LLNL is de-
ployed above ground and the data taken are under analy-
sis. The drawback of the water detectors is the impossibil-
ity to identify particles and a poor energy resolution. But 
these detectors are inherently safe thanks to the use of 
water.
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2.4 Comparative properties
One objective of the next antineutrino detection sub-WG 
group meeting in Brugge is to show the results of these 
various experiments but also to try to find common ways 
to quantify the detection properties. We need to agree on 
common definitions of quantities to qualify the detector 
performances. This is mandatory to allow comparisons 
helping leading the further required R&D. This is also man-
datory to be able to use the detector performances in the 
study of diversion scenarios, coupling reactor simulations 
to detection scenarios. These scenarios can also help 
leading the R&D by characterizing what are the detection 
properties to be improved in order to meet the required 
sensitivity on the fuel composition of various reactor types.
3. Reactor simulation initiatives 
Several reactor simulation developments for reactor moni-
toring with antineutrino detectors are on-going worldwide. 
The first initiative came from the Double Chooz collabora-
tion with the development of a simulation tool, the MCNP 
Utility for Reactor Evolution (MURE) code [19] and first sce-
narios involving PWR and CANDU reactors [20]. Since 
then several groups study diversion scenarios taking into 
account reactor physics constraints. The latter point is 
mandatory because these reactor physics constraints may 
eliminate de facto some scenarios that would be impossi-
ble to realize for safety reasons inherent to the operation of 
a reactor core. These reactor physics constraints influence 
also the results of a given scenario as the fission rate varia-
tions due to a fissile material diversion may be restricted by 
constraints on the maximal variation of the multiplication 
coefficient of the core or the fuel composition may be con-
strained by the minimum required delayed neutron 
fraction… 
To study whether an antineutrino detector of a footprint of 
a cubic-meter would reach an accuracy sufficient to detect 
a “significant” diversion in a “timely” fashion, the studied 
scenarios usually adopt the following IAEA definitions: a 
significant quantity would be of 8 kg of plutonium to be de-
tected in the timeliness of 3 months. 
IAEA is interested in knowing the response of an antineu-
trino detector associated to a lot of reactor designs and 
cases. Among the main ones, are the on-load reactors 
(CANDU but also Gen-IV Pebble Bed Reactors), the main 
Gen-IV designs, and the capability to distinguish various 
fuel compositions, like UOx vs MOX fuels or innovative fu-
els (including standard fuel burnt in non thermal reactors). 
Several studies are on-going and will be presented at the 
ESARDA NA/NT WG meeting [21]. 
A common methodology animates the following studies: 
first checking the modelled reactor physics using most of 
the time benchmarks, then check the feasibility of the 
considered scenarios under reactor physics constraints 
and check the interest of the scenario for safeguards 
(quality, quantity of the diverted materials). The last step is 
to analyse the probability of detection of the diversion us-
ing statistical tests, provided a number of hypotheses on 
the detector location, size, detection efficiency...
A study is on-going at Georgia-Tech and LLNL to see if 
antineutrino detection could help monitoring the irradia-
tion of plutonium-based ‘MOX’ fuel to ensure the material 
is hard to recover without reprocessing [22]. Two reactor 
designs are under study, using MCNPX and the CINDER 
evolution code: a Westinghouse-type PWR with partial 
MOX loading (most common on the US side) and the Fast 
reactor BN-600 with partial and full MOX loading (Rus-
sian side). The relation between the hypothetical detected 
antineutrino signal with the burnup is under study. Diver-
sion scenarios of replacement of assemblies by LEU or 
dummy assemblies are also under study.
Recent results obtained with the MURE code were pre-
sented recently [23]. Scenarios for a PBR (Pebble Bed Re-
actor) and a sodium-cooled FBR (Fast Breeder Reactor) 
have been studied. These reactors are Gen IV reactors, 
presenting issues for safeguards purpose: a PBR is an on-
load refuelling reactor, easing the withdrawal of plutonium 
of good quality, while FBR can, by definition, build-up 
plutonium. 
Sophisticated statistical methods inherited from funda-
mental neutrino physics calculations are also being used 
to compute the sensitivity of the antineutrino probe to the 
fuel content [24]. These calculations rely on assumptions 
made on the detector size, location, performance, but also 
on the reactor power. They were not yet coupled to realis-
tic reactor simulations but one could imagine to do so in a 
near future as the statistical tests constitute the ultimate 
steps of the study of scenarios. One outcome of these 
studies is the limitation of the sensitivity of the antineutrino 
probe due to the actual uncertainties associated to the re-
actor antineutrino spectra [24]. This opens a natural link 
between our problematics and nuclear physics as the anti-
neutrinos are emitted in the beta decays of the fission 
products. 
4. Links with other physics fields
An important work has been performed recently to investi-
gate the existing methods to compute the antineutrino en-
ergy spectra associated to the main isotopes contributing 
to the fissions in a Pressurized Water Reactor i.e. 235U, 
239Pu, 238U and 241Pu. The method developed by Schreck-
enbach et al. to convert the reference ILL integral beta 
spectra [25] was revisited leading to a normalisation shift of 
the newly obtained spectra upward by 3 % [26-28]. In par-
allel, the method relying on the summation of all the beta 
decay branches of the fission products was revisited as 
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well, taking benefit from the huge quantity of nuclear data 
available nowadays [26, 29], coupled to the MURE code. 
These works led to new synergies of our problematic with 
fundamental neutrino research on one hand with new ex-
periments at reactors aiming at evidencing potential sterile 
neutrinos [30] and with nuclear physics measurements on 
the other hand to improve our knowledge of the reactor 
antineutrino spectra [29,31].
4.1 Nuclear Physics
The antineutrino spectrum associated with one of the 4 fis-
sioning isotopes in a moderated reactor can be computed 
as the sum of the contributions of all fission products 
thanks to the use of the full information available per nucle-
us in nuclear databases. This so-called summation meth-
od is useful on several aspects. Not only it is the only one 
adapted to the computation of the antineutrino emission 
associated to various reactor designs, but also it allows 
the computation of antineutrino spectra for which no beta 
spectrum was measured so far. Moreover it is one of the 
only alternatives to the ILL data whilst takes into account 
off-equilibrium effects and allows to work with different en-
ergy binning of interest for reactor neutrino experiment 
analyses.
Lately, new summation method calculations of the antineu-
trino energy spectra arising after the fissions of the four 
main fissible isotopes 235;238U, and 239;241Pu in PWRs were 
obtained. The new calculations include the recently meas-
ured beta decay properties of the 102;104;105;106;107Tc, 105Mo, 
and 101Nb nuclei, that were suspected to suffer from the 
Pandemonium effect [31]. These beta feeding probabilities, 
measured using the Total Absorption Technique (TAS) at 
the JYFL facility of the University of Jyvaskyla, have been 
found to play a major role in the gamma component of the 
decay heat for 239Pu in the 4-3000 s range [31]. Following 
the fission product summation method, the calculation 
was performed using the MURE evolution code coupled to 
the experimental spectra built from beta decay properties 
of the fission products taken in evaluated databases. 
These latest TAS data are found to have a significant effect 
on the Pu isotope energy spectra and on the energy spec-
trum of 238U. It has thus been shown that the Pandemoni-
um effect plays a major role in the estimate of the antineu-
trino spectra [29]. TAS measurements can allow to improve 
drastically the prediction ability of these spectra. Moreover, 
independent evaluations of the reactor spectra could pro-
vide new constraints on the potential existence of sterile 
neutrinos but require a complete error calculation associ-
ated to the summation method spectra.
4.2 Neutrino Physics
As quoted above, the recent re-computation of the reactor 
antineutrino spectra has motivated a new search for sterile 
neutrinos at reactors with short baseline experiments [26-
28]. Most of the projects quoted above are mainly 
motivated by safeguards, but have added a fundamental 
physics part to their physics case. Conversely, new pro-
jects aiming at measuring sterile neutrinos at reactors 
could bring new detection and sensitivity information valu-
able for non-proliferation. In addition to the projects al-
ready quoted above, one can quote the following projects: 
SCRAAM (LLNL US), Neutrino4 (Russia), POSEIDON (Rus-
sia), HANARO (Korea), and STEREO (France) [30].
A review will be presented at the ESARDA NA/NT meeting, 
with emphasy on the possible synergy with reactor moni-
toring using antineutrino detection [21].
In addition to these projects, large detectors deployed at 
power plants measuring the theta13 mixing angle, Double 
Chooz, Daya Bay and Reno, can bring new results regard-
ing the antineutrino probe. First the R&D performed in the 
frame of these fundamental physics experiments triggered 
some of the R&D made for neutrino applied physics.
Secondly, their near detector measurements will provide 
sensitivity limits for probing the fuel content of a power re-
actor core when combined with the associated reactor 
simulation and operation parameters. In this frame, a de-
tailed full-core simulation of the Chooz PWRs, the most 
common reactor design in the world, has been success-
fully developed last year with the MURE code in order to 
compute their antineutrino emission for the Double Chooz 
experiment [6, 32]. These simulations will be compared 
during the second phase of the Double Chooz experiment 
with the near-detector data, giving a limit to the sensitivity 
on the fuel composition and reactor power that antineutri-
no detection could bring. A careful estimate of the fission 
rate systematics has been done and could allow to main-
tain the error associated to the antineutrino prediction as 
low as 1.7% [32]. This simulation is the first realistic simula-
tion of a reactor core performed in the frame of a reactor 
antineutrino experiment. This constitutes a key step of the 
studies of the detection of antineutrinos for non prolifera-
tion purpose as it will enable us to evaluate the sensitivity 
of this probe thanks to its accuracy. This validation is all 
the more important as we are moving toward an integrated 
tool (detector + simulation) for our non proliferation effort. 
Thirdly, the near detector measurements may constrain 
the value of the weak magnetism term entering in the anti-
neutrino spectrum calculation. This term is subject to large 
uncertainties akin to affect the normalisation of the anti-
neutrino spectra [27]. 
4.3 Neutron Detection
As we have seen in the first sections of these proceed-
ings, the detection of a reactor antineutrino is signed by a 
delayed coincidence between the signals created by a 
positron and a neutron. There is thus obviously strong 
synergies between antineutrino detector and neutron de-
tector R&D. For instance some segmented plastic detec-
tor designs quoted above have led to detectors that 
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could possibly replace 3He counters. The STUK develops 
a design of neutron detector combining plastic scintillator 
and 10B. We can also quote the scintilla project which 
aims, among other objectives, at developing alternative 
techniques to 3He counters to detect low energy neu-
trons [33]. We thus have to create bridges between the 
two research communities which should allow to improve 
neutron and antineutrino detection efficiencies and share 
ideas [21].
5. Conclusions and outlooks
In these proceedings, we have attempted to review briefly 
the main experimental projects on-going for near-field re-
actor monitoring. Several complementary techniques are 
employed to reject backgrounds while preserving the anti-
neutrino detection efficiency, either based on different de-
tection media either based on geometrical properties. This 
large variety of designs is accompanied by a large variety 
of deployment sites and a lot of results can be expected in 
the coming two years.
All these research axes are the object of discussions and 
exchanges between nuclear facility operators, safeguard 
authorities and researchers in the frame of the sub-work-
ing group (WG) devoted to the antineutrino probe of the 
European Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA [1]). This 
sub-WG is part of the NA/NT WG created in 2010 by the 
ESARDA. The goal of the sub-WG is to establish a road-
map for the development and performances of antineutri-
no detectors for reactor monitoring. Regular meetings are 
organized and the last one was held at the occasion of the 
ESARDA annual meeting in Brugge (Belgium) on May 27. 
2013 [1] and is the object of these proceedings. Very inter-
esting discussions were held at this occasion, presenting 
the proceedings of the first Ad-Hoc WG meeting at IAEA 
[5, 22], review talks on the on-going studies, but also on 
the synergies with other physics areas [21]… This material 
should help the community to draw the roadmap bringing 
the antineutrino detection on the next level of the Technol-
ogy Readiness scale [34].
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Abstract:
This paper reports on the results of the experiments per-
formed on spent VVER-440 fuel assemblies at the Paks 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), Hungary. The fuel assemblies 
submerged in the service pit were examined by high-reso-
lution gamma spectrometry (HRGS). The assemblies were 
moved to the front of a collimator tube built in the concrete 
wall of the pit in the reactor block at the NPP, and lifted 
down and up under water for scanning by the refueling 
machine. The HPGe detector was placed behind the colli-
mator in an outside staircase. The measurements involved 
scanning of the assemblies along their length of all the 
6 sides, at 5-12 measurement positions side by side. Axial 
and azimuthal burnup profiles were taken in this way. As-
sembly groups for measurements were selected accord-
ing to their burnup (10–50 GWd/tU) and special positions 
(e. g. control assembly, neighbour of control assembly). 
Burnup differences were well observable between assem-
bly sides looking towards the center of the core and oppo-
site directions. Also, burnup profiles were different for con-
trol assemblies and normal (working) fuel assemblies. The 
ratio of the measured activities of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was 
evaluated by relative efficiency (intrinsic) calibration. Meas-
urement uncertainty is around 3 %. Taking into account ir-
radiation history and cooling time (i. e.the time elapsed 
since the discharge of the assembly out of the core), the 
activity ratio Cs-134/Cs-137 shows good correlation with 
the declared burnup.
Keywords: Cs-134/Cs-137 ratio; high resolution gamma 
spectrometry; non-destructive assay; spent fuel 
verification
1. Introduction
Safeguarding spent fuel includes independent verification 
of fuel parameters such as burnup, cooling time, and fis-
sion material contents. Burnup is usually calculated and 
declared by the operator. Improving the accuracy of the 
calculation code has a great importance. The objective of 
this project is to support burnup calculation of spent 
VVER-440 type fuel assemblies at Paks Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP) by an independent experimental method. Most 
often nondestructive methods are used employing gamma 
and neutron techniques [1, 2]. 
On the other hand, burnup data are useful for the assess-
ment of fuel performance in the core as well as for reactor 
safety and fuel economy considerations. The burnup limit 
is provided by the supplier of the fuel. For safety reason, 
this value is to be reduced by the uncertainty of the burn-
up determination. The limit obtained in this way should be 
observed during reactor operation. Thus, effective exploi-
tation of the nuclear fuel is limited by the uncertainty of the 
burnup calculation code. If the uncertainty of calculation 
were less, the safety margin could be decreased, thus fuel 
burnup could be raised for more effective fuel use (in addi-
tion to introduction of new assembly types and longer re-
fueling period). Producing more power involves burnup in-
crease, otherwise the amount of fuel should be raised 
thereby worsening the economy. 
For verifying burnup calculated from reactor parameters, 
high resolution gamma spectrometric (HRGS) experiments 
have started at our institute for assessing the uncertainty 
of the burnup code used at the NPP. This paper presents 
a comparison of the measured and simulated values of a 
quantity found to be in correlation with the burnup; namely 
the activity ratio of the fission products Cs-134 and Cs-137. 
Improving the burnup calculation code based on the data 
presented here will ensue later. 
This paper is split up into three parts reporting the experi-
ments. The first section describes the technique used in the 
experiment, followed by evaluation and results. Finally some 
conclusions are drawn in context with enhancing the preci-
sion of the measurements and its role in refining the correla-
tion between burnup and the activity ratio Cs-134/Cs-137.
2. Experimental
The fuel assemblies were transferred under water to the ser-
vice pit for measurement. The experimental setup, shown in 
Fig. 1, was the same as described in an earlier paper [3]. The 
assemblies were moved to the front of a lead collimator built 
into the concrete wall of the pit in the reactor block, and 
moved down and up under water by the refueling machine. 
The 120 cm long collimator tube was shut on the water side 
by a 5 mm thick steel plate. Translation and rotation of the 
assemblies were performed for a full scanning. The distance 
of the assemblies from the closing plate of the collimator 
was from 30 to 60 cm in water depending on the activity of 
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Fig. 1: Scheme of the experimental setup
assembly. Gamma spectra were taken by a 46 cm3 coaxial 
HPGe detector placed behind the collimator in an outside 
staircase. The collimator enabled the detector to see the 
whole cross section of the assemblies, in 1 cm height. The 
remote controlling of a laptop computer was done from the 
measurement stand in the reactor hall by another laptop PC 
controlling the multichannel analyzer in the staircase through 
a local area network. Measurements were performed at 
5-12 measurement positions along each of the 6 sides of the 
hexahedral prism shape assemblies. 
A direct fission product 137Cs is widely considered as the best 
isotope for burnup verification. It has a measurable penetrat-
ing gamma energy of 662 keV, and similar yield comes from 
both U and Pu fission, where neutron absorption is negligible, 
and has a long half life of 30 yrs. This latter also explains its 
insensitivity to changes of the irradiation history. The activity 
of Cs-137 is proportional to the burnup (see, e. g., [4]). The 
measured Cs-137 intensity depends on the geometry as well. 
The correlation between burnup and the count rate of 137Cs 
measured at half-height of the assemblies is shown in Fig. 2. 
A typical axial distribution of the count rate of the 662 keV 
gamma rays of Cs-137 and the calculated burnup profile 
are plotted in Fig. 3.
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Dependence of Cs ratio on the distance
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Fig. 4: The activity ratio Cs-134/Cs-137 plotted as a function of collimator window-to-assembly horizontal distance. The coordinate 
2800 corresponds to 335 mm water layer
Whereas the intensity profile along the length of an assem-
bly follows the axial burnup profile, intensity values, howev-
er, depend on the measurement geometry, the absorption 
of gamma-rays, and the detector applied. Furthermore, in-
correct assembly positioning is much more likely during 
assembly rotation than during axial scanning. Since exper-
imental conditions did not allow arranging the geometry 
precisely enough, Cs-137 activity alone is not suitable for 
examining the azimuthal burnup profile, for which the ac-
tivity ratio Cs-134/Cs-137 is more suitable. As Cs-134 is 
not a direct fission product, but is formed by neutron 
capture on the fission product Cs-133, its abundance is 
approximately proportional to the square of the burn-up. 
The activity ratio of Cs-134 to Cs-137 (Cs ratio) is therefore 
approximately proportional to the burnup again [1, 5]. Un-
like the count rate of a given peak, the activity ratio is inde-
pendent of the geometry, the absorption, and the detector. 
For illustration, an assembly was measured at different dis-
tances from the collimator. The dependence of the Cs ratio 
on the distance is shown in Fig. 4. As seen, the measured 
ratio remains unchanged within to 1% at the assembly 
movement of more than 20 cm. 
A total of 28 spent fuel assemblies were measured at 5-12 
fixed height positions, from all six sides. Table 1 shows the 
main characteristics of the assemblies assayed. Four assem-
bly groups were selected, six assemblies in each, as the core 
was divided into six sectors. From all sectors, assemblies of 
similar positions and histories were chosen. Their burnup and 
cooling time varied between 10 – 45 GWd/tU and between 
0.7 – 5.7 years, respectively. Follower parts of two control as-
semblies and their neighbours were also assayed. The inten-
sities of the 605 and 796 keV peaks of Cs-134 as well as the 
662 keV peak of Cs-137 were measured for 300 – 600 s in 
each position. 
Table 1: Main data of the assemblies measured. Each group contains 6 assemblies of the same initial enrichment, burnup and irradiation 
history. Besides total burnup, yearly data are also given. Measurements were carried out at the end of the last campaign. Accumulated 
(over the campaigns) cooling times are indicated.
main BU / Campaign
group enr. % BU tot. cooling time years 1 2 3 4
1 3.8 44.34 0.7 9.59 12.67 11.24 10.84
2 1.6 10.26 5.7 10.26
3 3.8 39.49 1.6 10.37 12.75 12.20 4.18
4 2.4 26.44 2.6 8.57 9.90 4.16 3.82
follower 2.4 20.87 1.6 10.75 10.13
follower 3.8 32.43 0.7 9.73 12.17 10.53
neighbour 3.8 40.91 0.7 11.56 13.45 11.66 4.23
neighbour 3.8 40.91 0.7 11.56 13.45 11.66 4.23
The measurement campaign lasted for 5 weeks. About 
1200 spectra were evaluated by dedicated software devel-
oped at the institute. Statistical uncertainty of peak areas 
was around 1%. Cs ratios were extrapolated to a common 
date of the beginning of the measurements, due to the rel-
atively short half-life (2.06 y) of Cs-134, and were deter-
mined for each measurement point. The extrapolated Cs 
activity ratios varied between 0.1 and 1.5.
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Fig. 5: A typical Cs ratio profile with experimental points and theoretical curve
3. Evaluation and results
Activity ratios were determined using the main gamma 
lines of Cs-134 (605, 795 keV) and the 662 keV line of Cs-
137 by the relative efficiency (intrinsic) calibration method 
[5]-[7], which utilizes the fact that activities calculated from 
different gamma lines of the same isotope must be equal. 
Cs-137 activity and the activity ratio were evaluated at eve-
ry measurement point. 
A relative efficiency curve was constructed by using the 
two gamma lines of Cs-134 mentioned above. For ener-
gies above ~300 keV, the efficiency curve of HPGe detec-
tors can be approximated with a linear function on a log-
log scale. In the short interval between 605 and 796 keV, 
however, the linear approximation gives acceptable accu-
racy. For real spectra, the statistical uncertainty of the 
peaks other than those at 605 and 796 keV is quite high, 
thus only the peaks at 605 and 796 keV were used for 
constructing the relative efficiency curve. Using only two 
points on the linear scale simplifies the calculations, and 
provides an efficiency curve which might be the cause for 
small systematic biases in the measured Cs-ratio, but is 
free from random uncertainties which would emerge from 
using more gamma energies and a more complicated 
functional form for the efficiency. The eventual systematic 
bias is expected to be well below the uncertainty which is 
aimed at the present stage of the project. Using the 
γ-energies 605, 662, and 796 keV, a Monte Carlo simula-
tion provided a difference below 2% from the linear ap-
proximation in the relevant energy interval. The γ-rays of 
the three energies coming from various pins were taken 
into account in the model, and the ratios of the corre-
sponding count rates were examined after intensity sum-
ming, considering various radii of the water cylinder the as-
sembly being immersed. 
The relative efficiency εCs134(E) as a function of the gamma-
ray energy E can be given as 
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Then the activity ratio 134Cs/137Cs can be determined as 
 
A
A
keV
I B
Cs134
137
134
662 662
662
=
 ( )
/
. (2)
Here I605 and I796 are the measured peak areas of the 605 
and 796 keV γ-lines of 134Cs, I662 is that of the 662 keV 
γ-line of 137Cs, whereas B605, B796, and B662 are the corre-
sponding emission probabilities. 
The measured and calculated burnup profile of an assembly 
in terms of the Cs ratio is shown in Fig. 5. The calculation was 
carried out by the operator [8]. Production and decay of the 
Cs isotopes was followed by the C-PORCA code [9]. This 
model was developed with the help of the burn-up calculation 
procedure of the HELIOS 2D transport code [10]. The neces-
sary fission yields, decay constants, cross section data and 
number densities arose from the data library of HELIOS code 
which was based on the ENDF/B-VI data files [11] in this case. 
The system of the differential equations was solved by the 
method of fourth order Runge-Kutta as part of the  C-PORCA 
code. The results of calculations represent the burn-up and 
the concentrations of Cs isotopes in individual pins of an as-
sembly at axial nodes of 6 cm height. This means that calcu-
lated burn-up and concentrations for an assembly comprise a 
dataset of 41 values for each of the 126 pins. Burnup asym-
metries throughout the core were revealed and interpreted. 
Four groups of assemblies were measured with various burn-
up and cooling time. Differences of uniform burnup assem-
blies were observable between assembly sides looking at the 
center of the reactor core and opposite directions. 
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Fig. 6: Measured azimuthal Cs-ratio profiles at half-height of pins of the 26 GWd/tU burn-up assembly group around the core
This is illustrated on a polar diagram in Fig. 6 by a graphi-
cal representation of the Cs ratio measured in a group of 
six assemblies symmetrically positioned around the core 
during reactor operation. The burnup of the assemblies 
was uniformly 26 GWd/tU, whereas they were measured 
with 2.6 years cooling. It was shown that Cs ratios (in blue) 
are higher on the assembly sides looking at the core cen-
tre (the values plotted at the vertices of the hexagons cor-
respond to those at faces of the assemblies). In this case 
Cs ratio is varying between 0.47 – 0.66, reaching the high-
er value on the side nearer the core centre and the lower 
value on the opposite side. 
For example, Cs ratios measured on the 6 sides of the 
assembly on the top of the figure are as follows: on the 
side looking straight down (direction core centre), it is 
around 0.66, whereas on the side looking straight up, 
around 0.47.
Certain groups of assemblies show strong burnup asym-
metries depending on the position of their sides with re-
spect to the centre of the core, referring to “anomalies” in 
temperature or neutron flux in the core. Burnup profiles of 
the working assemblies and of the followers also differ 
from each other, in accordance with the measurements. 
Measured axial profiles (in terms of Cs ratio) of a working 
assembly are plotted in Fig. 7, whereas those of a control 
assembly are in Fig. 8, at various angles of assembly ro-
tation. Control assemblies consist of absorber and fol-
lower parts, the latter contain fuel pins like working 
assemblies. 
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Further experiments are required to refine the agreement 
between experiment and calculation, thus further de-
crease the uncertainty of both the measurements and the 
calculation.
4. Conclusions
Both the axial and azimuthal burnup profile of spent fuel 
assemblies can very precisely be followed using the re-
sults from non-destructive HRGS measurements.
Considering the statistical error (1%) and the linear approx-
imation of the efficiency, uncertainty of the measured data 
is about 3 %. This can be improved by longer measure-
ments and a more accurate treatment of the efficiency. We 
would eventually like to reach 1 % accuracy at least. 
It is expected in this initial state of the project that the cur-
rently assumed 13 % (3σ) uncertainty of burnup calcula-
tion can be decreased by utilizing the data of the experi-
mental results. This facilitates observing safety limits more 
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accurately in planning of the loading pattern of the core 
and during reactor operation.
Measurement of additional assemblies is needed to refine 
the agreement between experiment and calculations.
It is foreseen that the experimental results will be used for 
improving the accuracy of the burnup calculation code, 
thus enabling more efficient use of the nuclear fuel. How-
ever, the connection between the uncertainty of the burn-
up value and the Cs activity ratio needs to be investigated 
for different operational parameters and cooling times. 
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Abstract:
One of the most common ways to investigate new Non-
Destructive Assays (NDA) for the spent fuel assemblies are 
Monte Carlo simulations. In order to build realistic models 
the user must define in an accurate way the material com-
positions and the source terms in the system.
This information can be obtained using burnup codes 
such as ORIGEN-ARP and ALEPH2.2, developed at 
SCK•CEN. These software applications allow the user to 
select the irradiation history of the fuel assembly and to 
calculate the corresponding isotopic composition and 
neutron/gamma emissions as a function of time.
In the framework of the development of an innovative NDA 
for spent fuel verifications, SCK•CEN built an extensive 
fuel library for 17x17 PWR assemblies, using both ORIGEN-
ARP and ALEPH2.2. The parameters considered in the 
calculations were initial enrichment, discharge burnup, and 
cooling time. The combination of these variables allows to 
obtain more than 1500 test cases.
Considering the broad range of the parameters, the fuel li-
brary can be used for other purposes apart from spent 
fuel verifications, for instance for the direct disposal in geo-
logical repositories.
In addition to the isotopic composition of the spent fuel, 
the neutron and photon emissions were also calculated 
and compared between the two codes. The comparison 
of the isotopic composition showed a good agreement be-
tween the codes for most of the relevant isotopes in the 
spent fuel. However, specific isotopes as well as neutron 
and gamma spectra still need to be investigated in detail.
Keywords: Spent Fuel; PWR; ORIGEN-ARP; ALEPH2.2
1. Introduction
Spent fuel is characterized by a very high neutron and gam-
ma emission due to the  spontaneous fission of heavy nu-
clides and radioactive decay of fission products that have 
been produced during irradiation. The irradiation in the reac-
tor produces numerous fission products and actinides that 
make the resulting isotopic composition and associated 
gamma spectra particularly complex [1]. Considering the 
high neutron and gamma field together with the significant 
heat coming from the decay of the fission products and ac-
tinides, the spent fuel is generally stored under water in a 
spent fuel pool and it is not directly accessible by the safe-
guards inspectors. Given the characteristics listed above, 
the spent fuel can be considered as one of the most difficult 
materials to verify during an inspection.
Non-destructive assays (NDA) are one of the possible meth-
ods to verify the spent fuel and several research projects 
are trying to improve their current capabilities [2],[3]. One of 
the ways to investigate new NDA for the spent fuel assem-
blies are Monte Carlo simulations. In order to build realistic 
models the user must define in an accurate way the materi-
al compositions and the source terms in the system. There-
fore an effort was made to define a spent fuel library that 
serves as reference to benchmark the performances of the 
measurements methods under investigations.
The goals of this preliminary work are therefore twofold. 
The first one is to understand how the irradiation history of 
the fuel influences its isotopic composition (and conse-
quently its neutron and gamma source strength). The sec-
ond one is to generate automatically several input cards 
compatible with the MCNPX [4],[5] code that will be used 
in the study of innovative NDA techniques. To achieve both 
goals the spent fuel needs to be characterized in terms of 
isotopic composition, neutron and gamma emission (both 
source intensity and energy spectrum).
Section 2 of this paper describes the main features of 
ORIGEN-ARP and ALEPH2.2, the two codes used for the 
simulations, together with a brief explanation on the mod-
els that have been incorporated in both codes.
The third section gives an overview of the main structure of 
the spent fuel library and of the range of the parameters 
used to create it (initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling 
time). This section contains the main results obtained with 
the ORIGEN-ARP simulations. The neutron emissions are 
separated into the two main components (α,n reactions 
and spontaneous fissions) and the total values are plotted 
against initial enrichment (IE), burnup (BU) and cooling 
time (CT). In addition, the role of individual isotope is stud-
ied to understand how the composition of the spent fuel 
influences the neutron emissions.
A comparison between the results obtained with ORIGEN-
ARP and ALEPH2.2 is carried out in section 4. Both the 
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neutron emissions and nuclide concentrations calculated 
by the two codes are evaluated as a function of the burn-
up and cooling time.
Section 5 considers some parameters (e.g. boron concen-
tration in the water) that have an impact on the final results 
of the simulations. The impact is estimated both in terms 
of neutron emissions and nuclide concentration. This 
chapter is based on the results of ALEPH2.2 simulations, 
since with this code the user can completely define the 
geometry and material composition of the system.
The libraries built with the two codes are compared in sec-
tion 6 with the spent fuel reference library developed by 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This compari-
son considered the data of the total neutron emission and 
of four neutron emitters (two Cm isotopes and two Pu iso-
topes) of three corresponding cases (i.e. simulations with 
the same IE, BU, and CT).
The conclusions at the end of the document summarize the 
main results coming from the simulations, highlighting the 
main factors behind the change in the neutron and gamma 
emission and isotopic composition of the spent fuel.
2.  Computational models used for 
the calculations
The study of the time evolution of the nuclear fuel generally 
requires the combination of computer codes to model the 
neutron transport in the reactor and to predict the fuel 
composition due to the radioactive decay of its isotopes.
Two different codes have been used to perform the simu-
lations: ORIGEN-ARP and ALEPH2.2.
The first code uses a set of pre-compiled averaged cross 
section values (called ORIGEN-ARP cross section library) 
as input to the depletion calculation. This procedure avoids 
the time consuming neutron transport and therefore leads 
to the strong reduction in the computational time required 
for the simulations.
The second code uses a statistical approach (Monte Carlo 
method) for the calculation of the neutron transport and 
then performs the fuel depletion. By using the Monte Carlo 
code MCNP(X), ALEPH2.2 retains the great flexibility in the 
definition of the system (geometry, materials) and in the 
nuclear data used in the simulation. As a drawback the 
computational time can be significantly longer than in the 
case of ORIGEN-ARP.
The simulations with ORIGEN-ARP generally took less 
than one minute to complete with a regular portable PC. 
Most of the time was spent by the user in the selection of 
the input parameters.
The computational time required by the simulations with 
ALEPH-2.2 strongly depends on the statistics requested 
by the user (i.e. the parameters of the kcode used as 
source term) and by the burnup of the assembly. By using 
a cluster with 16 cpus, the fastest case was the one of 5 
GWd/tU and took about 2 hours to complete, whereas the 
case with 70 GWd/tU took almost 5 days.
2.1 ORIGEN-ARP
The first code used to generate the fuel library is ORIGEN-
ARP [6] and it is part of the SCALE package [7] that is de-
veloped by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).
ORIGEN-ARP employs a graphical user interface (GUI) to 
select several characteristics of the fuel assembly. The 
PWR 17x17 (w17x17) case has been chosen considering 
its worldwide use in the nuclear power plants. The GUI is 
composed of several menus that are shown subsequently 
when all parameters in one window have been introduced 
and validated by the user.
Apart from the type of fuel geometry, the first window (“Ex-
press”) contains other parameters as follows:
• all results are normalized to 1 ton of uranium;
• the average power is set to 40 MW/tU. This value is tak-
en from [8] and results in a burnup of 14.4 GWd/tU for a 
cycle of 360 days;
• the moderator density is the default value of 0.723 g/cm3.
The next section is the “Composition” window:
• the abundances of the uranium isotopes are the default 
values proposed by ORIGEN-ARP depending on the ini-
tial enrichment selected in the previous section;
• oxygen was added to the list of isotopes in the fresh fuel 
in order to model the UO2 material in the fuel pin. The 
natural isotopic composition was selected with a con-
centration of 134500 g/t.
The section “Neutron” allows selecting the energy-group 
structure for the neutron source spectra. The “238-group 
ENDF5” is the option chosen in the calculation. This group 
structure extends from 10-5 eV up to 20 MeV. This section 
determines only the division of the energy groups and 
does not select the data library used by the code for the 
nuclear data.
At the same way, the photon emissions are treated ac-
cording to a 74-group library defined by the user. The 
group structure extends from 10 keV up to 10 MeV.
The most extensive section in the ORIGEN-ARP interface is 
the “Cases” windows, where the user selects the character-
istics of the irradiation history. All simulations for the fuel li-
brary consider irradiation cycles of maximum 360 days, af-
ter which the fuel assembly undergoes a decay period of 30 
days. The duration of the last irradiation cycle is adapted to 
reach the desired level of burnup at the discharge. Following 
this procedure, the fuel assembly is exposed to the same 
power level during all cycles in the reactor. After the final un-
loading from the reactor (i.e. the last irradiation cycle is com-
pleted), the ORIGEN-ARP calculation considers 30 cooling 
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Figure 1: Neutron emission as a function of the burnup for a 17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly with initial enrichment of 3.5% and cooling 
time of 1 day. The contributions due to (alpha,n) and spontaneous fission reactions as well as the total neutron emission are shown.
times to compute the isotopic composition and both neu-
tron and gamma emissions.
Other options selected in ORIGEN-ARP are:
• no cutoff is selected for the composition so all the iso-
topes are reported in the output file;
• output precision is 6 digits for the values of the mass 
concentrations;
• output precision is 4 digits for the neutron and gamma 
emission;
• the fuel matrix for the (α,n) evaluation is the UO2;
• bremsstrahlung is not considered in the model.
2.2 ALEPH2.2
ALEPH is the Monte-Carlo burn-up code being developed 
by SCK•CEN since 2004 [9]. The code belongs to the cat-
egory of shells coupling Monte Carlo particle transport 
codes and deterministic depletion algorithms.
The fuel assembly model considered in ALEPH2.2 tries to 
be identical to the case considered with ORIGEN-ARP. 
The geometry is the same as the PWR 17x17 fuel assem-
bly modelled in ORIGEN-ARP (Table D1.A.3 of [6]), with the 
exception that the active length is reduced to 1 meter. It 
has been supposed that there is no water gap between 
neighbouring assemblies and this has been simulated 
placing reflecting surfaces around the fuel assembly.
The irradiation history is defined in terms of irradiation 
power (MW), length of the irradiation step (days), and 
length of the decay step (days, years). All these parameters 
are chosen to have the same conditions as those used for 
the ORIGEN-ARP simulations.
Other parameters in the input files are:
• the geometry of the fuel assembly (pin radius and pitch) 
and the initial composition of the fuel is the same as the 
ORIGEN-ARP simulations;
• the fuel temperature is 900 K;
• the cladding temperature is 620 K;
• the moderator temperature is 575 K (with a density of 
0.723 g/cm3);
• the water contains 630 ppm of Boron (according to 
abundances of 10B and 11B). This is the average Boron 
concentration reported in ORIGEN-ARP (Table D1.A.3 in 
Ref. [6]); this value is kept constant during the irradiation 
simulations in ALEPH2.2.
• each irradiation step runs a kcode with 5000 particles 
and an initial value for keff=1.16. The keff of the assembly is 
calculated taking the average value of 100 cycles, ne-
glecting the first one from the calculations;
• the neutron source is modeled as a Watt fission spec-
trum with the parameters of the neutron-induced fission 
of 235U [4].
3. Main characteristics of the fuel library
The reference spent fuel library has been developed using 
three variables to take into account the most representa-
tive irradiation histories of the spent fuel. In particular:
• Initial enrichment (IE): 4 values from 3.5% to 5.0%, with 
increments of 0.5%
• Discharge burnup (BU): 14 values from 5 up to 70 GWd/
tU, with increments of 5 GWd/tU
• Cooling time (CT): 30 values ranging from immediate dis-
charge up to 3 million years
The combination of these parameters allows to obtain 
1680 different compositions and source terms.
This fuel library does not consider the element history in 
the reactor core (location, different length of outages, dif-
ferent power level during irradiation). Future work will refine 
the results obtained at this stage and investigate these 
factors.
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In order to refine the study it is important to understand 
the role of each isotope in the total neutron emission. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the percentage of the total neutron 
emission due to each isotope as a function of cooling time.
Figure 1 shows the neutron emissions as a function of the 
burnup. The data have been calculated with ORIGEN-ARP, 
with a fuel of 3.5% initial enrichment and after a cooling time of 
1 day. The plot reveals that the spontaneous fission is the main 
source for the neutron emission after a short cooling time. This 
fact needs to be evaluated also with higher cooling times.
In order to do so, Figure 2 shows the neutron emission as a 
function of cooling time for the burnup value of 10 GWd/tU.
The contribution from (α,n) reactions is generally one order 
of magnitude lower than the term due to spontaneous 
fission. The only exception is for burnup of 10 GWd/tU with 
cooling times between 30 and 300 years (Figure 2). For 
these combinations the two contributions are similar, with 
cases where the (α,n) reactions have the dominant role on 
the neutron emission.
Looking at Figure 2, there is a clear increase of the (α,n) 
contribution around 100 years of cooling time. This is due 
to the build-up of 241Am from 241Pu (half-life of 14.4 years). 
The same effect is present also at higher burnup, but it is 
not visible due to the higher neutron emission that con-
ceals this contribution.
Figure 2: Neutron emission as a function of the cooling time for a 17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly with initial enrichment of 3.5% and 
discharge burnup of 10 GWd/tU. The contributions due to (alpha,n) and spontaneous fission reactions as well as the total neutron emis-
sion are shown.
Figure 3: Fraction of the total neutron emission due to a set of isotopes as a function of the burnup for a 17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly 
with initial enrichment of 3.5% and discharge burnup of 10 GWd/tU. The contributions due to specific isotopes and the sum of all remain-
ing isotopes (‘Others’) are shown.
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Figure 4: Fraction of the total neutron emission due to single isotopes as a function of the burnup for a 17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly 
with initial enrichment of 3.5% and discharge burnup of 35 GWd/tU. The contributions due to specific isotopes and the sum of all remain-
ing isotopes (‘Others’) are shown.
Both for Figure 3 and 4 there are 11 isotopes that are re-
sponsible for about 99% of the total neutron emission (the 
value ‘Others’ is relevant only for cooling times higher than 
10000 years).
At low burnup the 242Cm is the main responsible for the 
neutron emission up to 100 days, a role that is taken then 
by 244Cm and several plutonium isotopes. Another relevant 
contribution comes from 241Am (as it has been suggested 
from the peak in Figure 2). Other curium isotopes are not 
present at low burnup values because the short irradiation 
time did not allow the build-up of these high-Z isotopes.
With a burnup of 35 GWd/tU (Figure 4) two isotopes of cu-
rium (242Cm and 244Cm) are responsible for basically all 
neutron emissions up to a few years of cooling time, but 
opposite to Figure 3 now 244Cm is the main actor. Increas-
ing the cooling time another Cm isotope (246Cm) has an 
impact on the total neutron emission because the other 
previous isotopes have short half-lives. Other contributions 
come from 241Am, 240Pu, and 242Pu.
The latter isotope is the main responsible for the neutron 
emission in the long term, together with 238U, and a list of 
other isotopes (indicated as ‘Others’). One must bear in 
mind that the magnitude of the emission for high cooling 
times is very low compared to the value at the discharge 
and this is the reason why many isotopes have a non-neg-
ligible role for long cooling times.
Increasing the burnup to 60 GWd/tU there are small differ-
ences to the case of 35 GWd/tU. 244Cm takes an even high-
er contribution for the short cooling times, as well as 246Cm 
for intermediate values. At very high cooling time 248Cm ap-
pears to be important along with 242Pu and 238U.
The analysis so far focused on the influence of burnup 
(BU) and cooling time (CT) on the neutron emissions. 
Since the initial enrichment (IE) plays also a role, the next 
part investigates this variable. Figure 5 shows the ratios of 
the total neutron emission as a function of the burnup for 
the enrichments considered in the simulations.
By looking at the magnitude of the difference between the 
enrichment values, it seems that this variable plays a minor 
role in the determination of the neutron emission com-
pared to burnup and cooling time. In fact, while by chang-
ing the burnup the neutron flux value varies of more than 
one order of magnitude, the maximum difference with the 
initial enrichment is of less than a factor 3.
The origin of the peak observed in Figure 5 can be ex-
plained by looking at Figure 6. This plot shows the ratio of 
the total neutron emissions after a cooling time of 10 years. 
In addition to the curve ‘Total’ (that is the same of the 
curve ‘3.5/5.0’ of Figure 5) also the ratios for specific iso-
topes are added. The curve related to the single isotopes 
is calculated taking the ratio between the neutron emission 
due to this isotope at 3.5% initial enrichment and the total 
neutron emission at 5.0%
It is clear that the shape of the curve ‘Total’ is determined 
by the one of 244Cm at burnup higher than 30 GWd/tU, 
while at lower burnup mainly 239Pu, 240Pu, and 241Am deter-
mine the shape of the curve.
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4. Comparison of the two codes
The next step is to compare the two codes used to gener-
ate the spent fuel library. The set of simulations in the 
codes used the same values of:
• IE, BU, and CT;
• average power during irradiation;
• radius of the fuel pin, cladding, and pitch between neigh-
bouring pins;
• boron concentration in the water.
The impact of the boron concentration, the water gap be-
tween the assemblies, and the data library on the final re-
sults will be investigated in the next section.
Each code applies a different normalization unit for the cal-
culated data (tU for ORIGEN-ARP and cm
3 for ALEPH2.2). 
In order to compare the two codes it is necessary to 
renormalize one of the two to have the same measure-
ment unit in all simulations.
Figure 5: Ratio of total neutron emissions for different enrichments as a function of the burnup for a 17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly with 
cooling time of 10 years. The initial enrichments used for the ratio are indicated close to the corresponding curve.
Figure 6: Total neutron emission with different initial enrichments – role of selected isotopes (CT: 10 years). The green curve (‘Total’) is the 
same of Figure 5 (‘3.5/5.0’). The curves relative to single isotopes are calculated taking the ratio between the neutron emission due to the 
specific isotopes in the case of fuel with 3.5% initial enrichment and the total neutron emission at 5.0% initial enrichment.
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A comparison of the nuclides concentrations obtained by 
the two codes has been made in order to understand the 
reason of the difference in the neutron emissions. The fol-
lowing table shows the ratio between the concentrations 
of selected nuclides as a function of the burnup. The iso-
topic compositions are calculated at direct discharge.
Table 1 shows that the mass concentrations of the 
main neutron emitters calculated by ORIGEN-ARP are 
usually lower compared to the results obtained with 
ALEPH2.2. 
The fact that 242Cm and 244Cm are responsible for over 
90% of the neutron emission up to few years of cooling 
time, explains the lower neutron emission calculated 
with ORIGEN-ARP. The values in the table follow the 
same trend independently from the initial enrichment of 
the fuel. 
Figure 7 compares the results of ORIGEN-ARP and the 
ones coming from ALEPH2.2 in relative terms. The fuel 
used in these simulations had an initial enrichment of 
3.5%. ORIGEN-ARP always yields a lower value of 
emissions compared to ALEPH2.2. The ratio of the 
values coming from the two codes remains rather 
 constant around 0.95 with the burnup. The only excep-
tion is at 100 years of cooling time, where there seems 
to be a decreasing trend for burnup higher than 
40 GWd/tU.
Figure 7: Ratio of the total neutron emission as a function of the burnup. The plot shows the ratio between the total neutron emission 
calculated by ORIGEN-ARP and ALEPH2.2 for fuel with a 3.5% initial enrichment and 1, 10, and 100 years of cooling time.
Isotope
BU  
(GWd/tU)
cm242 cm244 cm246 cm248 u235 u238 pu238 pu239 pu240 pu241 pu242 am241
5 0.862 1.126 0.875 0.870 0.996 1.000 1.101 1.012 1.024 1.046 1.091 1.052
10 0.828 1.005 0.740 0.697 0.991 1.000 1.046 1.000 0.997 1.063 1.071 1.049
15 0.840 0.978 0.698 0.645 0.987 1.001 1.023 0.995 0.976 1.068 1.079 1.079
20 0.857 1.007 0.732 0.669 0.981 1.001 1.004 1.000 0.990 0.993 1.054 1.076
25 0.845 1.007 0.737 0.693 0.976 1.001 0.985 1.001 0.991 0.990 1.018 1.057
30 0.838 0.998 0.724 0.696 0.970 1.002 0.966 1.004 0.988 0.991 1.003 1.054
35 0.841 0.990 0.720 0.685 0.965 1.002 0.949 1.005 0.995 0.969 0.996 1.073
40 0.845 0.982 0.704 0.683 0.960 1.002 0.932 1.006 0.995 0.971 0.983 1.080
45 0.846 0.979 0.690 0.675 0.956 1.003 0.916 1.009 0.994 0.970 0.976 1.082
50 0.851 0.973 0.682 0.662 0.954 1.004 0.901 1.008 0.997 0.961 0.973 1.106
55 0.858 0.971 0.672 0.653 0.953 1.004 0.885 1.009 0.998 0.963 0.965 1.118
60 0.861 0.972 0.663 0.646 0.954 1.005 0.871 1.014 0.995 0.965 0.961 1.120
65 0.866 0.972 0.657 0.637 0.958 1.006 0.857 1.013 0.998 0.963 0.958 1.145
70 0.873 0.973 0.650 0.628 0.963 1.006 0.844 1.015 0.999 0.965 0.955 1.160
Table 1: Ratio between the nuclide concentrations obtained with  ORIGEN-ARP and ALEPH2.2 as a function of the burnup. The fuel had 
3.5 % initial enrichment and the concentrations were taken at direct discharge from the reactor.
55
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 50, December 2013
Figure 8: Influence of the boron concentration as a function of the burnup – ratio of the neutron emission. The fuel had 3.5 % initial en-
richment and the ratio has been calculated for 1, 10, and 100 years of cooling time.
5. Impact of other parameters on the results
5.1 Boron concentration
Simulations with ALEPH2.2 considered cases with water 
without boron and with a boron concentration of 630 
ppm (the same as the ORIGEN-ARP cases). In this sec-
tion the impact of boron on the neutron emissions is 
discussed.
The neutron emissions as a function of the burnup obtained 
with and without boron follow the same trend as in Figure 1. 
The trend of the curves is very similar, but the neutron emis-
sions are higher when boron in present. The magnitude of 
the boron impact can be seen in Figure 8 where the ratio 
between corresponding values of burnup is shown. By 
looking at the ratio, one can estimate that the influence of 
boron is within 10% of the total neutron emission.
The presence of boron modifies the energy spectrum of the 
neutron flux during irradiation in the reactor. This is because 
boron is an absorber of thermal neutrons and therefore the 
contribution of epithermal neutrons to the spectrum be-
comes higher when boron is present in the moderator. 
This induces an increase of the resonance captures and 
a higher production of actinides. Figure 9 shows the ratio 
between the mass concentration of 242Cm, 244Cm, and 
240Pu calculated with and without boron. The fuel had an 
initial enrichment of 3.5% and a cooling time of 10 years. 
Considering that the isotopes in Figure 9 are the main 
neutron emitters, this explains the higher neutron emis-
sion observed in the simulations with 630 ppm of boron.
Figure 9: Influence of the boron concentration as a function of the burnup. The plot shows the ratio of the nuclide concentrations calcu-
lated with ALEPH2.2 considering fuel with 3.5% initial enrichment and 10 years of cooling time.
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No water gap has been placed in the default simulations 
and this is motivated by the fact that operators try to keep 
uniform conditions over the whole core cross section. 
Therefore the pitch between outer rows of neighbouring 
fuel assemblies should be similar (if not equal) to the pitch 
of the rods within one single assembly.
5.3 Nuclear data library used in the codes
Another important parameter in the simulations is the set 
of data library that is used. The data libraries available in 
ALEPH2.2 are the ENDF/B-VII.1 [10] and JEFF-3.1.2 [11] li-
braries. Both libraries contain full data sets which include 
neutron transport data (cross sections and secondary par-
ticle emission data), radioactive decay data (which are 
used by the depletion module for the neutron source cal-
culation), and fission product yields data (which are also 
used by the depletion module). The choice of the library in-
fluences the results because of the different values for the 
evaluated nuclear data (e.g. nuclides cross sections) 
adopted in each data set.
Figure 11 shows the ratio of the neutron emissions at dis-
charge calculated using the different libraries as a function 
of the burnup. The difference in the results is within 10%, 
with the simulations using the ENDF data library always 
overestimating the neutron emission compared to the cal-
culations with the JEFF library.
ALEPH2.2 calculates the spontaneous fission neutron 
source in two ways: the first one generates the Watt fission 
spectrum of the neutrons for nuclides undergoing sponta-
neous fission, with the parameters taken from ORIGEN-S 
[9] (‘Type A’ curve in Figure 11); the second one calculates 
the source using the information stored in radioactive de-
cay data library (ENDF/B or JEFF, ‘Type B’ curve in Figure 
11). Usually, the two methods give close results, but a 
trend is observed for high burnup with the ‘Type B’ 
5.2 Water spacing between fuel assemblies
One important characteristic about the geometry of the 
fuel assembly is the distance between two neighbouring 
fuel assemblies during the irradiation in the reactor. This 
parameter depends on the type of fuel assembly and 
likely also on the particular configuration of the reactor 
(e.g. number of fuel assemblies in the core).
A set of simulations has been run to quantify the impact 
of the spacing between fuel assemblies on the concen-
tration of the nuclides and consequently on the neutron 
and gamma emissions from the spent fuel. The only pa-
rameter changing in the simulations was the water 
spacing between the fuel assemblies (from 0 up to 
10 mm). Other characteristics were:
• The initial enrichment of the fuel was 3.5%
• The discharge burnups were 10, 35, and 60 GWd/tU
• The water in the reactor had a constant boron concen-
tration of 630 ppm.
Figure 10 shows the total neutron emission as a function of 
the water spacing and discharge burnup. The ratio has been 
calculated normalizing all values to the neutron flux without 
water gap between the assemblies. From the plot it is evident 
that the water around the assembly influences significantly 
the neutron emissions. Already with a water gap of 4 mm (i.e. 
2 mm for each side) the total emission is altered by 5% How-
ever, this difference decreases with increasing burnup.
Figure 10: Total neutron emission as a function of the water spacing. The values are normalized to the case without gap between the 
assemblies. The fuel had 3.5% initial enrichment and the values refer to direct discharge from the reactor.
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Table 2 shows the ratio between the nuclide concentra-
tions calculated with the two libraries available in 
ALEPH2.2. The values refer to the fuel with initial en-
richment of 3.5% and directly after discharge.
As shown in the comparison between the two codes, 
also in the case of different data libraries the highest 
discrepancy is found for curium isotopes (244Cm and 
246Cm). The selection of the data library influences most 
of isotopic concentration within 5% but also for 238Pu 
the disagreement is higher and it increases with the 
burnup.
calculations. The trend observed with the calculations aris-
es because ALEPH2.2 recognizes a different set of iso-
topes contributing to the neutron emission from spontane-
ous fissions depending on the data library that is used in 
the calculation. The impact of the nuclides that are missing 
according to some data library (e.g. 252Cf is not used if the 
data library is ENDF/B-VII.1) is not negligible and it is the 
reason of the trend shown in Figure 11.
It is important to mention that ALEPH is still in the develop-
ment phase and there are interactions with the develop-
ment team to investigate this issue.
Figure 11: Ratio of the neutron emission calculated with ALEPH2.2 using different nuclear data libraries. The fuel had 3.5% initial enrichment 
and the values refer to direct discharge from the reactor. The contributions due to (α,n) reactions and spontaneous fission are shown.
Isotope 
BU  
(GWd/tU)
cm242 cm244 cm246 u235 u238 pu238 pu239 pu240 pu241 pu242 am241
5 1.053 1.195 1.179 1.000 1.000 1.018 1.006 1.013 1.020 1.025 1.031
10 1.042 1.159 1.172 1.000 1.000 1.017 1.001 1.007 1.015 1.016 1.020
15 1.037 1.147 1.166 1.000 0.999 1.021 1.001 1.004 1.011 1.011 1.017
20 1.036 1.138 1.156 1.000 0.999 1.025 1.002 0.998 1.013 1.012 1.018
25 1.035 1.130 1.155 1.001 0.999 1.033 1.001 0.996 1.011 1.010 1.018
30 1.034 1.124 1.159 1.001 0.999 1.041 1.000 0.995 1.008 1.010 1.017
35 1.032 1.108 1.156 1.001 0.998 1.050 0.999 0.993 1.007 1.010 1.016
40 1.031 1.097 1.154 1.001 0.998 1.059 0.998 0.991 1.008 1.009 1.015
45 1.029 1.089 1.153 1.001 0.998 1.069 0.998 0.988 1.006 1.008 1.015
50 1.029 1.084 1.145 1.002 0.997 1.080 0.998 0.985 1.009 1.007 1.015
55 1.028 1.074 1.138 1.002 0.997 1.092 0.997 0.983 1.007 1.008 1.015
60 1.027 1.066 1.134 1.001 0.997 1.104 0.994 0.985 1.000 1.008 1.012
65 1.026 1.058 1.128 1.000 0.996 1.117 0.992 0.984 0.997 1.007 1.010
70 1.023 1.051 1.123 0.999 0.996 1.130 0.990 0.983 0.996 1.005 1.006
Table 2: Ratio between the nuclide concentrations obtained with the two libraries (ENDF/JEFF) as a function of the burnup. The fuel had 
3.5% initial enrichment and the values refer to direct discharge from the reactor.
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IE: 4.00% BU: 30 GWD/tU CT: 5 years
Nuclide
ORI/ALE LA/ALE LA/ORI
(α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total (α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total (α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total
pu238 0.8101 0.9642 0.8314 0.8098 0.9483 0.8290 0.9996 0.9835 0.9970
pu239 0.8288 0.9720 0.8289 0.8473 0.9737 0.8474 1.0223 1.0017 1.0223
pu240 0.8150 0.9963 0.9704 0.8350 1.0020 0.9781 1.0245 1.0057 1.0080
pu242 0.8628 1.0182 1.0180 0.8776 1.0163 1.0161 1.0171 0.9981 0.9981
am241 0.8039 0.9981 0.8040 0.8374 1.0191 0.8375 1.0417 1.0210 1.0417
cm242 0.8193 1.0119 0.9751 0.8377 1.0142 0.9805 1.0224 1.0022 1.0055
cm244 0.8556 1.0044 1.0032 1.1653 1.3454 1.3439 1.3619 1.3394 1.3396
cm246 – 0.7414 0.7414 – 1.5552 1.5552 2.1419 2.0976 2.0976
Total 0.8202 1.0036 0.9968 0.8954 1.3368 1.3205 1.0918 1.3320 1.3247
IE: 4.00% BU: 45 GWD/tU CT: 5 years
Nuclide
ORI/ALE LA/ALE LA/ORI
(α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total (α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total (α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total
pu238 0.7745 0.9219 0.7949 0.8058 0.9347 0.8236 1.0404 1.0138 1.0361
pu239 0.8317 0.9753 0.8317 0.8553 0.9740 0.8554 1.0284 0.9987 1.0284
pu240 0.8218 1.0044 0.9783 0.8390 0.9971 0.9745 1.0209 0.9927 0.9961
pu242 0.8377 0.9886 0.9884 0.8738 1.0023 1.0022 1.0432 1.0139 1.0139
am241 0.7897 0.9803 0.7898 0.8422 1.0152 0.8423 1.0665 1.0356 1.0664
cm242 0.7987 0.9864 0.9505 0.8768 1.0511 1.0178 1.0978 1.0657 1.0708
cm244 0.8387 0.9845 0.9833 1.1283 1.2898 1.2885 1.3454 1.3100 1.3103
cm246 0.5935 0.7145 0.7145 1.2754 1.4891 1.4891 2.1489 2.0843 2.0843
Total 0.8077 0.9826 0.9795 0.9546 1.2880 1.2819 1.1819 1.3108 1.3088
IE: 4.00% BU: 45 GWD/tU CT: 5 years
Nuclide
ORI/ALE LA/ALE LA/ORI
(α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total (α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total (α,n) Sp. Fiss. Total
pu238 0.7619 0.9071 0.7820 0.8037 0.9239 0.8203 1.0549 1.0186 1.0491
pu239 0.8314 0.9750 0.8315 0.8595 0.9699 0.8595 1.0337 0.9948 1.0337
pu240 0.8230 1.0059 0.9798 5.9134 0.0000 0.8451 7.1853 0.0000 0.8625
pu242 0.8308 0.9805 0.9803 0.8767 0.9969 0.9968 1.0552 1.0168 1.0168
am241 0.7887 0.9788 0.7888 0.8472 1.0117 0.8472 1.0741 1.0336 1.0741
cm242 0.8020 0.9905 0.9545 0.8840 1.0508 1.0189 1.1023 1.0609 1.0675
cm244 0.8375 0.9833 0.9820 1.1116 1.2598 1.2585 1.3273 1.2812 1.2816
cm246 0.5893 0.7095 0.7095 1.2601 1.4586 1.4585 2.1382 2.0557 2.0557
Total 0.8049 0.9798 0.9771 0.9659 1.2569 1.2523 1.2000 1.2828 1.2818
Table 3: Comparison between the neutron emission due to specific isotopes (as well as the total values) reported in the LANL reference spent 
fuel library, and the ones calculated with ALEPH2.2 (LA/ALE) and ORIGEN-ARP (LA/ORI). The data from the comparison between ORIGEN-ARP 
and ALEPH are also reported (ORI/ALE). The values of initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time are shown at the top of each table.
6.  Comparison with the LANL reference spent 
fuel library
In the framework of the Next Generation Safeguards Initia-
tive (NGSI), the Los Alamos National Laboratory developed 
several reference spent fuel libraries [12], [13].
Since the geometry of the fuel assembly is the same as 
the one chosen for our case, it is possible to compare the 
results of the neutron emissions obtained with their calcu-
lations. However, of all the libraries developed by LANL, 
only the first one is relevant for the comparison since it as-
sumed a uniform composition and irradiation conditions 
for the complete fuel assembly.
There are three combinations of initial enrichment, burnup, 
and cooling time that are coincident between our library 
and their case:
• Case 1 - IE: 4% BU: 30 GWd/tU CT: 5 years
• Case 2 - IE: 4% BU: 45 GWd/tU CT: 5 years
• Case 3 - IE: 5% BU: 60 GWd/tU CT: 5 years
The comparison focused on the neutron emissions of the 
main contributors and on the total neutron emissions.
The next table shows the ratio between the values calcu-
lated by Los Alamos (LA) and with ALEPH2.2 (ALE) or 
ORIGEN-ARP (ORI). They contain also the ratio between 
the values obtained with ORIGEN-ARP and ALEPH2.2 
(column ORI/ALE).
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The agreement with the LANL fuel library is very good for 
240Pu and 242Pu (all values within 5%), while there are differ-
ent results with the other isotopes. The LANL fuel library 
generally has higher values (≈15–30%) compared to the 
ones calculated with ORIGEN-ARP and ALEPH2.2 and 
this induces higher total neutron emissions as well.
From information available on the report on the LANL 
spent fuel library we can highlight some similarities and 
differences that can explain in part the discrepancy in the 
results:
• The boron concentration in the water was 660 ppm for 
the LANL simulations whereas we used a concentration 
of 630 ppm.
• The fuel, moderator, and cladding temperatures are the 
same for both libraries.
• The only geometric parameters that change are the length 
(365.76 cm for LANL, 100 cm for ALEPH cases) and the 
pellet radius (0.41 cm for LANL, 0.4025 cm for ALEPH).
• There are four radial subdivisions for the fuel pellet mod-
elled by LANL.
• The average power during irradiation is 38 MW/tU in-
stead of 40 MW/tU used in our cases.
• The simulations done by LANL considered irradiation cy-
cles of 420.3 days, apart from the last irradiation cycle 
that is reduced to 312.3 days.
• Each irradiation cycle of the LANL library determines an 
additional burnup of about 15 GWd/tU to the fuel 
assembly.
• The nuclear data library used by the LANL cases was 
the ENDF/B-VII.0, whereas the ORIGEN-ARP cases 
used data from ENDF/B-VI.2 and the ALEPH simulations 
from the ENDF/B-VII.1 data set.
Apart from the factors included in the previous list, the dif-
ference in the results can be determined also by other 
characteristics that are not contained in the LANL report.
7. Conclusions
A reference spent fuel library has been built using the soft-
ware ORIGEN-ARP and ALEPH2.2 to provide some in-
sights of the different isotopes relevant for neutron emis-
sion. A comparison of the two codes has been performed 
to check their consistency and the reasons of possible 
discrepancies.
The neutron emission increases with increasing burnup, 
whereas there is an opposite trend with initial enrichment 
and cooling time. Apart from very low burnup values, the 
spontaneous fissions are the main contribution to the total 
neutron emission, with (α,n) reactions accounting for the 
remaining.
By looking at the role played by individual isotopes, it is 
clear that the main contributors are the curium isotopes 
(242Cm and 244Cm are very important up to 100 years of 
cooling time, while 246Cm and 248Cm arise at high burnup). 
At low burnup and also at high cooling times there are sig-
nificant contributions from plutonium isotopes (especially 
240Pu and 242Pu). As a general consideration, there are al-
ways less than 10 isotopes that combined are responsible 
for about 99% of the total neutron emissions. Only for 
cooling times higher than 10000 years more isotopes have 
relevant contributions.
The build-up of several actinides (such as the Cm iso-
topes) explains the trend of the neutron emission with ini-
tial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of the spent fuel. 
In fact, decreasing the initial enrichment or increasing the 
burnup will lead to a higher fluence level, a higher produc-
tion of actinides and therefore to a higher neutron 
emission.
Comparing the two codes used in the simulations, the 
general agreement is rather satisfactory since the total 
neutron emission values are within 15%. This is due to a 
different concentration of actinides calculated by the two 
codes and possibly also to approximations applied in both 
models.
The boron added to the water during irradiation in the re-
actor core is also playing a role, although reduced com-
pared to the main variables associated to the irradiation of 
the spent fuel (IE, BU, CT). 
The presence of boron determines the hardening of the 
neutron energy spectrum during the irradiation in the re-
actor. This induces an increase of the resonance cap-
tures and a higher production of actinides. The results 
show that the addition of 630ppm of boron increases 
the total neutron emission of about 10%. Other impor-
tant parameters that affect the calculated composition 
of the spent fuel are the water spacing between neigh-
bouring fuel assemblies during the irradiation in the re-
actor (decrease of the total neutron emission of roughly 
1% for each mm of gap) and the nuclear data library 
that is used in the calculations (10% on the total neutron 
emission).
The library has been compared with one reference spent 
fuel library made by LANL. There are three comparable 
cases (i.e. same IE, BU, and CT) and the comparison 
showed good agreement (difference lower than 5%) for 
some plutonium isotopes, but a larger discrepancy for the 
curium isotopes (≈30%).
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Seismic monitoring of an Underground Repository in Salt - 
Results of the measurements at the Gorleben 
Exploratory mine
Jürgen Altmann
Experimentelle Physik III, Technische Universität Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund, Germany
Abstract:
We have measured seismic and acoustic signals from vari-
ous mining activities in the Gorleben exploratory mine in 
Germany, underground at -840 m and at the surface, 
tasked by the German Support Programme to the IAEA, in 
order to provide basic knowledge on the detectability of 
undeclared activities. During 7 weeks total nearly all sourc-
es of sound and vibration available in the mine were cov-
ered, with sensors at several positions and sources at sev-
eral sites, sometimes with background signals from 
on-going exploration elsewhere.
The peak-to-peak values of vibration velocity, referred to 
100 m distance, range from tenths of micrometres/second for 
a hand-held chain saw via few μm/s to tens of μm/s for other 
tools such as picking, for vehicles, drilling and sledge-ham-
mer blows. A grader with compactor plates produces hun-
dreds, and a blast shot around one hundred thousand μm/s. 
The last two sources could be detected at the surface, too, at 
about 1.1 km slant distance; blasts were even seen at 5-6 km 
distance. The signal strengths vary by a factor 2 to 5 for simi-
lar conditions. Fitted by a power law, the decrease with dis-
tance is with an exponent mostly between -2 and -1.
Spectra of seismic signals from periodic sources (such as 
percussion drilling or vehicle engines) show harmonic se-
ries. Rock removal, e.g. by drilling, produces broad-band 
excitation up to several kilohertz. Acoustic-seismic cou-
pling is relevant.
Monitoring could be done with an underground geophone 
“fence” around the repository, e.g. 500 m from the salt-
dome margin and possibly in the salt 1 km off the reposi-
tory. With that excavation by drilling and blasting could be 
detected by a simple amplitude criterion. Under which 
conditions excavation by tunnel boring machine or road 
header machine and other weaker activities could be de-
tected needs to be studied.
Keywords: final repository, salt, seismic monitoring, min-
ing, Gorleben
1. Introduction
In the case of direct disposal spent nuclear fuel contains 
plutonium, thus such material should remain under IAEA 
safeguards even after emplacement in an underground fi-
nal repository. Underground final disposal of nuclear waste 
presents a new challenge for safeguards and has led to 
proposals of using geophysical techniques and methods 
for monitoring [e.g. 1, 2, 3]. During operation, the tasks 
would include monitoring for creation of undeclared cavi-
ties and surveillance of those parts of the mine already 
filled with refuse for undeclared re-opening. After the em-
placement phase, when drifts and shafts will have been 
closed, and the above-ground parts of the final repository 
will have been cleared for other uses, the IAEA needs the 
capability of long-term monitoring for covert access to 
the mine.
Mining and other underground operations produce seis-
mic vibrations directly as well as via acoustic noise. Seis-
mic excitation propagates through the ambient medium 
and can thus be used to detect activities remotely. 
The main question with seismic monitoring is whether 
signals from undeclared activities can be detected, that is 
separated from signals from different sources and from 
other back ground noise. In the operational phase of the 
repository most noise stems from normal activity (mining, 
transport, filling, etc.), and sensors can be deployed 
at many sites in the mine. After closure, no sensors and 
cables can remain in the mine; in this phase sensors will 
be located at considerable distance from the repository, 
deep underground and maybe also near the surface. 
Seismic background will be much lower, produced no 
longer by activities in the mine; the remaining sources at 
the surface are traffic, industry, agriculture and weather, 
plus seismicity proper (near and far earth quakes and un-
derground explosions).For answering the question about 
detection and discrimination, the first task is to determine 
the characteristics of the signals from various mining ac-
tivities and of their propagation to potential sensor loca-
tions. This was the goal of the measurement project de-
scribed here.
Seismic monitoring of underground final repositories has 
been studied only rarely. In Yucca mountain, formerly 
planned as a repository for the US, where the rock is tuff, 
vibration caused by a tunnel-boring machine was meas-
ured at the surface [4]. A study of the issues for detecting 
unde clared excavation discussed many basic questions, 
dealing mainly with granite [2]. The Canadian Safeguards 
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Figure 1: Simplified geological cross section through the Gorleben salt dome. Indicated is a possible repository level at about 930 m 
depth. The main exploration tunnels are at 840 m. (From [7], © Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), Hannover, 
reproduced by permission)
Support Program had a theoretical investigation done 
based on experiences with microseismic monitoring sys-
tems in working mines where events such as blasts and 
excavation-induced seismicity are classified and localized 
[5]. A local seismic network has been monitoring the exca-
vations at the Onkalo planned repository in Finland 
for many years [6]. With its focus on the localisation of 
blasts it could follow the tunnel advance well, but raise 
boring and other continuous activities have not been stud-
ied systematically yet. 
One potential repository site in Germany is the Gorleben 
salt dome; it has been explored for its usability since 1986 
under contract to the Federal Office for Radiation Protec-
tion (BfS) by the firm Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Bau und 
Betrieb von Endlagern für Abfallstoffe mbH (DBE). It ex-
tends from 3.2 to 0.3 km depth (Figure 1). 
Not much is known about seismic signals from mining ac-
tivities in salt – neither at close range within salt nor after 
propagation through the surrounding sediment layers. 
Some seismic measurements had been done on the Gor-
leben site in the 1990s during sinking of the first shaft, us-
ing a temporary geophone network. These measurements 
were  mainly directed at propagation velocities [8]. A 
network of borehole seismometers around the site (with 5 
to 15 km distance) is operated continuously, also by the 
Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources 
(BGR), but this concentrates on the earthquake-safety as-
pect [e.g. 9].
In order to gain information on the properties of seismic 
signals from mining activities, a dedicated measurement 
project was carried out at Gorleben, tasked by the Ger-
man Support Programme to the IAEA. The objective was 
to measure and characterise all sources of vibration availa-
ble in the exploratory mine at Gorleben. Because seismic 
signals are also produced by acoustic ones, microphones 
were deployed, too. Sensors were placed underground 
and near the sur face, at different positions and source dis-
tances. Signals from typical mining activities as well as 
background noise were recorded by geophones, low-fre-
quency accelerometers and microphones. The presenta-
tion here focuses on the geophone measurements. (High-
frequency recordings were  made in parallel by the 
Fraunhofer Institute for Non-Destructive Testing Dresden; 
these are not treated here but are part of the common 
JOPAG report published by the German Support Pro-
gramme to the IAEA [10].)
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Figure 2: Gorleben exploratory mine, main drift system at 840 m depth, consisting of the “Hauptförderstrecke”, “Querschlag 1 Ost”, 
“Nördliche Richtstrecke” and “Querschlag 1 West”. Two shafts (“Schacht 1/2”) provide access. Indicated are the Dortmund under-
ground measurement stations (UT1, UT2, UT3, UT4) and sensor positions (numbers); not all were used at the same time. Abbreviations 
for particular locations: AR: “Arbeitsraum”, BO “Bohrort” (BO), N niche. (Based on figure provided by DBE)
2. Measurements
The main measurement systems were deployed in the drift 
system at 840 m depth (Figure 2). Here nearly all activities 
took place as well. (Spent fuel would be stored some-
what more deeply.) In addition a measurement system was 
deployed at the surface. The sampling rate was 10 kHz 
throughout, with 16+8 analogue channels recorded under-
ground and 8 at the surface. The underground sensors (geo-
phones sensing vibration velocity, some three-dimensionally, 
others vertically sensitive only) were bolted to the salt-rock 
wall. At the surface geophones were buried about 0.2 m 
deep; in addition one plus three of the old on-site BGR geo-
phones in about 7 m deep wells were used. The recorded-
signal bandwidth was a few hertz to 4.5 kilohertz. All stations 
were synchronised by pulses derived from GPS signals. 
After a test experiment of one week in April 2011 
the main measurements were done during three weeks each 
in June/July 2011 and in November/December 2011. Nearly all 
sources of vibration and sound available in the mine could 
be measured somehow, but not all of them under good condi-
tions – the use of equipment at certain locations was decided 
by the operational needs of the mine. In some cases sources 
were too far away to yield useful signals, in others more than 
one source was active at the same time near the sensors so 
that one source masked the other. The following main catego-
ries were measured: blast shots, vibrating compactor plate, 
transport installations/activities, drilling rigs, scaler, roof cutter, 
heavy to light vehicles and hand tools. To produce impulse-
type signals a sledge hammer was used for excitation of seis-
mic waves and balloon blasts for acoustic ones.
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3. Some results
Here the most important results are given.1 Full detail is 
contained in the JOPAG report [10].The signal strength 
is measured mostly by the peak-to-peak value because 
the root-mean-square value is only sensible for continuous 
sources. These values show considerable variation with 
source and sensor positions even if the mutual distance is 
similar. A statistical evaluation of exactly the same propa-
gation paths was done only for one source (Section 3.2). 
The variability shows up as scatter in the graphs of 
strength versus distance, and the trends derived have 
considerable uncertainties.
3.1 Wave speeds
Of fundamental importance are the wave speeds because 
they determine the arrival times of signals and the reflec-
tion and refraction at media boundaries. They depend on 
the elastic constants and the density of the material. For 
seismic waves (that is waves in an elastic solid) the fastest 
wave is the compressional or longitudinal one where the 
particle motion is in the direction of propagation. Shear or 
transversal waves are slower, here the motion is orthogo-
nal to the propagation direction. The speeds of these pri-
mary (P) and secondary (S) waves are [e.g. 11: 238-243]
 cP = [(λ+2μ)/ρ]
1/2 and  cS = [μ/ρ]
1/2, 
respectively. Here λ and μ are the Lamé constants describ-
ing the relation between strain and stress of an isotropic 
elastic medium, and ρ is the density. (Waves along a sur-
face are somewhat slower than S waves.) The first equation 
also applies to fluids where shear waves do not exist (μ = 0).
Hammer blows were applied to various positions along a 
drift and recorded by several geophones. From the on-
sets of the primary (P) and the secondary (S) waves the 
seismic speeds in the central salt were determined by lin-
ear fits to be (4.52±0.06)  km/s for the P wave and 
(2.590.04) km/s for the S wave (95% confidence intervals 
assuming normal distribution). The ratio is equal to the 
theoretical value of √3 for a medium where the Lamé 
constants λ and μ are equal.
Similarly, onset times of the sound wave from balloon 
blasts resulted in a sound speed of (351±5) m/s, fitting well 
to the theoretical value for dry air at 30°C temperature.
3.2 Seismic-background amplitudes
The simplest way of seismic detection of a certain activity 
is by the amplitude rising above some threshold. For a 
high detection range the threshold needs to be low, but 
this has its limit by the background noise; to avoid 
too many false alarms the threshold is usually set at some 
1 With slight corrections and modifications of the presentation at the ESARDA 
2013 Symposium.
factor above 1 times the background amplitude. The seis-
mic background is thus another important characteristic.
The seismic background was determined at relatively qui-
et periods, however with some machinery such as venti-
lators and the shaft haulage running at distant positions. 
The peak-to-peak values of wall velocity underground, in 
the main drift system at 840 m depth, varied between 
positions considerably, from a few tenths of a μm/s to 
several μm/s, for the vertical as well as horizontal compo-
nents. However, at one position in a drift (Pos. 2 in 
 Figure 2) there was much higher excitation with strong 
temporal variation (time scale of a second) between a 
few μm/s and nearly 100 μm/s, different from two other 
positions (Pos. 1a and 5) only 20-30 m away; the reason 
is unclear. The background peak-to-peak values when 
the mine was active were in the same range, between 0.6 
and 10  μm/s, during a certain period, as can be derived 
by multiplying the comparison root-mean-square values 
of Figure 7 below by a factor eight.
For the post-operational phase it is important to know 
the background at positions at several hundred metres 
depth without any activity in the mine. Such conditions 
did not exist during the measurements. Obviously the 
lowest value observed is an upper bound. It seems 
plausible that the background peak-to-peak value (with 
a bandwidth from a few hertz to a few kilohertz) is 
around 0.1 μm/s. 
At the surface the background during quiet periods was 
between 1.5 and 3 μm/s peak to peak for the geophones 
at 0.2 m depth and 1-2 μm/s at 7 m depth. During a peri-
od of heavy rain the general background increased to 
about 15 μm/s in 0.2 m and to 3-5 μm/s in 7 m depth, with 
individual pulses – probably from single big raindrops – 
between 70 and 150 μm/s in 0.2 m depth.
Similar values would probably hold during the operational 
phase should Gorleben be selected. The background at 
the surface from human activity thereafter will depend on 
the land use; for weather-produced background no 
change is expected. Its relatively high values argue against 
relying mainly on sensors at or close to the surface.
3.3 Variability between sensor positions
Variation between the seismic-signal strengths with posi-
tion was not only observed with the background, but also 
with the sources observed. Systematic evaluation was 
done with signals from picking by an electropneumatic 
pick hammer (breaker, Hilti TE 1000-AVR) at one site, re-
corded after travelling from the western to the eastern drift 
through about 430 m of salt. Because the picking-caused 
amplitudes did not dominate the signals, the latter were 
high-pass filtered with 500 Hz corner frequency; spectral 
analysis had shown that most of the power from picking 
was between 500 Hz and over 3 kHz. Figure 3 shows the 
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Figure 3: Peak-to-peak value of vertical wall velocity at various sensor positions (indicated by the numbers) of Dortmund station UT1 dur-
ing eight picking events at the same position (northern corner of “Querschlag 1 West”, length coordinate 510 m), versus sensor distance, 
determined by high-pass filtering with 500 Hz corner frequency and subtraction of the peak-to-peak values before/after picking, in linear 
scale. Shown are the mean values plus/minus the standard deviations (N = 7 mostly, N = 8 twice, N = 6 and N = 5 once each).
peak-to-peak values of the filtered signals during picking 
after subtraction of the ones before/after picking at differ-
ent sensor positions of approximately equal distance, with 
their respective standard deviations resulting from 5 to 
8 usable picking events each. At sensor Positions 1, 1a, 3, 
5 and 6 the variation among the events is reasonably low, 
with standard deviations between 10 and 20%, and 
the mean values agree among the positions. The higher 
values at Position 5a are consistent, as are the very low 
values (around 0.3 μm/s) measured at Position 2. The lat-
ter seem to have nothing to do with the very strong low-
frequency background at this position. Since al l 
geophones were mounted at the same height (1 m) by 
holders of the same type, the most plausible reason for 
the variation is the rock structure.
One can conclude that the seismic-signal strength of the 
same event measured at various positions of approximate-
ly equal distance can vary considerably, here by a factor 
0.3 to 1.5. This variability should be taken into account for 
example when estimating detection ranges. As a conse-
quence signal strengths are mostly presented in logarith-
mic scale, and decrease with distance needs two or more 
orders of magnitude to be taken as valid.
3.4 Amplitude decrease with distance
Because of the strong signal-strength variation only 
changes above 30-50% are relevant, and the graphics 
use logarithmic scale. For a seismic volume wave propa-
gating from a point source spherically into a homogene-
ous medium, due to energy conservation and geometri-
cal expansion, one expects a decrease of intensity 
(power per area) with distance r in proportion to 1/r2. 
Since intensity is proportional to amplitude squared, the 
amplitude decreases in proportion to the inverse of the 
distance, that is, according to a power law with expo-
nent -1. Often the wave energy is reduced by absorption 
and scattering. This is described by an additional factor 
that decreases exponentially with distance; the attenua-
tion coefficient often increases linearly with frequency. 
The present case is much more complicated. The medi-
um is inhomo geneous with reflection and refraction, sev-
eral wave types may be excited, shafts and drifts can 
block a direct seismic path but present an acoustic 
waveguide with weaker decrease of sound amplitude 
with distance than the r-1 dependence valid for free 
space. Sound impinging on shaft and drift walls can 
cause them to vibrate; acoustic resonances in the cavi-
ties may further complicate the picture. The sources may 
be extended with a complicated spatial and temporal de-
pendence, they may be driven with different force in vary-
ing directions.
To roughly catch the losses due to geometric expansion, if 
needed refraction and reflection at media boundaries, and 
attenuation, a simple  model is used: the empirical 
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Figure 4: Signals of vertically sensitive underground geophones near site “Bohrort 3.2” during the blast at site “Bohrort 5.0” of 13 July 
2011; the blast occurred at 13:41:36.25 CEST (“B”). Positions and slant source-sensor distances are indicated at the right. At Position 2 
(bottom) the amplitude is uncertain due to the high DC offset. The 12 individual shots are best seen in the trace of Position 5 (centre). (The 
PC time at the axis is 15.91 s too low.) 
decrease of peak-to-peak value of wall vibration velocity 
vPP with distance d is described by a power law 
v d v d d
dPP PP
a
( ) ( )= 


0 0
where the exponent a and the value at the arbitrary refer-
ence distance d0 are gained from a fit to an appropriately 
selected sub-set of the observed data pairs, analogously 
for the rms value. (The scatter in the measured data gen-
erally is too big to separately determine the exponential 
attenuation.) Plotted in double-logarithmic scale a power 
law gives a line, its slope is the exponent a. The empirical 
power-law exponent of distance thus derived is normally 
lower than the simple theoretical one of -1. Due to the 
variation of the signal strengths the exponent is question-
able if the strength values span less than two orders 
of magnitude.
3.4.1 Blast shots
Figure 4 shows three underground signals from a blast at 
“Bohrort 5.0”, using 130 kg of explosive in 24 drill holes of 
5 m length. As best seen in the centre trace, there were 
12 individual shots with 0.25 s delay. The signal is 4 orders 
of magnitude above the noise at about 30 m and 2-3 or-
ders at about 200 m. Figure 5 shows the signals at the 
surface after propagation through about 800 m of salt and 
300 m of overlying sediment; here the individual shots are 
no longer discernible, but the signal is still 1-2 orders 
of magnitude above the noise. Blast shots were even visi-
ble at 5-6 km distance at the seismometers in 300 m deep 
boreholes (with accordingly less background noise), here 
the signal-to-noise ratio (at much lower bandwidth) had 
decreased to 1-3.
Systematic amplitude evaluations were done with the blast 
of 1 December 2011 (several shots distributed over about 
2 seconds) and a contour blasting of 6 December 2011 
(one single shot only). Figure 6 shows the maximum peak-
to-peak values of vertical wall or ground velocity. A clear 
trend can be seen from 140 to 1100 m, here the power-law 
exponents are -2.3±0.6 and -2.1±0.5 (95% confidence in-
tervals assuming normal distribution), respectively, much 
below the theoretical value of -1. Combining both sets 
gives -2.2±0.3. The closest and the farthest distances are 
excluded from the fit. The sensor at 45 m distance is at the 
opposite wall of the adjoining drift, so that it was located in 
the seismic shadow of the drift. The signals from the BGR 
seismometers at 5 and 6 km have much narrower band-
width (their sampling rate is 100 Hz), so they fall outside of 
the trend, too.
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Figure 5: Geophone signals at the Dortmund surface station from the blast shot at site “Bohrort 5.0” of 13 July 2011. The blast occurred 
at 13:41:36.25 CEST (“B”). Positions, geophone directions (z vertical, N north, E east) and slant source-sensor distances are indicated at 
the right. At Positions OB1 and OB2 there were old BGR geophones in about 7 m depth, at Position OB3 Dortmund geophones were 
buried at 0.2 m. (The PC time at the axis is 7.63 s too low.)
Figure 6: maximum peak-to-peak value of vertical wall/ground velocity from blasting versus distance for the events of 1 December (sev-
eral shots, circles) and 6 December (single shot, squares) 2011, double-logarithmic scale. The sensors from 45 m to about 700 m dis-
tance were deployed underground in the mine, the ones at about 1100 m were at the surface. The geophone at 45 m is in the seismic 
shadow of the drift. The BGR seismometers at 5-6 km are in 300 m deep holes, here recording is done with much lower bandwidth. The 
power-law trend lines from 140 to 1100 m have exponents of -2.3±0.6 and -2.1±0.5, respectively.
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Figure 7: Rms values of vertical wall velocity during plate-compactor activity versus slant distance from source to sensor in double-loga-
rithmic scale (x: measured at the main Dortmund station UT1 in “Bohrort 3.2”, +: measured at the smaller Dortmund station UT4 in the 
“Hauptförderstrecke”, near shaft 1). The power-law trend line has a slope of -1.9±0.2. (Additional circles mark the signals at Position 6 in 
the “Nördliche Richtstrecke” from the three sites in the same drift.) The dashed horizontal lines indicate the comparison rms values at 
several sensor positions when the plate compactors were inactive.
3.4.2 Grader with vibrating compactor plates
The grader vehicle at its front carries a plate compactor of 
three plates (Stehr SBV 55 H3). Each plate contains two 
counter-rotating eccentric masses driven hydraulically that 
cause a vertical vibrating force to the ground (amplitude 60 
kN per plate, frequency 60 Hz). This was the second-
strongest seismic source, 2.5 orders of magnitude below 
the blasts. On spectrograms it was also seen at the sur-
face, at 1.1 km slant distance (0.8 km through salt plus 
0.3  km through the overlying sediment); after remov-
ing machinery noise by high-pass filtering with 90 Hz cor-
ner frequency it became even visible in the signal ampli-
tude. For this source root-mean-square (rms) values of 
vertical seismic velocity underground were evaluated over 
20 seconds each while the plate compactors were vibrat-
ing, and over about the same time period while they were 
inactive for comparison. The latter values differed consid-
erably between the positions, probably because 
different machinery (for example for ventilation) was run-
ning at different distances from the sensors. Figure 7 
shows the rms values of vertical wall velocity versus slant 
distance from the respective grader position to the respec-
tive sensor. (The corresponding peak-to-peak values are 
higher by about a factor eight.) Also shown are some of 
the comparison rms values, the variation between posi-
tions is evident.
The general decrease of seismic rms value with dis-
tance r follows a power law with exponent -1.9±0.2 
(95% confidence). Extrapolating the trend one sees that 
clear detection of compacting by amplitude only should 
be possible to around 1  km distance for the lower 
range of background rms values, but only to 500 or 
200 m for the higher-background positions. Obviously 
for achieving maximum detection distance one should 
use sensor positions with the lowest-possible back-
ground signal.
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3.4.3 Scaler
The scaler (Proxima C1 BF AKR) is a heavy vehicle with a 
strong hydraulic arm. At its end there are steel cutting edg-
es at three sides (left, top, right). These edges are moved 
forcefully along the side walls or roof of a drift to remove 
salt that has become loose. It is interesting that often the 
seismic amplitude was higher between the periods of scal-
ing, caused by the engine rotating faster for moving the ve-
hicle or for moving the arm, probably from coupling of 
acoustic to seismic excitation (see also Figure 12 below). 
Figure 8 shows the maximum peak-to-peak values of verti-
cal wall velocity from the scaler versus distance during pe-
riods of scaling as well as in between, that is including the 
high values from engine rotation between scaling. 
The maxima show considerable variation. The power-law 
trend lines have exponents of -1.1±0.2 and -1.0±0.2 (95%) 
for scaling and in between, respectively. Whether these 
values – differing from the exponent around -2 determined 
for several other sources – are a consequence of the pri-
mary source being acoustic remains to be investigated.
3.4.4 Picking
The hand-held electropneumatic pick hammer (breaker) 
Hilti TE 1000-AVR applies repeated blows to the material 
via a chisel. For breaking into and removal of salt the chisel 
angle is varied from time to time by the operator. In order 
to determine the maximum peak-to-peak values at dis-
tances above 8 m, a 500-Hz high-pass filter was applied 
as for Figure 3. Figure 9 shows the results versus distance. 
The decrease can be approximated by a power law with 
exponent -1.3±0.3 (95%), closer to the theoretical one of 
-1.0 for a seismic body wave without attenuation than the 
value -2 found with other sources. 
Figure 8: maximum peak-to-peak values of vertical wall velocity from the scaler versus distance, double-logarithmic scale. Circles: during 
scaling, squares: in between. For the shortest distance 11 m was used while in fact it varied between about 5 and 15 m by vehicle move-
ment. The power-law trend lines have exponents of -1.1±0.2 and -1.0±0.2, respectively.
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3.4.5 Chain saw
The hand-held chain saw (Spitznas no. 5 1029 0010, 
 power 3.0 kW, rotation rate to 6500 min-1) is driven pneu-
matically by compressed air, its blade length is 0.43 m. 
This turned out to be the weakest seismic source. It was 
used at two sites in the “Arbeitsraum”; at the farthest, only 
one sensor showed a signal discernible from the back-
ground. Because of masking by different sources (proba-
bly a vehicle among them), the recordings were filtered 
with a high pass of 1 kHz corner frequency, retaining most 
of the chain-saw-related contributions.
Figure 10 shows the distance dependence of the peak-
to-peak as well as the rms values of the chain saw. 
Trends can only be computed for the closer excitation 
site, the power-law exponents are -2.0±1.0 (peak-to-
peak) and -2.1±0.8 (rms). These values fit to the -2 found 
for several other sources, but are less reliable because 
here the distances extend over half an order of magni-
tude only. Figure 10 also demonstrates the typical ratio of 
8 between peak-to-peak and rms values.
Figure 9: maximum peak-to-peak value of vertical wall velocity during picking versus sensor distance, double-logarithmic scale. At the 
lowest distance the signal was evaluated directly, elsewhere it was high-pass filtered with 500 Hz first. The values around 450 m are 
the mean values shown in Figure 3. The power-law trend line has an exponent of -1.3±0.3.
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3.5  Comparison of seismic strengths for various 
sources 
From the power-law trend found for a source rough esti-
mates of the peak-to-peak values of vertical seismic veloc-
ity at any distance can be gained. In doing so one should 
keep in mind the variability in signal strength by a factor 
two to five and more (see Section 3.3).
Power-law trends were computed for 14 representative 
sources, using the reference distance d0 = 1 m. From 
this the nominal peak-to-peak value at 100 m distance 
was computed. This value and the exponent with its 
confidence interval are given in Table 1, together with 
the range of distances over which the trend was deter-
mined. The exponents have confidence intervals (95% 
for normal distribution) of ±0.2 to ±1.6. Not unexpected-
ly the uncertainty is higher when the range for the trend 
computation ends markedly below 100 m. In these cas-
es the 100-m values are particularly uncertain, more 
than the factor 2 or so holding for the other sourc-
es. more reliable values would need a better under-
standing of the sources and the propagation. Table 1 
also contains the general signal properties: pulse, 
broadband noise or harmonics.
Figure 10: Peak-to-peak and rms values of vertical wall velocity when the chain saw was used, high-pass-filtered with 1 kHz, versus 
distance, in double-logarithmic scale. Open symbols: sawing at the western wall of the “Arbeitsraum” at closer distances. Solid symbols: 
sawing at the northern wall with generally larger distances and the drift in the direct path, only visible at the closest sensors; the relatively 
high excitation raises the suspicion that it was rather caused by a different source. The power-law trend lines for the closer sawing posi-
tion (open symbols) have exponents of -2.0±1.0 (peak-to-peak) and -2.1±0.8 (rms). 
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Remarks:
a The closest position was in the seismic shadow of a 
drift; this value – markedly below the trend – was 
excluded.
b Peak-to-peak values estimated as 8 * rms values.
c 2 distances below 10 m excluded because they are in 
the range of the vehicle size.
d 100 m is markedly beyond the range for the trend.
e When passing 3 positions (in front of “Bohrort 3.2”, 
23 m south and 19 m north of it), 2 passes.
f Averages from 4 blows at “Bohrort 3.2”. The values 
from hammer blows at “Bohrort 3.1”, distance 167-
210 m, are clearly lower.
g The closest point at 18 m is at the opposite wall of the 
hall, but was included.
h Only two points were used for the trend, no confi-
dence interval can be computed.
i When passing in front of “Bohrort 3.2”, one pass each 
in 2nd, 3rd and 4th gear.
j Too few points for trend were available, but an esti-
mate for 100 m was possible. 
The nominal 100-m values are depicted in Figure 11. As-
suming a background-noise value one can deduce detec-
tion ranges simply from amplitude by defining a detection-
threshold signal-to-noise ratio S/Ndet. Somewhat 
generously requiring S/Ndet = 2, for example with a back-
ground peak-to-peak value around 10 μm/s as found dur-
ing the plate-compactor  measurements at Position  6 
(8 times the rms value of about 1.2 μm/s, see Figure 7), 
one concludes that the scaler and stronger sources could 
be detected at 100 m whereas the large-hole drilling rig 
and weaker sources would be below the detection thresh-
old. Assuming on the other hand a background peak-to-
peak value of 0.6 μm/s as at Position 16 during the grad-
er  measurements (the rms value in Figure  7 is about 
0.08 μm/s), all sources except the chain saw would be de-
tectable at 100 m.
Table  1: Power-law trend data for the representative sources: distance range from which the trend was gained, exponent with 
95%- confidence interval, ensuing theoretical peak-to-peak value of vertical seismic velocity at 100 m distance (ranked by this value), 
general properties of signal. When the trend range ends markedly below 100 m (source in italics), the value should be taken with caution.
Source Range for 
trend / m
Exponent Value at 
100 m / (μm/s)
Remarks Signal properties
Blast 139-1184 -2.2±0.3 1.0⋅105 a Pulse, repeated
Grader compacting 18-569 -1.9±0.2 1.6⋅102 b Broadband
Heavy loader 13-45 -0.6±0.6 7.1⋅101 c, d, e Broadband, engine harmonics
5-kg sledge hammer 7.1-178 -1.5±0.3 6.7⋅101 f Pulse
Scaler 
  engine only
  scaling
11-182
11-182
-1.1±0.2
-1.0±0.2
2.0⋅101
2.2⋅101
Engine harmonics
broadband
Large-hole drilling rig 18-99 -0.8±1.2 1.8⋅101 g Broadband
Core drilling 27-58 -1.9 1.6⋅101 a, d, h Broadband
Hoist platform 18-173 -1.7±0.4 1.2⋅101 i Engine harmonics, broadband
Roof cutter 
  engine only
  cutting 
16
16-49
-
-1.4±0.3
about 3⋅100
1.0101
d, j
d
Broadband
Broadband
Salt through drop hole 24-42 -1.3±0.5 6.3⋅100 d Broadband
Picking 8.4-460 -1.3±0.3 5.1⋅100 Broadband, chisel harmonics
Stud driving 4.6-42 -1.6±0.5 3.6⋅100 d Pulse
Percussion drilling 4.6-42 -1.3±1.6 3.0⋅100 d Broadband, percussion harmonics
Chain saw 15-43 -2.0±1.0 4.110-1 d Broadband
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For monitoring after repository closure seismic sensors 
would be deployed at distances on the order of 1 km. With 
a quiet mine and sensors at several hundred metres depth 
a background peak-to-peak value of 0.1 to 0.2 μm/s 
seems achievable. Summarily assuming a power-law de-
crease from 100 m to 1000 m with an exponent of -2 as 
observed with the blasts the values at 1 km are lower than 
at 100 m by a factor 1/100. With a threshold of 2*0.2 μm/s 
the four sources from blasts down to the hammer would 
be detectable, with 2*0.1 μm/s the set of detectable sourc-
es would expand by the scaler and possibly the large-hole 
drilling rig. If the signal strength decreases more slowly, for 
example with a power-law exponent of -1.5, as found for 
hammer blows, the reduction factor from 100 m to 1000 m 
is about 1/30. In this case core drilling, the hoist platform, 
the roof cutter cutting and salt falling through a drop 
hole, maybe also picking, would be detectable and the 
stronger sources would reach out correspondingly far-
ther. more exact statements require looking at the ampli-
tude decrease with distance for each source specifically.
Of course, the amplitude crossing a detection threshold is 
a simple criterion and not the only one available; looking at 
spectra or using other more sophisticated detection pro-
cedures one can find signals masked by noise.
For seismic monitoring during the emplacement phase – 
for example to support information provided by surveil-
lance cameras by a second, redundant signal – the back-
ground noise will be markedly higher, probably similar to 
the values measured under different conditions in the pre-
sent project (see Section 3.2), resulting in lower detection 
ranges. On the other hand, sensors could be de-
ployed much more densely, close enough to the potential 
sources that their amplitude is higher than the back ground 
under normal conditions. Here the problem of masking 
one source by another, stronger one close-by has to be 
tackled.
Figure 11: Nominal peak-to-peak value of vertical wall velocity in 100 m distance from various sources, logarithmic scale. These values 
are uncertain by a factor 2, and more if the distance interval used for the trend ends markedly below 100 m (italics).
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3.6 Seismic spectra
Spectra show how components with different frequen-
cies contribute to the total signal. If two signals with dif-
ferent frequency content are superposed this can be 
seen in spectra. In particular, since the background 
spectrum is known, an additional activity with a different 
spectrum shows up even if the amplitude is not in-
creased significantly by it; this can be used as a more 
sophisticated detection criterion than just amplitude. 
Based on spectra one can design filters suppressing 
certain frequencies for improved detection. Spectra at 
different distances from a source may allow one to de-
termine frequency-dependent properties of propaga-
tion. Periodic signals (for instance from machinery) show 
up as peaks at the fundamental frequency (the inverse 
of the period) plus at integer multiples of it (harmonics); 
the signal form is reflected in the relative strength and 
phase of these peaks. Change of spectra over time can 
indicate motion or other variation of a source. This is 
visualised by a spectrogram where the abscissa de-
notes time, the ordinate frequency, and the spectral 
power (or amplitude) is coded in grey value or colour. 
Here only a few example spectrograms are presented, 
with grey value in logarithmic scale.
Figure 12 is a spectrogram of the scaler operating in about 
25  m distance. During scaling broadband excitation 
extends to 2.7 kHz. In the periods in between the frequen-
cies of the engine harmonics increase and decrease again 
with the engine rotation rate as the hydraulic arm is moved 
and the vehicle drives to the next scaling position. Acous-
tic-seismic coupling from the greatly increased engine 
noise can explain the strong seismic signals in these peri-
ods (see Section 3.4.3).
Figure 13 is a spectrogram from a pass of the heavy 
loader with 3-4 m/s speed, fully loaded with about 9 t of 
salt. There is a harmonic series of lines typical of the pe-
riodic signals from a reciprocating engine, probably pro-
duced by acoustic coupling. The frequencies follow the 
variation of the engine rotation rate, jumps can be ex-
plained by gear switching. It is notable that there is con-
siderable broadband excitation up to the Nyquist fre-
quency of 5  kHz (half the 10-kHz sampling rate). Its 
power increases and decreases in parallel to the engine 
rotation rate.
Figure 14 is a spectrogram from picking, percussion drill-
ing and stud driving at close range. All three activities pro-
duce spectral power nearly up to the Nyquist frequency of 
5 kHz. Due to their periodic blows to the salt rock, picking 
and drilling show harmonics of a fundamental frequency. 
This is about constant at 44 Hz for picking, while it de-
creases with growing friction from about 57 to about 37 Hz 
for drilling as the drill hole gets deeper.
Figure 12: Spectrogram of vertical wall velocity at Position 1 of station UT1 (in the niche “Bohrort 3.2”) when the scaler (Proxima C1 BF 
AKR) worked in the adjacent drift. Grey value: spectral power in logarithmic scale. Periods of scaling are indicated by “Sc”, they are char-
acterised by broad-band power from 0 to 2.7 kHz. In between the frequencies of the engine harmonics show up as curves at discrete 
frequencies, increasing strongly and decreasing again, e.g. with peaks at 1.0 and 1.5 kHz around 17:38:33. The constant-frequency lines 
are probably due to holder vibration.
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Figure 13: Spectrogram of vertical wall velocity at Position 2 (at the drift wall) during a pass of the heavy loader (Centauri I HFL 00 K R), 
fully loaded, with speed 3-4 m/s. Grey value: spectral power in logarithmic scale. The sensor was passed at about 19:33:05 (brightest 
region 19:32:55 to 19:33:30, with variations in parallel to engine rotation rate). The curves of varying frequency are harmonics of the en-
gine, probably from acoustic-seismic coupling. In addition broadband power exists up to 5 kHz.
Figure 14: Spectrogram of vertical wall velocity 8.4 m from a site where picking (P) (Hilti TE 1000-AVR), percussion drilling (D) (Hilti TE 
6A36) and stud driving (F) (Hilti DX 460 KIT ) were done. Grey value: spectral power in logarithmic scale. Picking and drilling produce 
harmonic and broadband features over the duration of the activity, the harmonics are best visible between 0.3 and 1.5 kHz. The impulses 
from stud driving make broadband power contained only in one 0.8-s spectrum (or two neighbouring ones) each. Several weaker events 
are visible, too.
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4. Conclusions
On a general level several findings are relevant:
 – Removing rock by drilling or cutting produces broad-
band vibration.
 – Different from drilling the signals from the scaler, but also 
the roof cutter are irregular, as rock is hit or not dur-
ing movement of the respective arm.
 – Periodically working machinery produces harmonic sig-
nals in addition.
 – In the underground cavities significant coupling from 
acoustic to seismic excitation takes place. This is most 
relevant with the engine noise from heavy vehicles.
 – Seismic excitation in the salt rock extends to very high 
frequencies (tens of kilohertz, not shown here), and geo-
phone signals contain frequencies up to several kilo-
hertz. In future monitoring at least within the salt dome 
the high frequencies should not be neglected, in particu-
lar for localisation.
 – After propagation through the overburden of sand, silt 
and clay to the surface, kilohertz frequencies have van-
ished by attenuation, only frequencies up to several 
100 hertz remain (not shown here).
 – Not shown here likewise: Very low frequencies (below a 
few hertz) are not excited to a relevant extent, so that 
specific sensors covering these are not needed. 
With a view towards seismic detection of mining activities 
the following can be stated:
 – Seismic-signal strength shows considerable variability, 
peak-to-peak values from the same source at the same 
distance can vary by a factor 2 to 5.
 – Power-law fits to signal strength versus distance give ex-
ponents in the range -2.2 to -0.6; if credible values from 
distances of 100 m and more exist, the range is -2.2 to 
-0.8, with confidence intervals of ±0.2 to ±1.2.
 – Detection ranges by amplitude alone are many kilome-
tres for blasts, many hundreds of metres for heavy vehi-
cles and, depending on background noise, 100 m to a 
few times this value, for weaker sources.
The shorter detection ranges are relevant mostly for the 
emplacement phase when the mine is open and active, 
and seismic sensors could be deployed along shafts 
and drif ts with relatively close spacing, for example 
50 m or 100 m. Their signals would be evaluated and 
processed continuously, mostly in an automatic mode. 
The results could complement the information gained 
from video cameras and other traditional safeguards 
sensors.
After closure of the repository sensors and cables must 
not remain in it. monitoring for undeclared activities, that 
is for excavation in the former mine or close to it, would 
Figure 15: Notional possibilities for placement of seismic sensors after a possible emplacement phase in Gorleben, avoiding the reposi-
tory volume in the salt-dome centre (brown/light-grey quadrangles). Blue/light grey: in the salt dome, red/dark grey: surrounding it. Ad-
ditional sensors could be placed in the overburden above the dome. (Based on map from Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS), 
used by permission)
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rely on sensors far from the repository, also active contin-
uously, forming a “fence” in the surrounding sedi-
ment, maybe with parts in the salt dome (Figure 15). 
Keeping 500 m distance from the salt margin and 1 km 
from the repository in the salt, relevant distances from the 
repository would be 1-3 km, without sensors in the dome 
up to 5-8 km. With the mine closed a much lower back-
ground will hold. Assuming deployment in boreholes of 
several 100 m depth, a value of 0.1-0.2 μm/s is plausible. 
With a power-law exponent of -2, the sources down to 
the scaler and possibly large-hole drilling could be de-
tected at 1 km distance. This is a very rough estimate – 
with an exponent of -1.5 instead of -2 the signals at 1 km 
would be 3-fold higher. Additional sensors could be 
placed above the dome in the sand/silt/clay overburden, 
at, for example, 150-200 m depth. Here the distances 
from the repository would be 0.7 to 1.5 km, with about 
the same conditions for detection.
Excavation could be done by two major methods: drilling 
and blasting, or by cutting machines (tunnel boring ma-
chines or smaller road-header machines) (principally, salt 
could also be removed by water dissolution; if deemed rel-
evant this scenario should be investigated separately). In 
the first method blasts would provide a very strong and 
clear signal, even if drilling could not be detected. Removal 
of rock by cutting machines would set much higher re-
quirements on detection – a road header should be similar 
to the roof cutter, not a strong vibration source, see Fig-
ure 11. But with a road header advance would be relatively 
slow. A tunnel boring machine that would proceed faster 
should produce stronger signals with a larger detection 
range. Such a machine was not available in the Gorle-
ben mine; for this problem at least some estimates should 
be made. machine activity would also be needed for re-
moving debris. If a vehicle were used, the signal strength 
would probably be somewhere between the loader and 
the hoist platform, with corresponding conditions for 
detection.
In terms of monitoring prospects it can be stated that ex-
cavation by drilling and blasting can be detected by the 
sketched concept with virtual certainty. Whether removal 
of salt by tunnel boring machine or road header machine 
can be detected at sensor positions far enough away from 
the repository, and what the requirements on sensors and 
sensor density would be, needs to be studied. Scenarios 
should also consider other methods of reducing seismic 
excitation.
Most relevant is the investigation of the propagation of 
seismic waves from sources in the salt dome to longer dis-
tances in the salt dome and in particular to the surround-
ing and overlying sediment. This can be done at first by 
detailed seismic modelling, taking into account the proper-
ties of the various underground media and all boundaries 
between them. Such a project has begun at TU 
Dortmund. Some validation of its results will be possible 
using data gained in the measurements described here, 
including from the surface. If seismic modelling gives a 
reasonably positive outcome, then a subsequent project 
can validate the results at other positions using sensors in 
a few exemplary boreholes.
The results found will generally hold also for a different salt 
dome, with variations due to different geometry and inter-
nal as well as external structure. Concerning a repository 
in another medium (for example granite or clay, both alter-
native media are under research in Finland and France, re-
spectively, and are being discussed in Germany), there is 
no reason to assume that seismic  monitoring would 
be markedly less suitable than with salt. But there will be 
considerable differences for several reasons. For example, 
rock of different hardness can lead to different source 
strength for drilling. Acoustic-seismic coupling can differ. 
Propagation will be affected by different wave speeds and 
attenuation. Quantitative statements such as the 
ones made here will require a study with measurements 
for each potential site.
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Abstract:
The paper describes the practical implementation of the 
idea of 3S: safety, security and safeguards synergy, which 
was widely discussed at the relevant forums, in particular 
at the Seoul summit. The idea was aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the cooperation between these elements, 
which have relatively large number of common points, but 
at the same time have their proper features. Careful con-
sideration has showed that the sphere of non-destructive 
testing is the most appropriate one to start 3S synergy im-
plementation. Non-destructive testing methods and devic-
es are widely applied in each S-element and could quite 
often be retargeted. The prototype of closure weld seam 
was inspected by the means of standard ultrasonic echo-
pulse method. However, the collected data was processed 
with developed mathematical algorithm, that allows to use 
this information for security and safeguard purposes as 
tagging instrument. The main challenges for industrial ap-
plication were defined.
Keywords: Intrinsic fingerprints; spent nuclear fuel; ac-
counting; dry fuel storage; ultrasonic inspections.
1. Background
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director 
General Yukiya Amano, in his statement to the Fifty-Sixth 
Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference in 2012, 
emphasized that “…Eighteen months after the accident 
[Fukushima Daiichi accident], it is clear that nuclear energy 
will remain an important option for many countries. Our lat-
est projections show a steady rise in the number of nucle-
ar power plants in the world in the next 20 years”[1]. It 
means further dissemination of nuclear energy for peaceful 
use among new countries and in the new regions as well 
as improving existing capabilities.
Nuclear energy technology is complex and sophisticated 
and requires high level of scientific development, but at the 
same time poses potential hazards for humanity and re-
quires the most advanced and well-thought actions. De-
spite the worldwide robust experience in operating nuclear 
facilities and related infrastructure, the Fukushima accident 
showed that the use of nuclear energy still can lead to dis-
astrous consequences. Thus the system of nuclear energy 
utilization requires new and innovative ideas to improve the 
level of nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear safe-
guards. It is clear, that each of S has its particular duties 
and peculiarities, but together these elements create a 
stable system for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Within “2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit”, which was 
held in Seoul in March 2012, as one year past after Fuku-
shima Daiichi accident, synergy between safety and secu-
rity was one of the main topics of discussion. On the offi-
c i a l  Seou l  Summi t  Commun iqué h igh l ighted: 
“Acknowledging that safety measures and security meas-
ures have in common the aim of protecting human life and 
health and the environment, we affirm that nuclear security 
and nuclear safety measures should be designed, imple-
mented and managed in nuclear facilities in a coherent 
and synergistic manner” [2]. Additionally to this statement, 
in the context of protecting human life and health and the 
environment, safeguard measures (non-proliferation) also 
needs to be taken into account. Thus, today, the key chal-
lenge for scientists, politicians, diplomats is to seek op-
tions for preventing any situation which can undermine the 
reliability of peaceful use of nuclear energy. One of the 
ways of resolving this problem is to enhance the synergies 
between nuclear safety, security and safeguards.
Careful consideration has showed that the non-destructive 
testing (NDT) is one of the most appropriate options to 
start 3S synergy implementation. NDT methods and devic-
es are widely applied in each S-element and quite often 
could be retargeted. [3] To understand what we should 
choose as the very first object for synergy implementation 
we need to screen for the most vulnerable stages in the 
nuclear fuel cycle. According to the official Russian RO-
SATOM guidelines, the following challenge exists for apply-
ing sealing technologies: “...there is no official data con-
cerning sealing systems that could not be faked...” [4]. 
Within 3S initiative Tomsk Open Laboratory for Material In-
spections of National Research Tomsk polytechnic universi-
ty has launched the project on NDT methods application for 
fingerprinting by intrinsic features of dry intermediate stor-
age (DIS) casks with spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Nowadays, 
NDT is mainly focused on safety purposes, but it seems 
possible to apply those methods for providing national and 
IAEA safeguards. [5] The containment of spent fuel in 
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Item Type of Storage Containment & Shielding Features Notes
1 Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Pool
(Wet Storage of Spent Fuel)
Water in a deep stainless steel 
lined concrete pool within an 
enclosed structure
Traditionally used for 
expanded storage of spent 
fuel.
Many examples worldwide
Current trends are for dry rather 
than wet storage, for reasons of 
reduced maintenance (water 
management) and improved 
safety and security.
2 Vertical Dual-Purpose Spent
Fuel Dry Storage/Transfer
Cask
Heavily shielded steel cask with 
spent fuel sealed in inner steel 
canister (i.e. double lidded)
Vertical, dual purpose, dry 
spent fuel storage and 
transfer cask
Examples:
CASTOR, TN
NAC-ST/STC
BGN Solutions
3 Vertical Concrete Dry Spent
Fuel Storage Cask/Silo
Heavily shielded concrete cask/
silo with spent fuel sealed in an 
inner steel canister
Vertical, dry spent fuel 
storage cask/silo
Examples:
CONSTOR
HI-STORM
4 Horizontal Modular Concrete
Dry Spent Fuel Storage
Heavily shielded modular 
concrete storage with spent fuel 
sealed in an inner steel canister
Horizontal, modular dry 
spent fuel storage vault
Examples:
NUHOHMS
NAC-MPC/UMS
MAGNASTOR
5 Concrete Dry Storage Vault 
with Thimble Tube Storage
Wells
Heavily shielded concrete vault 
with thimble tube storage wells 
for spent fuel
Vertical, dry spent fuel or 
vitrified waste storage vault 
with thimble tube
storage wells
Examples:
MVDS
MACSTOR
6 Dry Geologic Storage
(Tunnel or Mine)
Dry gas-filled spent fuel 
canisters emplaced in an 
isolated deep tunnel or mine 
and backfilled with earth
Dry spent fuel storage in 
tunnel or mine; vertical or 
orizontal fuel orientation
Example:
Olkiluoto NPP Spent Fuel
Repository (Onkalo)
Table 1: Storage options for away-from-reactor storage of spent fuel [8]
storage casks and vaults at DIS could be dramatically im-
proved in case of development of so-called “smart” spent 
fuel storage and transfer casks. Such casks would have 
tamper indicating and monitoring/tracking features integrat-
ed directly into the cask design. These features could be an 
add-on package or be integrated into the cask construction. 
The microstructure of the containers material as well as of 
the dedicated weld seam applied to the lid and the cask 
body provides a unique fingerprint of the full container, 
which can be reproducibly scanned by using an appropriate 
technique. Reproducing of a unique fingerprint can be 
achieved due to the following factors: 1) DIS cask design – it 
is based on defence in depth principle in order to prevent 
harmful influence from stored SNF (neutron radiation and 
any kind of corrosion); 2) ultrasonic techniques allow to 
choose area of control quite preciously what helps to avoid 
influence of external factors (wedges, coupling, scratches 
etc.). Additionally, this paper contains description of the weld 
seams investigation performed by ultrasonic backscattering 
technique for providing those fingerprints 
2. Overview of a dry cask storage design
The energy content of SNF is significant and thus be-
comes the incentive to keep the option of future use of 
SNF. The historical vision towards the future of the nu-
clear fuel cycle was determined by key idea that LWR 
SNF is a valuable resource. Plutonium from LWR SNF 
was to be recovered and fabricated into fuel for the 
start-up of fast reactors. Such a system could increase 
the available energy from uranium by more than an or-
der of magnitude. [6]
The technologies currently available for spent fuel storage 
fall into two categories, wet and dry, distinguished in com-
pliance with the cooling medium used. In wet storages the 
fuel cooling is performed by water and in dry it is per-
formed by air, accordingly. Whereas wet storage option 
has been used for spent fuel storage and cooling at reac-
tor sites and in some off-site storage facilities around the 
world. A variety of technical methods for dry storage has 
been developed since then and is available in the interna-
tional market.
Intact fuel storage, which is the most prevalent dry storage 
method, refers to storage of fuel assemblies with no at-
tempts to pre-compact them or alter them by destructive 
methods prior to storage. A variety of storage systems have 
been developed to meet specific requirements of different 
reactor fuels and a number of designs based on these ge-
neric technologies is now available for dry storage for the 
spent fuel containers (also called casks) or vaults (horizon-
tal, vertical etc). The general examples of storage types are 
highlighted in Table 1. The technology continues to evolve 
keeping up with the design optimization and new materials. 
One of the driving forces of the trend towards dry storage 
options (especially those of casks) is the inherent technical 
flexibility linked to economics. Compared to the pool facili-
ties, which need to be built at full capacity initially, the mod-
ular type dry facilities can be added as needed with the ad-
vantage of minimizing capital outlays. [7]
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Several variations of these fuel storage concepts, often by 
combination of existing dry storage technologies, have been 
developed with prospective applications in the future. Cask 
is currently the most popular option that can be purchased 
or leased from the competitive market for expedited installa-
tion, on the assumption that the necessary license can be 
obtained and any other obstacles such as opposition on 
behalf of the affected local community have been or could 
be resolved. Inheriting the technology initially developed for 
large-scale transportation of spent fuel from storage to re-
processing operations, several large size casks are now be-
ing marketed for storage services. Concrete modules have 
also become popular as a competitive option, with more 
designs licensed and implemented over the years. Markets 
for concrete modules are merging with those for vaults as a 
compact storage system, in terms of advantages when land 
availability is an issue. Multi-purpose technologies (i.e. a sin-
gle canister package for storage, transportation and dispos-
al) have also been developed, for instance in the US. Within 
this paper we will focus on Vertical Dual-Purpose Spent 
Fuel Dry Storage/Transfer Cask as the most popular type of 
DIS cask in Russia.
3. Ultrasound inspection
The echo-sounder technique is most commonly used 
method for material inspection. The ultrasonic pulse called 
transmitter pulse is usually generated by piezo-electric 
conversion. The pulse propagates through the material 
that is supposed to be isotropic. Part of the acoustic wave 
is scattered back to the transducer and converted again 
by the reciprocal piezo-effect. The received pulse is A-
scan. The amplitudes of the A-scan indicate the intensity 
of reflection correlates with the reflector dimension. The ar-
rival time of reflector amplitudes is used for their localiza-
tion and providing straight propagation along the central 
line of the wave field intensity profile.
Figure 1: Typical UT inspection of cask weld
Figure 1 represents the scheme of Vertical Dual-Purpose 
Spent Fuel Dry Storage/Transfer Cask UT inspection for 
safety reason. For the detection of structural features, es-
pecially planar, normal incidence of the wave field to re-
ceive the backscattered reflection is required. Depending 
on possible critical flaw geometries and a risk classification 
of the inspected component the inspection procedure re-
quires various angles of sound wave incidence. 
The required angle of incidence is realized by plastic 
wedges of different sound velocity and low attenuation. 
Snell’s law [9] can be used for the wedge design of the 
specified angle of sound incidence as long as the beam is 
directed. A typical angle beam transducer design is shown 
in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Typical design of an angular beam transducer [10]
Both the longitudinal mode (cL = 5920 mm/sec in steel) 
and the slower shear mode (cs = 3250 mm/sec in steel) 
can be realized by the appropriate wedge design. Above 
the first critical angle of 90° refracted longitudinal mode 
and only shear waves are transmitted into the sample. We 
use acoustic noise, reflected from material’s artefacts, re-
ceived from both modes while travelling through controlled 
material; and the purpose of it is to obtain structural finger-
printing. Raleigh scattering forms most of the acoustic 
noise and usually not evaluated for flaw detection and as-
sessment. However, we assume that the acoustic noise 
depends on the microstructure what specifies the position. 
Geometric extended reflectors are by far more position re-
lated and may be evaluated for position data and position 
changes. However, in high quality steels which are used 
for structures extended material flaws or material inhomo-
geneity are quite rare. It is worth mentioning, that only 
point reflectors will provide accurate data as required. 
Back-wall reflection is independent of the transducer posi-
tion. Compound reflector geometries, such as crack faces, 
require careful analysis of the radio frequency (RF) A-scans 
to separate individual and interfering scatter centres [11]. 
The number of experiments was conducted during the in-
vestigation. The main goal of experiments was the 
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Figure 3: Experimental installation
development of methodology for structural fingerprints 
identification. Experimental set-up was developed to 
achieve the goal. Russian universal industrial ultrasonic 
flaw detector USD 60 was chosen as basis for the installa-
tion. (Fig.3) Transducer by Olympus Panametrics 2,5 MHz, 
70o beam angle and standard laptop with software includ-
ed in the set-up, also. Software package consisting of sig-
nal receiving utility provided with flaw detector, freeware 
digitizing module and Origin Lab. All specific algorithms 
were realised by means of C#.
Three steel plates with dimension 100x100 mm and differ-
ent thickness (8, 10, 12 mm) were welded and used as 
samples dedicated to be equivalent of cask weld seam. 
(Fig.4) The thickness of the samples was recommended 
by our Russian industrial partner – customer of DIS casks. 
Weld seams at each sample were cut off for 40 mm form 
the edge. 
For the investigation were chosen nine points of interest in 
order to provide required statistics. (Fig. 5) 50 measure-
ments were done in each point. Around 100 measure-
ments were done to investigate the main factors that influ-
ence the results, such as position inaccuracy, coupling 
problem etc.
Figure 4: The sample example – 8 mm thickness
Figure 5: The sample example – 8 mm thickness
So-called “Area of interest” is used in order to prevent 
internal or external influence on material structure, 
 within frameworks of the experiment. It is internal 
volume that is placed for 2 mm above internal surface of 
the sample. (Fig.6)
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During the investigation, we used standard software for 
data acquiring and processing. The development of 
data processing model is based on biometric system as 
the most reliable. Fingerprinting systems are used as 
reference technology. In these systems matching 
threshold is defined by equation 1.
 k D
p q
=
×
2
, (1)
where k – required correlation rate; D – quantity of defined 
features; p, q – amplitudes of features in reference and 
measured signal respectively. [12] In this case, a correla-
tion threshold for a valid result is 65 percent. This thresh-
old was taken for development and testing of the data pro-
cessing system. 
Ultrasound equipment allows to use different types of 
signals.. Radio frequency A-scan was chosen for the in-
vestigation to present data in real scale. During ultra-
sonic testing procedure, reference signature (Fig. 7a) 
was obtained. Further fingerprint images the system 
digitizes and analyses the input data. Then the most 
distinctive point should be picked from a digitized im-
age, on the basis of those points system creates a pat-
tern for reference signature. The same steps are taken 
for authentication process, the last one will be matching 
points of patterns. The correct signature (Fig. 7b) was 
obtained and more than 65% of points met with each 
other.  identity of signatures is proven and the controlled 
item is considered not the object of malicious acts. [13] 
In case when inherent microstructure of closure weld is 
corrupted and correlation rate is below than the thresh-
old, a poor signature as result of the inspection is ob-
tained. (Fig.7 c)
Figure 6: Scheme of sound distribution
a) 
b) 
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Figure 8: Data quantity optimizing 
c) 
Figure 7: a) Reference signature; b) Corrected signature; c) Poor signature 
50 portable network graphics (png) images of the RF sig-
nal were acquired for each of nine points.  Comparative 
data analysis proved the uniqueness of the acoustic noise 
image.
Further data processing was performed whereby the in-
itial signals were digitised and represented in the shape 
of data arrays thus representing them by a set of X and 
Y coordinates. The error minimization problem was 
solved by averaging the X and Y values for each signal, 
after which  an optimal number of peaks was defined 
and found to vary between 38 and 43. Noteworthy, due 
to the fact that a sufficient number of points is required 
in order to form a pattern the correlation rate decreased 
when the number of peaks was less than 38.  However, 
a number of peaks  higher than 43 will also result in the 
correlation rate decreasing due to the presence of 
peaks artificially created by the hardware. Thus, in the 
present study the optimal number of peaks was chosen 
to be equal to 40 (Fig.8).
The peaks obtained create a pattern for the chosen 
measurement point described by a suitable function us-
ing OriginPro Lab 8.0. These data will be used for 
authentication. 
During an inspection it is necessary to perform control 
measurements at some points chosen by the inspector, 
the results of which are compared to the patterns originally 
assigned to the measurements at the same positions. In 
order to evaluate the data obtained, the confidence interval 
is defined taking into account the maximal number of 
peaks to minimize false data. Exceeding the confidence 
gate by 0.4 point leads to a significant increase in false 
data (Fig.9) and this is taken into consideration. The refer-
ence signal amplitude is taken as 1 and the gate is within 
the range [0.8 to 1.2]. 
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Experiments have shown that in case of the successful au-
thentication the match accuracy reaches from 72,5% to 
87,5%. The divergences with the pattern are more often 
seen at the initial and final values of the data array. The 
Poor authentication case simulation demonstrates the 
match accuracy within the interval 12,5% to 45% that is 
considerably less the Successful authentication range.  
4. Conclusion
Obtained results during the experiment have verified the 
consistency of the chosen combination of the control 
method and structural fingerprint appliance. The suc-
cessful authentication demonstrates the levels of the 
feature points’ compliance exceeding the given thresh-
old on 65% which differs considerably from the percent-
age of the concurred points during authentication from 
other points. Since reproduction or doubling of the pro-
posed unique identification characteristics is impossible 
at the current state science and technology, application 
of this technique is considered to identify the interfer-
ence into the nuclear materials displacement with high 
accuracy. 
Obtained results revealed the fact, that information for all 
3S can be gathered by applying single measurement. Ul-
trasonic inspection of DIS cask closure weld has approved 
the following useful applications: for safety reasons - pos-
sible cracks and flaws for evaluating degradation of materi-
al; for security - intrinsic features of weld – natural finger-
print of material can be used as non-tamperable seal for 
controlling and accounting purposes; and for safeguards - 
automatic data acquisition and processing facilitates crea-
tion of the data storage in order to make verification pro-
cess easy and robust.
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Abstract:
In November 2012 the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) sponsored a Technical Meeting on the Interfaces 
and Synergies in Safety, Security, and Safeguards for the 
Development of a Nuclear Power Program. The goal of the 
meeting was to explore whether and how safeguards, 
safety, and security systems could be coordinated or inte-
grated to support more effective and efficient nonprolifera-
tion infrastructures. While no clear consensus emerged, 
participants identified practical challenges to and opportu-
nities for integrating the three disciplines’ regulations and 
implementation activities. Simultaneously, participants also 
recognized that independent implementation of safe-
guards, safety, and security systems may be more effec-
tive or efficient at times. This paper will explore the devel-
opment of a framework for conducting an assessment of 
safety-security-safeguards integration within a State. The 
goal is to examine State regulatory structures to identify 
conflicts and gaps that hinder management of the three 
disciplines at nuclear facilities. Such an analysis could be 
performed by a State Regulatory Authority (SRA) to pro-
vide a self-assessment or as part of technical cooperation 
either with a newcomer State, or to a State with a fully de-
veloped SRA.
Keywords: 3S; facility operations; regulatory development
1. Introduction
It has been long recognized that there are organizational 
and technical incompatibilities and at the same time over-
laps among Safety-Security-Safeguards (3S)1 require-
ments in nuclear facilities. In 2008, led by Japan, the G8 
countries agreed to support the concept of 3S. The objec-
tive was to set up nuclear energy infrastructures in coun-
tries that were beginning nuclear programs. The idea was 
to help countries to integrate their approach to implement-
ing safety, security, and safeguards measures so that they 
all receive appropriate attention, and through regulatory 
development, training. This approach would enable coun-
tries to take advantage of the synergies among the 3S 
components, while recognizing the differences.
1  Acknowledging that there is no IAEA definition for 3S, we use the term in this 
paper as shorthand for Safety-Security-Safeguards.
Subsequently there has been much discussion about the 
concept of 3S. ESARDA and INMM meetings have devot-
ed sessions to various elements of the topic, such as 3S 
by design and 3S culture. A special session at the 2013 
INMM meeting in Palm Desert, California, focused on 3S 
including discussions of regulatory oversight, implementa-
tion at a spent fuel facility, and 3S by design [1]. Interna-
tional Meetings on Next Generation Safeguards have also 
addressed the topic [2]. In November 2012 the IAEA con-
ducted a Technical Meeting in Vienna on Safety, Security 
and Safeguards: Interfaces and Synergies for the Develop-
ment of a Nuclear Power Programme, which noted several 
interfaces and synergies between nuclear safety, security, 
and safeguards [3]. 
These discussions about 3S are typically conducted at a 
high level and rarely examine specific examples of when 
safeguards, safety and security measures intersect. In 
these cases, the reviews – while moving the literature for-
ward – are typically limited to one element of 3S such as 
non-destructive testing [4], probabilistic risk analysis [5], or 
operator organizational structure [6]. Consequently, these 
discussions do not examine thoroughly whether such in-
tersections reinforce or undermine the objectives of each 
discipline. Indeed, existing literature on the topic of 3S ap-
pears to echo the assumption that these intersections are 
inherently beneficial to the operator. The literature often 
continues to argue for greater coordination and integration 
of the three disciplines, particularly during the nuclear in-
frastructure development process.
The assumption that 3S is inherently beneficial does not 
encourage consideration of fundamental questions: Is 
there really a need for greater coordination and integration 
among the disciplines? Are there really many conflicts 
among the disciplines? Would greater coordination and in-
tegration have a measureable impact on facility operations 
or reduce perceived vulnerabilities or risks?
When we looked for examples that required a coordinated 
3S intervention, we found a few, but each seemed to have 
reasonably simple solutions. The classic example has to 
do with emergency exits. You need to let people exit the 
facility in a fire emergency, but there is also a need to sub-
sequently corral them for security reasons. There are also 
safeguards components to this example to ensure that no 
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one is exiting illegally while possessing nuclear material. 
Security can help, but the circumstances may require a 
physical inventory verification prior to letting people back 
into the facility. This well-known example seems to per-
suade people that there is something important about 3S, 
but more examples are needed to warrant promotion of 
the concept. Some other areas ripe for research and de-
velopment include access control, facility design, and 
computer security risks. 
Without a thorough examination of the intersections 
among the three disciplines, nuclear plant operators and 
regulators are limited in their conclusions about whether 
and in what contexts greater coordination among the dis-
ciplines would truly generate beneficial results. The pur-
pose of this paper is to propose a framework for analysis 
of the concept, and then suggest how various entities 
might employ the framework. Officials from Finland’s nu-
clear regulatory body, STUK, provide specific examples 
from their experience enforcing safeguards, safety and se-
curity regulations in Finland.
2. Framework
As part of the effort to develop a framework, we sought to 
record in a table intersections of safeguards, safety and 
security through the identification of discrete events that 
trigger interactions among the three disciplines. 
Working from left to right, the table’s four columns specify 
areas of impact (“Intersection Area”), the specific instigator 
of a possible 3S conflict (“Event”), the risk(s) posed by that 
event to one or more of the 3S disciplines (“Event Impact”), 
and potential ways to address these risks by restoring the 
equilibrium among the three disciplines (“Risk Mitigations”). 
(The order of the blocks in the table is arbitrary). By investi-
gating each element of the framework individually, while 
focusing on the discrete events where the disciplines inter-
sect, regulators, designers, operators and staff may be 
able to better identify who can take best advantage of or 
reinforce the 3S concept. 
The event impacts described in the table and the risk miti-
gations proposed are illustrative. Further, the set of inter-
section areas may not be comprehensive. As recommend-
ed in the conclusion, stakeholders will need to further 
develop the content of this framework.
The table requires two prefatory notes:
When describing 3S intersections, risks and opportunities 
are two sides of the same coin. A situation can either be 
characterized as a risk that requires mitigation or an op-
portunity that overcomes a challenge. For example, the ta-
ble could be structured to say either that “separate nuclear 
laws create conflicts and regulators should integrate them” 
or “an integrated nuclear law allows regulators to avoid 
conflicts that can arise”. We have chosen for consistency 
to structure the table as risks that require 3S mitigation. 
Further, it is important to note that this framework focuses 
on 3S impacts. As described in Suzuki et. al. [5], interac-
tions between the three disciplines can include one or 
more of the three discipline pairs (safety-security; safety-
safeguards; and security-safeguards) or impact all three 
disciplines. Table 1 is limited to the narrow set of interac-
tions that force an intersection among all three disciplines, 
but future work could expand the table to capture addi-
tional events that only affect one or more of the discipline 
pairs.
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3. Preliminary Conclusions
From our preliminary findings suggested in the table, we 
can assert that there is value in the concept of 3S, and 
that a framework can be developed to support thoughtful 
analysis about how the three disciplines interact at a facili-
ty. Moreover, there are instances where safeguards, safety 
and security measures could be better coordinated, inte-
grated or considered holistically by regulators, operators, 
designers and staff to improve facility operations. Recog-
nizing that our framework and approach are not complete, 
we provide recommendations for various users to advance 
discussion on this topic. More research will be needed to 
validate our preliminary conclusions.
4. Implications
4.1 Regulators
Each State will choose its own approach to handling the co-
ordination or integration of the three disciplines. Responsi-
bilities for each discipline may reside in one or more organi-
zations. In a nuclear newcomer state, it may be important to 
keep all of the issues under one organization to ensure that 
none of them is ignored. In a state with an advanced nucle-
ar energy infrastructure, the disciplines may need to be 
managed separately. A regulatory authority with responsibil-
ity for all the disciplines may be most cost effective. A State 
with more than one regulatory authority will need to closely 
coordinate among these authorities to avoid conflicts or 
gaps. Either approach can ensure that regulators are able to 
see possible contradictions among requirements for opera-
tors. As a starting point there should be a joint risk assess-
ment, including possible use of DBT, and risk management 
program among the 3S participants. The regulators for each 
of the three disciplines should be cognizant of the require-
ments of the other disciplines. With cross training of inspec-
tors, they will be able to recognize conflicts when inspecting 
for any of the three disciplines. This would ensure that har-
monization of regulations will prevent conflicts among re-
quirements for each discipline.
In Finland, STUK is the 3S regulator. STUK experience has 
been that simply locating the responsibility in one organi-
zation is not enough. Regulations should reflect the possi-
ble synergies, interfaces and conflicts among the disci-
plines. And good practices to strengthen cooperation 
among the different sections include good coordination, 
assertive management, common informative meetings, 
and combined inspections by inspectors from each of the 
three disciplines.
4.2 Operators
In an operating facility, nuclear safety can eclipse nuclear 
security and safeguards due to its direct impact on worker 
safety and health and facility operations. Because of its 
overriding priority, safety will often drive the budget, limit-
ing the amount of money dedicated to safeguards and se-
curity measures. There are consequences to allowing this 
to happen. Reducing security measures can leave vulnera-
bilities. Limiting resources for safeguards implementation 
can lead to inaccurate or incomplete reporting to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, which could generate sus-
picions that there has been a diversion. These suspicions 
may require greater IAEA scrutiny and intrusion into facility 
operations. A rigorous assessment by the operator of how 
the three disciplines benefit most from harmonization, or 
how they are likely to generate vulnerabilities would help 
inform resource allocation for a facility.
From a Finnish perspective, it is essential that the operator 
incorporate safeguards and security into the bidding pro-
cess to achieve more functional nuclear plants and save 
costs. This is not strictly a design issue, as all the relevant 
parties developing new plants should understand the ba-
sic criteria on safeguards and security. This requires in-
formative meetings among the operator, the State Regula-
tory Authority, and designers with the IAEA or the regional 
safeguards authority. This will facilitate safeguards meas-
ures with the needed equipment and cabling being imple-
mented in a harmonized way, integrated with safety and 
security requirements.
4.3 Designers
For nuclear facility design engineers, safety has been the 
overriding paradigm. Accidents at Three Mile Island, Cher-
nobyl, and Fukushima have reinforced that concern. In-
dustrial safety, criticality safety, radiation safety, electrical 
safety, high pressure safety, and other areas of safety are 
likely to be second nature to the designers. In the past, se-
curity was left to the security professionals, and therefore 
was often an add-on to the facility design and computer 
systems. International Safeguards has had even less em-
phasis in the design community, and has had to be devel-
oped as an afterthought. Clear requirements and guidance 
are needed for developers. 
One example is the first final-disposal facility for spent nu-
clear fuel, currently under licensing review and partially un-
der construction in Finland. The facility will consist of an 
encapsulation plant and a geological repository for spent 
nuclear fuel. The safety of final disposal is a fundamental 
issue. The current process and plans for the encapsulation 
plant and geological repository have been designed pri-
marily with safety in mind. The implementation of security 
and safeguards must not compromise safety. However, 
challenges appear from the security point of view. These 
include the identification of vital and inner areas; creation 
of a new design basis threat (DBT); identification of inter-
faces, synergies and challenges between safety, security 
and safeguards, and handling classified information 
throughout the lifecycle of the facility. 
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The safeguards concerns of final disposal are unprece-
dented. Traditional safeguards measures for the spent fuel 
will be impossible once the fuel is stored and tunnels are 
backfilled. The whole process must provide sufficient as-
surance that the fuel has been stored and emplaced ac-
cording to declarations and that no diversion has been 
possible. Several safeguards decisions are part of broader 
3S considerations. For example: 
• The calibration of the equipment used for verifying spent 
fuel before encapsulation involves both computer securi-
ty and safeguards aspects,
• Continuity of knowledge from the first verification of 
spent fuel to the last one before encapsulation is an is-
sue that involves safety, security and safeguards. 
• Once the capsules are moved from the encapsulation 
plant to the final disposal storage underground verifica-
tion is no longer possible. This movement involves safe-
ty, security and safeguards.
Some challenges have occurred in the design of the facili-
ty, underscoring the importance of recognizing the safe-
guards requirements early in the design phase. An analogy 
is designing a house without considering electricity, and it 
is only once construction is done that you realize that you 
forgot to include cabling. In a nuclear facility, particularly 
one where the operating duration is measured in centu-
ries, including safeguards in the design phase would pre-
vent such problems. Further, during the life of the facility 
some parts may be storing nuclear material while other 
parts will still be under construction. Therefore, it is neces-
sary that safeguards be designed into the facility along 
with safety and security to manage these activities. 
The international community has started to meet this chal-
lenge. The International Atomic Energy Agency published 
guidance on safeguards by design principles in 2013 [9], 
and US National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next 
Generation Safeguards Initiative has sponsored develop-
ment of a series of Safeguards by Design guidance docu-
ments to be used for reference by designers [10]. In Janu-
ary 2012, the IAEA issued a new Safety Requirements 
document that includes the requirement that safety meas-
ures, nuclear security measures and arrangements for the 
State system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear ma-
terial for a nuclear power plant shall be designed and im-
plemented in an integrated manner so that they do not 
compromise one another [14].
Consideration of all three disciplines during the design 
phase may lead to operational efficiencies but more re-
search is needed in this area. 
4.4 Staff
In previous articles some of the current authors have dis-
cussed the culture of the three disciplines (safety-security-
safeguards) using an organizational culture construct [11]. 
We argued that safety culture was the best developed of 
the three, with nuclear security still catching up since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Safeguards culture is the 
least developed of the three, partly because there is no 
natural analogue to international safeguards in daily life. 
Additionally, safeguards culture does not benefit from hav-
ing an internationally agreed-upon definition as do safety 
culture and nuclear security culture. Even less developed 
is the concept of a 3S culture. We have argued elsewhere 
that an international agreed-upon definition of safeguards 
culture should be a next step prior to consideration of 3S 
culture. [12] The framework developed in this paper sug-
gests there are specific actions staff may be able to take to 
reinforce 3S objectives and communicate the importance 
of all three disciplines in an organization. A closer examina-
tion of these actions could lead to more productive devel-
opment of the 3S concept. 
5. Conclusions
We have proposed a framework for analysis, but have not 
performed the rigorous analysis that we argue needs to be 
done. Rather than continuing to talk about 3S in the ab-
stract, we propose a focused research project that brings 
together experts from each of the disciplines to give the 
nuclear community a better understanding of the range of 
specific conflicts that 3S integration could help resolve. 
Once understood, communities of regulators, operators, 
and designers can begin to discuss best practice. By tak-
ing actionable steps to scope and implement 3S, the inter-
national community can take advantage of the potential 
benefits of 3S activities. 
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Abstract:
Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays 
an increasingly important role in the IAEA’s move towards 
safeguards implementation based on all safeguards rele-
vant information known about a State. The growing volume 
of open source information requires the development of 
technology and tools capable of effectively collecting rele-
vant information, filtering out “noise”, organizing valuable 
information in a clear and accessible manner, and assess-
ing its relevance. 
In this context, the IAEA’s Division of Information Man-
agement (SGIM) and the EC’s Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) are currently implementing a joint project to ad-
vance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA’s work-
flow for open source information collection and analysis. 
The objective is to provide tools to support SGIM in the 
production of the SGIM Open Source Highlights, which is 
a daily news brief consisting of the most pertinent news 
stories relevant to safeguards and non-proliferation. The 
process involves the review and selection of hundreds of 
ar ticles from a wide array of specif ically selected 
sources.
The joint activity exploits the JRC’s Europe Media Monitor 
(EMM) and NewsDesk applications: EMM automatically 
collects and analyses news articles from a pre-defined list 
of websites, and NewsDesk allows an analyst to manually 
select the most relevant articles from the EMM stream for 
further processing.
The paper discusses the IAEA’s workflow for the produc-
tion of SGIM Open Source Highlights and describes the 
capabilities of EMM and NewsDesk. It then provides an 
overview of the joint activities since the project started in 
2011, which were focused i) on setting up a separate EMM 
installation dedicated to the nuclear safeguards and secu-
rity domain (Nuclear Security Media Monitor, NSMM) and 
ii) on evaluating the NSMM/NewsDesk for meeting the 
IAEA’s needs. Finally, it presents the current use NSMM/
NewsDesk at the IAEA and proposes options for further in-
tegration with the IAEA workflow.
Keywords: open source information, information collec-
tion and analysis, media monitoring, non-proliferation, nu-
clear safeguards
1. Introduction
The Agency collects and processes safeguards relevant 
information about a State from a wide range of sources: 
information provided by the State itself (e.g. declarations 
and reports); safeguards activities conducted by the Agen-
cy in the field and at Headquarters (e.g. inspections, de-
sign information verification, material balance evaluations); 
and other relevant information (e.g. from open sources and 
third parties) [1].
Open source information is defined as any information that 
is neither classified nor proprietary. It includes but is not 
limited to: media sources, government and non-govern-
mental reports and analyses, commercial data, and scien-
tific/technical literature. The Agency conducts ongoing re-
views of all safeguards relevant information and evaluates 
its consistency with the State’s declarations about its nu-
clear programme. 
The growing volume of open source information, the di-
verse forms of information available (text, audio, visual), 
and the technical competence required to evaluate this in-
formation poses significant challenges to effective informa-
tion collection and analysis. Meeting these challenges re-
quires the development of technology and tools capable of 
effectively collecting relevant information, filtering out 
“noise”, organizing valuable information in a clear and ac-
cessible manner, and aiding in the assessment of the in-
formation’s relevance.
To improve the IAEA’s ability to utilize open source infor-
mation, a joint project is currently underway as part of the 
European Commission’s (EC) support to the IAEA De-
partment of Safeguards (task EC-D-1880) to optimise ex-
isting processes involved in the daily collection of open 
source information by the Global Monitoring Team (GMT) 
and production of SGIM Open Source Highlights 
(OSHL) [2]. The project utilizes the Europe Media Monitor 
EMM/NewsDesk application, developed by the EC’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC). 
This paper describes the continuation of a project which 
was previously reported on at the Institute of Nuclear Ma-
terials Management (INMM) Annual Meeting in 2011 [3]. 
Section 2 describes the workflow for the daily collection of 
open source information by the SGIM GMT and for the 
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production of SGIM Open Source Highlights (as it existed 
prior to the start of the joint project). Section 3 discusses 
the EMM family of tools and provides an overview of the 
main functionalities and underlying technologies. 
Section 4 describes the work that has been carried out in 
order to customise EMM to IAEA’s needs with the goal of 
optimizing IAEA’s Open Source Collection process: it dis-
cusses the testing that took place in the pre-launch 
phase (coverage tests), and the deployment and out-
comes of the Phase 1 launch of the application (usability 
tests). Sections 5 details the ongoing joint activities to 
streamline the production of the OSHL and proposes ef-
forts to enable a more effective and efficient mining of 
open source information to enhance state evaluation 
through continuous monitoring. Section 6 draws some 
conclusion.
2. Open Source Information at IAEA
Acquisition and analysis of safeguards-relevant open 
source information plays an important role in the under-
standing of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle and activities. All 
safeguards relevant information available to the IAEA is 
used not only to support the drawing of safeguards con-
clusions, but also to plan the optimal set of safeguards 
verification activities to be conducted in a State. The evalu-
ation of all information is an ongoing and iterative process, 
in which knowledge about a State will continue to expand 
and improve. This allows the Agency to draw safeguards 
conclusions in the most effective and efficient way [4].
The Department of Safeguards uses open sources in sev-
eral ways in support of the State evaluation process, in-
cluding: i) daily review of open source information by the 
GMT to maintain current awareness and serve as early 
warning for safeguards-significant events; ii) as part of 
continuous monitoring of safeguards-relevant activities 
within a State, which contributes to State evaluation; iii) for 
focused research to support in-field verification activities 
such as complementary access; and iv) for special investi-
gations related to a specific State, entity, fuel cycle step, or 
technology. 
The IAEA’s focal point for the collection and analysis of 
open source information is the Division of Information 
Management (SGIM) within the IAEA’s Department of 
Safeguards. As part of its mandate for reviewing and an-
alysing open source information to maintain current 
awareness and provide early warning for safeguards-sig-
nificant events, SGIM produces a daily news briefing, 
called SGIM Open Source Highlights (OSHL), which cov-
ers safeguards-relevant news and analyses items, as well 
as relevant developments in nuclear non-proliferation, 
disarmament, arms control, and the nuclear fuel cycle. 
OSHL generally consists of four to eight news stories dai-
ly, and has a distribution list of nearly 600 staff members 
within the Department of Safeguards and other IAEA 
staff. A typical snapshot of SGIM Open Source Highlights 
is shown in Figure 1.
Periodically, the IAEA conducts a user survey of SGIM 
Open Source Highlights readers. In the most recent survey 
conducted, over 90% of those who responded considered 
Highlights important in their work. The majority of staff use 
Highlights to stay informed of safeguards-related news 
around the world, and, to a lesser degree, to track coun-
try-specific issues and to learn of relevant commentary 
and analysis on safeguards and non-proliferation issues. 
Three-quarters of respondents read Highlights every day, 
and over 95% read Highlights the same day it comes out. 
90% of respondents prefer to receive Highlights with ab-
stracts. Overwhelmingly, the Highlights’ readership finds 
the breadth of issue coverage and sources used appropri-
ate and satisfactory. 99% of respondents are satisfied or 
highly satisfied with the product.
2.1 Daily Review Procedures
The production of OSHL begins with a coordinated daily 
review by the Global Monitoring Team (GMT) of news re-
positories and websites. Sources of information include 
subscription-based news databases and aggregators, 
general news media sites, blogs, non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), universities and research institutes, 
and government agency websites.
The daily monitoring consists of a preliminary manual re-
view by the GMT of approximately 1500 news items on av-
erage. Prior to the Phase 1 NewsDesk deployment (see 
section 3.1), the daily monitoring consisted of three 
streams of information: i) a subscription-based news data-
base, ii) website-tracking software set up to monitor over 
100 news and analysis sites not covered by the database, 
and iii) a set of websites composed of nuclear-focused 
news aggregators, internal sources, and subscription-
based publications. 
Approximately 100 articles are selected for secondary re-
view by the OSHL editorial team, which then selects arti-
cles either for inclusion in OSHL or for further back end 
processing ensuring the long-term availability of the infor-
mation. Following these previous procedures, the prelimi-
nary review required approximately three staff-hours, fol-
lowed by the secondary review by the OSHL editorial team 
of approximately one staff-hour.
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2.2  Production and Distribution of SGIM Open 
Source Highlights
Once news stories are selected for inclusion in OSHL, they 
are distributed to the OSHL editorial team. Editors re-
search the stories, and create an abstract of the issue of 
approximately 3-5 sentences, pulling together several 
sources as necessary. The abstracts are posted as drafts 
in a blog format on a SharePoint intranet portal called the 
IAEA Safeguards Portal. The abstracts are then reviewed 
by an editor and published on the Safeguards Portal. Each 
abstract includes a link to a PDF of the full-text article(s) 
that is saved for archival purposes.
Once abstracts of all news stories for the day are complet-
ed, they are also distributed in an email newsletter to near-
ly 600 IAEA staff members. Production of the OSHL takes 
approximately an additional four to six staff-hours a day, 
depending on the volume of news and the complexity of 
the issues.
2.3 Back End Processing 
Because of the dynamic nature of information contained in 
websites, the daily monitoring of open source information 
also serves to build an IAEA internal knowledge base. This 
ensures that information that is identified as relevant by the 
GMT is available to the Agency in the future. Selected arti-
cles are manually processed to add metadata and then 
transferred to the internal repository. This process takes 
approximately one staff-hour per day. The resulting reposi-
tory is used as a starting point for subsequent analysis 
work related to State evaluations and other safeguards 
verification activities. 
3. Europe Media Monitor Platform and Tools
The Europe Media Monitor (EMM), developed by JRC [5], 
is a web-based multilingual news aggregation system that 
collects over 170 000 news articles per day in about 50 
languages from more than 4000 web news sources. The 
sources are mainly general news sites with a world-wide 
coverage, but also include some specialist websites and 
twenty commercial news providers. The system employs 
text mining techniques to provide a picture of the present 
situation in the world as conveyed in the media. These 
techniques include automatic multilingual categorization, 
entity extraction, geo-location, quote extraction and senti-
ment analysis. In addition, an algorithm for detecting 
breaking news automatically clusters all collected news ar-
ticles every ten minutes and displays the ten largest 
Figure 1: Snapshot of SGIM Open Source Highlights. News stories are presented in order of importance to safeguards activities. 
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clusters per language by plotting them on a time-by-size 
graph. It also provides all the necessary hyperlinks to navi-
gate through the clusters and to go to the source for a de-
tailed exploration. Furthermore it applies some deeper se-
mantic information analysis techniques, for example, to 
automatically detect violent events, derive reported social 
networks and analyze media impact [6].
EMM creates a searchable full-text index of all articles that 
flow through the system. For each article, it stores meta-
information including title, description, source, category, 
language, and original URL (Uniform Resource Locator). 
However, it does not store the original article itself.
At the core of the EMM system is a processing chain of 
lightweight extensible processes each independently run-
ning and chained together using a very basic but reliable in-
house developed web service architecture. Articles flow 
through the processing chain as thin RSS (Really Simple 
Syndication) items that grow as meta-data gets added at 
each stage of the processing chain. The first process in this 
chain is a Scraper. This process periodically checks all web 
sites of interest and generates a simple RSS feed containing 
a list of the current items published on the site. The next 
system in the chain, Grabber, is then notified with the result-
ing RSS feed. Grabber detects the new articles published 
and using a text extraction process determines the main 
content of the new articles. Grabber produces a new RSS 
feed for each site, containing title, link, description and text 
for all new articles detected, which is then passed on to the 
next process in the chain, the automated language detec-
tion process. The automatic language detection process 
uses word frequency tables to automatically detect the lan-
guage of the RSS content in the title and description. Next 
the Entity Recognition process detects people and organi-
zations in the article from a home grown information base of 
entities and organizations which is populated by an auto-
mated (offline) entity recognition system [7]. Homonyms are 
detected and disambiguated using a multilingual, classified 
geospatial information base of place names, provinces, re-
gions and countries. The disambiguation module also uses 
the meta-information of previously recognized entities, in or-
der to perform geo-tagging. Then, the classification system 
works on two levels, first it classifies articles on Boolean 
combinations of multilingual keywords, second it classifies 
on Boolean combinations of previously discovered classes 
and other metadata. A near-duplicate detection system 
identifies and flags duplicate articles, even if they contain 
small variations. It uses character trigram feature vectors 
and performs a simple cosine distance calculation. Finally a 
tonality module assigns tonality to the RSS item using a 
similar keyword based approach as the classification sys-
tem. All of these processes that implement basic informa-
tion extraction rely on the use of highly efficient finite state 
machine pattern matchers.
The articles then flow into the Clustering and Story Tracking 
Cache. Every 10 minutes the last 4 hours of articles are 
hierarchically clustered in every language individually. Initially 
each news article is considered to be a cluster, the process 
is agglomerative and employs average group linkage to de-
termine the distance between the clusters using a simple 
cosine measure. The clustering process continues until the 
maximum cosine distance falls below a certain set thresh-
old. The article feature vectors are simple word count vec-
tors, constructed using a simple bag of words approach, 
with some additional ad-hoc rules like: ignore top 100 fre-
quent words, ignore words of 2 characters. A cluster only 
remains if it has at least 2 articles that are not duplicates 
from at least 2 different news stories. The system also 
tracks the evolution of stories over time. It is represented as 
the evolution of a news cluster as it grows or shrinks in time. 
Several EMM installations have been set-up providing var-
ying thematic focus and user accessibility. The main EMM 
installation monitors generic news media with little cover-
age of specialised thematic areas and serves as a general 
media monitor and demonstrator of EMM capabilities. Its 
front page – the EMM Newsbrief [8] - provides a user inter-
face to all this information and is visited on a regular basis 
by some 25 000 users, and gets some 1.5 million hits per 
day. A snapshot of the EMM website is shown in Figure 2. 
Other EMM installations are targeted at specific thematic 
areas and/or customers. For example, MedISys is special-
ized in medical and health-related topics [9].
3.1 NewsDesk
EMM is a powerful tool for automatically aggregating and 
analysing open source information from the Internet. Howev-
er, if the information needs to be disseminated further or fed 
into an existing information analysis workflow, the generated 
news stream has to go through a review and selection pro-
cess carried out by a domain expert. For this purpose, the 
JRC developed the NewsDesk application (see Figure 3).
NewsDesk allows for manual review and selection of the 
most relevant articles with an easy-to-use drag-and-drop 
interface. It also supports the rapid production of newslet-
ters which can be disseminated to interested user groups. 
The articles selected in NewsDesk including the meta-in-
formation extracted by EMM can be posted to existing 
third-party IT systems, for example, to ingest the informa-
tion into a back end archive or to publish the selected 
news on a web portal.
NewsDesk is conceived as a collaborative environment, 
i.e. users are organised in virtual groups where they can 
work as a team on the news articles review and newsletter 
production. It is a web application, which uses RSS feeds 
as information input – typically generated by EMM. Howev-
er, it is also possible to ingest feeds from third-party appli-
cations. NewsDesk allows users to send notifications via 
SMS or e-mail; it also integrates an automated notification 
system to alert personnel on duty during holidays or out of 
office hours.
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Figure 2: Partial view of the EMM Newsbrief page showing details of the main functional areas: the graph at the top shows the develop-
ment of the ten top stories over the last twelve hours; details of the top stories and the links to the related articles are listed below the 
graph. The top stories are across all thematic areas. The navigation bar on the left provides access to sub pages that filter articles – based 
on EMM’s classification system - according to thematic or geographic areas of interest. The part of the page that allows filtering the arti-
cles according to language is omitted for improved readability.
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3.2 Other EMM Tools
Besides NewsBrief web site and NewsDesk moderation 
tool, the EMM platform provides additional tools including:
• Category Editor: ‘Categories’ are a fundamental part of 
the EMM system, as they allow generating automatic 
alerts and filters according to thematic or geographic ar-
eas of interest, thus significantly reducing the information 
overload. The Category Editor is a web-based applica-
tion that enables users to create and maintain the cate-
gory definitions, which can be based on complex key-
word or meta-data combinations. A description of the 
category mechanism and results for applying it to the 
medical and health domain is given in [10].
• Media Impact is a media analysis tool that, starting from 
a dataset (typically news articles selected via a search in 
NewsDesk), allows media analysts to further tag and ag-
gregate articles in order to produce statistics and re-
ports. The primary purpose is to analyse how specific 
events are reported in the world-wide media and to ex-
amine their media impact according to country, media 
type or other criteria. The tool exploits the meta-informa-
tion automatically extracted by EMM together with man-
ually added metadata. 
• EMM Mobile Apps for both iOS and Android platforms 
addresses the need of a personalized access to the 
EMM content and functionality. The web site content 
selection is fully automated and its ergonomics offers a 
common navigation through the daily news. NewsDesk 
and Media Impact are meant for human-moderated 
news selection where final clients receive a product con-
ceived and structured by analysts; EMM Mobile Apps ul-
timately gives end-users direct control on content selec-
tion and visualization in order to render their own view of 
the daily news [11].
4.  Optimizing IAEA’s Open Source Collection 
Process 
The IAEA intends to increase the efficiency of its open 
source information monitoring process and OSHL produc-
tion workflow and therefore is interested in using EMM/
NewsDesk. IAEA and JRC are engaged in a joint project to 
evaluate EMM/NewsDesk for IAEA needs and to analyse 
how the applications can be integrated in the existing IAEA 
workflows and systems. 
The IAEA has a well-established workflow for the open 
source information collection and SGIM Open Source 
Highlights production, which is constrained by various 
boundary conditions including legacy IT systems, confi-
dentiality considerations and time and human resource 
availability. The IAEA/JRC collaboration on the project 
aims to analyse EMM/NewsDesk compatibility with re-
spect to i) source coverage ii) interoperability with existing 
Figure 3: Screenshot of the NewsDesk workspace. The news feed generated by EMM is displayed in the right column. The analyst re-
views the information, selects relevant articles and drags them to the newsletter area in the left column. Selected articles can be edited 
and then published using a customisable newsletter template.
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IAEA back end IT systems and iii) NewsDesk functionality 
and compatibility with IAEA workflow. It is anticipated that 
at a minimum EMM/NewsDesk will be used to process the 
information sources that IAEA currently monitors manually. 
Potentially, it can cover the entire workflow including the 
review of all sources, the production and dissemination of 
OSHL and back end processing. 
The remainder of this section illustrates the issues that 
have been addressed since the start of the project in order 
to introduce EMM/NewsDesk to the IAEA workflow and 
describes the current status of the activities.
4.1  Nuclear Security Media Monitor (NSMM): 
Extending Source Coverage 
The public version of EMM monitors pre-selected websites 
targeting mainly general news media with little coverage of 
specialised thematic areas. Typically, important news sto-
ries are duplicated across many media sites, thus generat-
ing some redundancy in the system. Consequently, the 
system tolerates a certain degree of undetected articles, 
meaning that not all relevant articles of all targeted sites 
need to be retrieved. 
The IAEA, however, also needs to monitor a set of specific 
nuclear safeguards-related websites, including NGOs, blogs 
and sites of national and international authorities. Hence, 
IAEA provided a list of more than 140 nuclear-specific 
websites, which it would like to be added to the EMM 
source list (hereafter referred to as nuclear websites). 
In order to fine-tune EMM to IAEA needs without interfer-
ing with the public EMM website, it was decided to set-
up a separate EMM installation dedicated to the nuclear 
safeguards and security domain, hereafter referred to as 
Nuclear Security Media Monitor (NSMM). The types of 
websites of potential interest to the IAEA and therefore 
monitored by NSMM include: nuclear-focused news 
agencies and aggregators; regional, national and local 
government and intergovernmental organisations whose 
domain covers nuclear issues; NGOs, academic sources 
and blogs providing analyses on safeguards-relevant top-
ics; general news sources and aggregators; technical 
publications on the nuclear fuel cycle, etc. A classification 
of the sources monitored by NSMM is given in Table 1 
and a snapshot of the NSMM NewsBrief page is given in 
Figure 4.
Some technical challenges still needed to be resolved as 
the nuclear websites differ from the general news media 
typically targeted by EMM in several aspects: i) the nuclear 
websites often publish unique information, thus a high reli-
ability in the detection of new articles is required, ii) the nu-
clear websites are more static, i.e. the frequency of new 
articles/reports is much lower and iii) some of the nuclear 
sites require authentication.
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Figure 4: Partial view of the NSMM NewsBrief page. Structure and functionality of the page correspond to the generic EMM NewsBrief 
page as detailed in Figure 3; however, both the automatically generated top stories and the thematic areas of interest relate to nuclear 
security and safeguards issues.
MediumInteractive websites with commentaries on nuclear issues. Blogs
Very HighDirectly-accessed news sources, news aggregators, and "fee-based" comprehensive news archive with 
collection of newspapers, periodicals, and news wires, filtered by user defined keywords.
General News and
Aggregators
Category Name Content Frequency
Nuclear News
Aggregators
Articles from news agencies and news aggregators that customarily or primarily report on issues related 
to nuclear industry and safeguards.
High 
NGO &
Academic
Non-governmental organization or university providing detailed reports and added value assessments 
concerning State's nuclear programmes and activities, and general nuclear nonproliferation issues.
Medium
Government & 
Intergovernmental
Information from relevant intergovernmental organizations and competent authorities at national level 
are a unique source of authoritative information on nuclear safeguards and nuclear industry issues.
Low / 
Medium
Nuclear Industry Information on companies including location(s), products, capabilities, activities, number of employees, 
main customers, exports of nuclear related items.
Low / 
Medium
Table 1: Classification of sources monitored by NSMM 
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Considerable effort was made to configure and test the 
monitoring of the nuclear websites: for each site, the rele-
vant RSS feeds and/or HTML pages were selected and in-
serted into an EMM configuration file. The monitoring re-
sults are validated to ensure that all relevant articles are 
collected successfully. The maintenance of the nuclear 
sources is a continuous task: some of the source defini-
tions have been optimized or updated following changes 
on the site or the source URL and additional sources have 
been added to the system on IAEA’s request.
4.2  Interoperability with Existing IAEA Back End IT 
Systems
It is important that all information which is selected during 
the daily review within the EMM/NewsDesk operating envi-
ronment are permanently transferred to the IAEA back end 
systems. The efficient archiving of information selected in 
NewsDesk into a back end system is essential for compat-
ibility with IAEA workflows. As NewsDesk does not directly 
provide this functionality, the project aims to identify possi-
ble mechanisms for transferring the EMM/NewsDesk out-
put (i.e. the list of selected articles including the meta-infor-
mation) to the IAEA repository. 
4.3 Testing and Deployment
4.3.1 Pre-launch Coverage Testing
In order to evaluate NSMM/NewsDesk performance with 
respect to the nuclear sources, several trials were carried 
out by simultaneous manual monitoring of the websites 
and review of articles processed in NewsDesk. Search re-
sults were then compared in number and relevance to 
identify the coverage of retrieved articles and required re-
sources. The trials confirmed that the articles collected 
with the existing tools and workflows, could also be cap-
tured with NSMM/NewsDesk and that at a minimum the 
coverage provided by NewsDesk adequately replicates the 
coverage from the previous monitoring method.
4.3.2 Phase 1 Launch
After the coverage test results were found to be satisfacto-
ry, the IAEA carried out a number of usability tests to as-
sess the efficiency of the new process in comparison with 
the previous method. Following weeks of intensive usability 
testing, the NewsDesk application was deployed in Phase 
1--utilized for information review and collection. During 
Phase 1, web sources previously monitored manually or 
via a website tracker were consolidated into one source 
stream in the NewsDesk. Certain sources from this set re-
main outside the NewsDesk and continue to be reviewed 
manually. The consolidation affected nearly two-thirds of 
the search effort involved in daily monitoring, and was 
found to raise the overall efficiency of the GMT. 
From 11-29 March 2013 SGIM GMT conducted a usability 
survey of NewsDesk that documented total articles 
reviewed, total number of relevant articles selected for re-
view by the SGIM Open Source Highlights editor, and the 
total amount of search time. In this three week period, the 
GMT reviewed a total of 5800 documents using News-
Desk, and passed on 236 (roughly 5%) of these to the 
OSHL editorial team for further review. 
Prior to the Phase 1 introduction of the NewsDesk applica-
tion into daily operations, GMT staff members conducted 
searches from a set of websites and information reposito-
ries, with a collective effort of approximately three staff-
hours daily. Consolidating hundreds of sources of varying 
structure and style into one format in the NewsDesk appli-
cation that also permits a degree of de-duplication, has 
streamlined the daily review, reducing the effort to two-
staff hours per day. The survey also found that the average 
length of time required to conduct the review with the help 
of NewsDesk was approximately one hour1. This repre-
sents approximately a 33% time savings in daily search 
and collection effort, with no loss in coverage or quality of 
results (see Table 2).
Table 2: Overall daily effort for GMT and OSHL (in staff-hours) 2
Collection2 Editor  
review  
and OSHL 
Production
Back  
end 
process-
ing
Total daily 
time 
require-
ments
Pre-NewsDesk 
launch
3 hours 5-7 hours 1 hour 9-11 hours
NewsDesk 
Phase 1
2 hours 5-7 hours 1 hour 8-10 hours
5. Future Developments
After the successful introduction of NSMM/NewsDesk into 
IAEA’s Open Source monitoring workflow, IAEA’s initial fo-
cus is to gain operational experience with the system and 
to evaluate different possibilities to fully benefit from the 
NSMM/NewsDesk capabilities. The options that are cur-
rently under consideration are listed hereafter.
5.1  NewsDesk for Article Collection and OSHL 
Production
In the next phases it is foreseen that all sources currently 
monitored manually should be included in the NewsDesk 
application, such as news aggregators, internal sources, 
and subscription-based websites.
In subsequent phases, the project anticipates the use of 
NewsDesk for the production of Open Source Highlights 
newsletter, which will be predicated on further integration 
of the NewsDesk application with SGIM workflow and in-
frastructure. A critical element of the process is the ability 
to automate the back end processing of the newsletter 
1 This includes the manual review of select news aggregators, internal websites 
and subscription-based websites.
2 Includes total collection time for all three source streams (see Section 2 above)
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information, which is expected to result in additional sav-
ings of one to two staff-hours per day.
5.2 NSMM for Real-time Information Awareness
Under the current scope of the project, NSMM is intended 
as an information source for SGIM Open Source Highlights 
production. A further step could be the broader distribu-
tion and use of the NSMM NewsBrief page within IAEA 
Safeguards. The nuclear-specific categories which auto-
matically filter the incoming information could be further re-
fined and thus allow the users to access the articles ac-
cording to areas of interest, such as a geographic region, 
the different stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, or event types 
such as illicit trafficking of nuclear material, export control 
violations or dual-use equipment transfers.
The NSMM could allow an IAEA safeguards inspector or 
analyst involved in State evaluation to set up filters for their 
assigned States or facilities to ensure access to relevant 
open source information on a near real-time continuous 
basis. This passive continuous monitoring would free up 
(human) resources that could be re-allocated for tasks re-
quiring more in-depth active searching. A schematic over-
view of a potential future setup based on NSMM and 
NewsDesk is illustrated in Figure 5. The user base could 
also be enlarged beyond SGIM; depending on the select-
ed deployment architecture (e.g. if deployed on JRC serv-
ers), the system might even be opened as a public service 
to the general nuclear security community.
5.3  NSMM/NewsDesk for Country-Specific 
Monitoring
As well as the daily news monitoring and OSHL produc-
tion, SGIM analysts also carry out country-specific moni-
toring and searches, which typically involves monitoring 
additional national sources and generates more state-spe-
cific information. Following the positive experience in the 
general daily monitoring, SGIM analysts are considering 
using NSMM/NewsDesk for country-specific monitoring. 
For initial trials, country-specific ‘targets’ i.e. separate con-
tainers where the collected information is located in News-
Desk, will be setup. State-specific daily monitoring using 
NSMM/NewsDesk has the potential to enhance the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the continuous monitoring and 
evaluation of states.
Plans for developing and implementing processes and 
technologies for the collection, analysis, dissemination 
and management of open source information within the 
Department of Safeguards are described in the IAEA’s 
biennial Development and Implementation Support 
(D&IS) Programme for Nuclear Verification 2012-2013. 
The purpose of this programme is to assist the Depart-
ment of Safeguards meet is short term development ob-
jectives and to support the implementation of its verifi-
cation activities in a manner which is effective, efficient 
and encourages innovation and excellence. It has been 
produced in accordance with the Departmental Long-
Term Strategic Plan, 2012–2023, the IAEA Medium-Term 
Strategy, 2012–2017, and the Long-Term R&D Plan, 
2012–2023.
In order to support the long-term direction, activities are 
initiated, continued and/or finalized during the biennium 
and are structured under the following key objectives: 1. 
Optimize information utilization, 2. Expand and Diversify 
Sources and 3. Enhance Information Evaluation and Anal-
ysis. Funding for most of the described D&IS activities is 
foreseen to be provided by Member State Support Pro-
grammes (MSSP) which will continue to play a major role 
in achieving the stated project objectives. By facilitating the 
use of EMM and NewsDesk to the IAEA, the JRC contin-
ues to support the first key objective, enhancing informa-
tion collection by introducing new data collection method-
ologies which is contributing to streamlining open source 
information handl ing with in the Depar tment of 
Safeguards [12].
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6. Conclusions 
The IAEA possesses robust open source capabilities. 
However, the growing volume of information and variety in 
the number of available sources has made it imperative for 
the IAEA to continue to increase the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of its collection, analysis, and dissemination pro-
cesses. A clear priority for the Department of Safeguards 
is to streamline the acquisition and analysis of open source 
information and move away from the current labour inten-
sive information collection/newsletter production process 
to a more efficient system.
NSMM/NewsDesk is a powerful tool developed by JRC 
for automatically aggregating and analysing open source 
information from the internet focusing on the nuclear se-
curity and safeguards domain. After extensive testing 
showed that utilizing NSMM/NewsDesk improves the effi-
ciency of IAEA’s open source collection process, the 
IAEA has started using the system in its daily workflow. 
Currently, the IAEA is gaining operational experience with 
the system and intends to further integrate NSMM/
NewsDesk into IAEA’s workflow in order to fully exploit 
the system capabilities.
As safeguards implementation evolves to make better use of 
all safeguards relevant information available to the IAEA new 
effective and efficient approaches for open source informa-
tion collection and analysis are required [13]. The utilisation of 
tools such as NSMM/NewsDesk together is one example of 
how new technologies and tools can support this process.
7. Acknowledgements
The work here presented has been carried out within the 
European Commission (EC) Support Programme to the 
IAEA, task on Collection, Analysis and Dissemination of 
Open Sources.
8. References
[1] IAEA, The Conceptualization and Development of 
Safeguards Implementation at the State Level, 
GOV/2013/38, Date: 12 August 2013
NewsDesk 
Internet Media Sources
Nuclear specific sources
Information  Analyst
Users
Nuclear Security Media Monitor
N
SM
M
 : A
utom
atic A
ggrgation and A
nalysis
Back - end
Figure 5: Schematic overview of information flow in a possible future setup for open source information collection and analysis based on 
NSMM and NewsDesk. 
105
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 50, December 2013
[2] IAEA, Development and Implementation Support 
Programme for Nuclear Verification 2012-2013 (STR-
371), Vienna, 2012.
[3] Giacomo G.M. Cojazzi, Flavio Fuart, Erik van Der 
Goot, Erik Wolfart, Zoe Gastelum, Yana Feldman, Wil-
liam Hammond, Ryszard Zarucki, Matthew Ferguson, 
“Collection, Analysis and Dissemination of Open 
Source Safeguards-Relevant News Using Web 
Based Applications”, INMM 52nd Annual Meeting, 
Palm Desert, CA, USA, July 2011.
[4] Michael Barletta, Ahmed El Gebaly, William Ham-
mond, Thomas Lorenz, Stephen Robb, Nicholas Za-
rimpas, Ryszard Zarucki. “Open Source Information 
Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of 
Safeguards”, ESARDA Annual Meeting, Budapest, 
Hungary, May 2011.
[5] Martin Atkinson, Erik van der Goot, “Near real-time 
information mining in multilingual news”. In: Proceed-
ings of the 18th International World Wide Web Con-
ference (WWW 2009), Madrid, Spain, pp. 1153–1154, 
April 2009.
[6] Ralph Steinberger, Bruno Pouliquen, Erik van der 
Goot, “An introduction to the Europe media monitor 
family of applications”. In: Gey, F., Kando, N., Karl-
gren, J. (eds.) Proceeding of the SIGIR Workshop on 
Information Access in a Multilingual World (SIGIR-
CLIR2009), Boston, USA, July 2009.
[7] Ralf Steinberger, Bruno Pouliquen,“Cross-lingual 
Named Entity Recognition”. Journal Linguisticae In-
vestigationes, Special Issue on Named Entity Recog-
nition and Categorisation LI 30:1 (2007) John Benja-
mins Publishing Company. ISSN 0378-4169. 135-162, 
2007
[8] http://emm.newsbrief.eu
[9] http://medisys.newsbrief.eu
[10] Ralf Steinberger, Flavio Fuart, Erik van der Goot, Clive 
Best, Peter von Etter & Roman Yangarber, “Text Min-
ing from the Web for Medical Intelligence”. In: Fogel-
man-Soulié Françoise, Domenico Perrotta, Jakub 
Piskorski & Ralf Steinberger (eds.) Mining Massive 
Data Sets for Security, pp. 295-310, IOS Press, Am-
sterdam, The Netherlands, 2008.
[11] http://ecurl.eu/emm-mobile
[12] Development and Implementation Support Pro-
gramme for Nuclear Veri f ication 2012–2013. 
STR-371.
[13] IAEA, IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term 
R&D Plan, 2012-2023 (STR-375), Vienna, 2013
106
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 50, December 2013
New Approaches and New Technologies 
for the Verification of Nuclear Disarmament
David Keir
Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), Development House, 56-64 leonard Street, London EC2A 4LT, 
United Kingdom david.keir@vertic.org
Abstract:
ESARDA’s New Approaches/Novel Technologies Working 
group has recently begun to take a great interest in tech-
nology for use in arms control verification, in parallel with a 
focus on Nuclear Safeguards technology. A topic-based 
meeting of members of the NA/NT Subgroup was hosted 
at Joint Research Centre (JRC), ITU-Nuclear Security Unit 
in Ispra (Italy), to further explore the technical issues and 
opportunities presented by the need for new approaches 
and technologies in a future verified nuclear weapons dis-
mantlement regime. 
Nuclear warheads must contain radioactive material and, 
by their nature, gamma rays and neutrons are likely to pen-
etrate to the outside of the warhead casing and even metal 
containers. Therefore radiation signatures should be de-
tectable by appropriate pieces of equipment. For this rea-
son, researchers in the field of technical verification of nu-
clear warhead dismantlement have studied and developed 
technologies for Non-Destructive Assay (NDA).
This paper presents a generic dismantlement pathway for 
verified nuclear warhead dismantlement, based on the 
scenario employed by the UK-Norway initiative for their 
exercise in 2008/9. Using this as a framework the types 
of measurement challenge likely to be presented to a ver-
ifying inspector are discussed. The problem of intrusive-
ness of measurements in relation to the issue of prolifera-
tive release of classified information about the warhead 
attributes is discussed and the concept of ‘information 
barriers is introduced as a possible solution to this issue. 
A list of candidate technologies for use in verification ac-
tivities, with or without information barriers is then pre-
sented and, since most of these are new or novel ap-
proaches to the issue, an already-established system for 
classifying them – in terms of state of development and 
complexity of use in this context – is proposed. Finally, 
the concept of capturing this information as a library of 
‘datasheets’, designed for periodic review as develop-
ment proceeds, is presented.
Keywords: nuclear; weapons; disarmament; verification; 
technology; NDA; datasheets
1. Introduction
Within the ESARDA family, arms control applications and 
the common ground shared with safeguards has always 
been on the agenda. For instance the Working Group on 
Verification Technologies and Methods, the DA Working 
Group and the NDA Working Group, have long had an eye 
on nuclear weapons issues as well as civil material safe-
guards technology. 
A newer Working Group (New Approaches/Novel Technol-
ogies) has recently begun to take a great interest in this 
subject, in parallel with a focus on Nuclear Safeguards 
technology. A topic-based meeting of members of the NA/
NT Subgroup was hosted at the Joint Research Centre 
(JRC), ITU-Nuclear Security Unit in Ispra (Italy), to further 
explore the technical issues and opportunities presented 
by the need for new approaches and technologies in a fu-
ture verified nuclear weapons dismantlement regime.
One of the outputs of that meeting was that the NA/NT fo-
cus group on nuclear disarmament verification technolo-
gies, would develop a structure for further consideration of 
technology R&D requirements - in such a way that the 
items of interest could be categorized, for example in the 
following way:
1. Constraints on technology and deployment in real 
situations
2. Fissile material attribute measurements
3. Fissile material template measurements
4. Quality assurance of the measurements and analysis
5. Warhead dismantlement assurance
6. Information barriers
7. Information security scenarios
8. “Spoofing” detection
9. Sampling of non-fissile materials as ‘signatures’.
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Part of developing a structure for further work is first to un-
derstand what warhead dismantlement is like and what 
the challenges are. While historically there is a significant 
body of work on these issues1,2,3,4,5,6,7, - 8 the following sections de-
scribe the scenarios and challenges generically.
2.  The role of technology in verifying nuclear 
disarmament
In a future nuclear disarmament activity, under a treaty or 
other agreement, the deployment of inspectors to witness 
nuclear warhead dismantlement is likely to be the princi-
pal, and most effective, approach to verification.
But nuclear warheads and components are a special class 
of object. Because the design of a nuclear weapon is in-
formation which, if passed on to a non-nuclear-weapon 
state would be proliferative, it is highly unlikely that any 
person attempting to verify its presence or identity would 
be allowed to view any of its design details. 
There may be exceptions, where the visual appearance of 
the outer shell of a warhead, viewed from a minimum dis-
tance, could be classified as non-proliferative. However, 
actual measurements of such features as dimensions and 
weight will probably always be classified. 
During the process of dismantlement, where parts of the 
warhead are being removed and the inner components re-
vealed, the situation would be even more problematic. This 
is because the appearance of internal structures would be 
even more sensitive and potentially proliferative if revealed. 
Thus, the likelihood of an inspector witnessing dismantle-
ment procedures or having eye contact with any of the 
components emerging from dismantlement is, at this date, 
vanishingly small.
2.1 Non-destructive assay
There is a saving grace, however, and that is that all nu-
clear warheads must contain radioactive material. What 
1 Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau (1969) Demonstrated Destruction of 
Nuclear Weapons, Washington DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Bureau.
2 Cochran, TB (1989), Black Sea Experiment Only a Start, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 45 (9), pp.13-16.
3 Fetter S, Frolov V A, Miller M et al (1990), Detecting Nuclear Warheads in the 
USSR-US Black Sea Experiment, Science and Global Security, I, pp. 225-327.
4 Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (1997), Transparency and Verifica-
tion Options: An Initial Analysis of Approaches for Monitoring Warhead Disman-
tlement, Washington, US Department of Energy.
5 Technology R&D for Arms Control, Office of Nonproliferation research and Engi-
neering, US Department of Energy/NNSA, Spring 2001.
6 National Academy of Sciences Report, 2005, Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and 
Nuclear-Explosive materials, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 
(2005).
7 Cliff D, Elbahtimy H, and Persbo A; Verifying warhead Dismantlement, Past, 
present, future, VERTIC Research Report, Number 9, September 2010, (in-
cludes a detailed account of the UK-Norway Initiative activities from 2005 to 
2010).
8 Eberhart J inter alia, Technical challenges in verifying nuclear disarmament, 25 Oct 
2013, Briefing co-organized by the Permanent Mission of United Kingdom and the 
United States Mission (First Committee experts) on the UK-US collaborative re-
search programme on nuclear arms control verification. http://webtv.un.org/watch/
technical-challenges-in-verifying-nuclear- disarmament/2769294424001/.
that means is that ionising radiation is constantly being 
emitted from the radioactive components inside the 
warhead. 
By the nature of them, gamma rays and neutrons, if emit-
ted, are likely to penetrate to the outside of the warhead 
casing and even metal containers containing the warhead 
for transport and storage. Therefore radiation ‘signatures’ 
may be detectable by appropriate pieces of detection 
equipment. For this reason, researchers in the field of 
technical verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement 
have studied and developed technologies for Non-De-
structive Assay (NDA). This has centred on the radiometric 
measurement of gamma rays and neutrons, which will be 
discussed more fully later in this paper.
3. Nuclear warhead dismantlement processes 
Although most nuclear weapons appear follow the same 
general principles, in that nuclear yield is achieved by com-
pressing fissile material to prompt criticality, diversity in de-
sign appears to apply across the world’s various nuclear-
armed states. 
Given the many types and sizes in which nuclear weapons 
come, dismantlement processes are likely to be varied. 
Despite that, some generic processes must be common 
to all such dismantlement activities and an attempt will be 
made here to define a generic overall process, with a view 
to verification.
3.1 Removal from deployment
First, a nuclear warhead must be removed from its de-
ployed location (e.g. on a missile, in a heavy bomber air-
craft, in storage at a bomber base, or on board a naval 
vessel) and transported, perhaps via an interim storage lo-
cation, to the facility at which it will be dismantled.
It is possible (though currently thought to be unlikely) that 
an inspector could be allowed to make some kind of 
measurement of radiation emissions from the warhead at 
the deployment site. However, they may be allowed to ap-
ply a tamper-indicating device (TID) or other ‘unique identi-
fier’ to the outer warhead casing at this stage. Or they 
might be allowed to do both.
We note that this is the location at which the NEWSTART 
treaty9 between the US and Russia, provides for some ver-
ification activities.
3.2 Receipt at the dismantlement facility
The area receiving the warhead at the generic, future dis-
mantlement facility would be the next key location in the 
chain. This, realistically, might be the area where an in-
spector is first allowed to interact with a warhead ready for 
9 www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm.
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dismantlement, though the warhead might well be inside a 
container at the time. 
Again, some sort of measurement might be allowed here, 
and application of a tamper-indicating device (TID) or 
checking of a previously-applied TID might be allowed at 
this point.
3.3 Dismantlement
As far as can be judged, the disassembly of nuclear war-
heads seems to be a de-construction process, where 
components are unfastened using simple tooling, rather 
than a violent process using power tools and cutting 
equipment to destroy the structure.
The arrangement of nuclear materials and high explosives 
and associated firing devices at the heart of a nuclear war-
head tend to be collectively referred to as a weapon’s 
‘physics package’. To remove the fissile components from 
a nuclear warhead, it seems inevitable that the physics 
package would first have to be exposed by the removal of 
outer casings and ancillaries. As far as can be judged, 
every type of removed component would be separately 
packaged before it emerged from the dismantlement 
workshop. This was the model followed by the UK-Norway 
Initiative exercise in 2008/200910.
According to the US Department of Energy, nuclear war-
head ‘dismantlement’ refers essentially to the separation of 
a weapon’s explosive components from its fissile material 
components. 
3.4 Disassembly of the nuclear physics package
Considering the stage at which the conventional explo-
sives must be removed and separated from the fissile ma-
terial part of the warhead. It is not at all clear that any ac-
cess to this process would ever be possible for verification 
inspectors. For this reason it may be necessary to find a 
way of maintaining ‘continuity of knowledge’ of the treaty-
accountable item, or items, while they are inside the dis-
mantlement processing area. Other than the confidence-
building measure of inspection of the empty workshop 
before and after the dismantlement, the author is not yet 
aware of any satisfactory proposal of how this can be 
done.
After disassembly of the physics package is complete, its 
various components are likely to be packaged in dedicat-
ed, specially-designed containers, then stored or pro-
cessed further, as appropriate to the future plans of the 
owner state.
Were the dismantlement to be a verified one, the alterna-
tive end points shown on Figure 1 would be monitored, 
10 Cliff D, Elbahtimy H and Persbo A; Verifying Warhead Dismantlement, past, 
present, future, VERTIC Research Report Number 9, September 2010, The UK-
Norway Initiative, pp 64-85.
subject to negotiation and agreement between treaty 
partner(s). These end points are theorised here, based on 
publications over the last 20 years which have suggested 
these main possible end-points for fissile materials re-
moved from nuclear warheads. 
3.5 Post-dismantlement fissile component pathways
Figure 1 shows generic possible pathways that the fissile 
components might follow, ending in four possible main 
states:
1. Components stored whole in a long-term store;
2. Components shape-destroyed and stored long-term
3. Components processed into fissile material and stored 
long-term;
For one end-option on this diagram — the processing of 
fissile components into fissile material — there might also 
be further stages, leading to IAEA Safeguards, such as 
emerging fissile material, being blended with other fissile 
material (not from the declared weapon) stored long term, 
then possibly transferred to safeguards. Again, depending 
upon the treaty negotiations and outcomes, any one of 
these options might involve a jointly-monitored store, 
where the owner state and other parties to a treaty would 
have joint custody and monitoring rights to the store and 
its systems11. The setting up and equipping of such a joint-
ly-trusted facility might take some years to realise. In the 
case of civilian fissile materials however, there are of 
course many jointly-monitored systems in operation for re-
actor-associated material, under Safeguards.
11 A jointly-monitored store could include joint monitoring by a State and the IAEA, 
for which there is a precedent, in the Republic of South Africa.
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4.  Challenges for Non-Destructive Assay 
technologies
What really matters, as far as the operators of NDA sys-
tems are concerned, is what they are presented with and 
what they are being asked to measure. The latter will be 
determined by what declaration has been obtained by ne-
gotiators – because it will probably be necessary, as a 
minimum, to verify the declaration. The key factors in these 
measurement challenges are likely to be:
(i) For ‘passive techniques’: how much radiation or heat 
signature is being emitted and what does it have to pass 
through before reaching the detector itself? We note that 
the amount of attenuating material in a warhead is likely to 
be significantly more that is encountered in Safeguards-
type NDA measurements of fissile material in cans. This 
means that low-energy gamma rays, for instance, may not 
be detected at all.
(ii) For ‘active’ techniques: What is the nature of the whole 
presented object and it’s container and can an active 
technique feasibly (and safely) stimulate an emission signa-
ture that will be interpretable?
The following is a list of the possible presented object 
scenarios:
• Warheads in/on delivery systems;
• Complete warheads inside multiple (i.e. Russian Doll) 
transport containers, inside road or rail vehicles;
• Complete warheads in multiple containers removed from 
road or rail vehicles;
• Complete warheads in innermost storage containers;
• Bare complete warheads (i.e. the re-entry body or outer 
casing is visible);
• Bare physics packages;
• Fissile components in single shell process containers;
• Fissile components in multiple (i.e. Russian doll) storage 
or transport containers
• Shape-destroyed fissile components in containers;
• Weapons-derived fissile material in process or storage 
containers (possibly blended with other fissile-containing 
material);
• Weapons-derived fissile material; possibly blended with 
other fissile-containing material; in multiple (i.e. Russian 
doll) containers. 
5. The problem of intrusiveness
The release to inspectors of any design information about 
the nuclear warheads or components involved in a verified 
dismantlement regime would only be possible and legal if 
the inspector party were themselves from NPT Nuclear 
Weapons States. Even then, it may be that national securi-
ty requirements of the dismantling State would require that 
no information of this sort were released.
So how can an inspector from a Non-Nuclear-Weapons 
State verify that a nuclear weapon is being dismantled if 
Warhead receipt area 
at the dismantlement 
site
Warhead storage 
area on the 
dismantlement site
Warhead initial disassembly 
area (ancillaries)
Interim store for in-process 
items
Physics Package 
dismantlement area
Possible fissile component 
shape destruction and storage 
area
Possible fissile component 
processing to fissile material 
and material storage area
Fissile component storage 
area
Removed 
ancillary items
Removed 
explosives
Removed non-
fissile items
Warhead 
deployment area
Removed fissile 
components 
items
Figure 1: Possible nuclear warhead dismantlement pathways
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he/she is not allowed to know the identifying characteris-
tics or attributes of that weapon? 
Several of the technologies appearing in Table 1 below will 
have the potential to reveal design information. In fact the 
Inspector does not really require to know this sort of infor-
mation at all. What he/she is being asked to verify is ‘is this 
a: nuclear warhead, nuclear component, nuclear material 
etc. - of the type declared, yes or no?’
So, the inspector essentially needs decisional information 
that will allow them to conclude yes or no, (with some 
measure of confidence). They also need to minimise the 
chance that they will later be shown to have been wrong. 
This being so, a mechanised way of getting that decisional 
data to the inspector directly, without the inspector having 
access to numerical data, can be devised. Potentially, this 
is what an ‘Information Barrier’ can do.
5.1 Information Barriers
An information barrier in this context should contain within 
itself the mechanism to consider the data it collects, com-
pare it to the declared data (or data threshold) and then to 
output a logical result—which contains no proliferative in-
formation, it is just a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’. This can then be used 
directly by the inspector to make a decisional statement to 
their superiors and thence to the rest of the world.
The devil in the detail however, comes down to the 
following:
 – Is the information barrier system collecting and process-
ing appropriate data, directly related to attributes of 
concern (such as the mass of a specific radioisotope 
present) and comparing it to a sufficient and appropri-
ate declaration to make the verification decision valid?
 – Is the information barrier receiving the true input data 
from the object in question?
 – Is the information barrier and all its inner workings exact-
ly what both parties believe it to be (authentication)?
 – Has the information barrier been isolated from any possi-
ble tampering?
5.2 Types of information barrier in existence
There appear to be several types of information barrier 
system currently in operation or under consideration in the 
nuclear field. For warhead dismantlement verification, the 
main types discussed are:
Multiple technology analysis systems, which internally 
handle classified attribute-derived data, such as high-res-
olution spectra and/or multiplicity numbers; all physically 
isolated from the outer world by a robust, tamper-proof 
cabinet with just an output line for red or green lights. 
Simplified systems, which look at only limited pieces 
of data and which make their yes/no decisions on the 
basis of an agreed threshold match to a pre-agreed cri-
terion—this criterion being directly-related to an impor-
tant attribute (such as Pu-239:Pu-240 isotope ratio). An 
example of this is the prototype information barrier de-
veloped by the UK-Norway initiative over the last four 
years. 
Template systems, which are essentially black box de-
vices that collect an array of data being emitted from the 
object in question, and store it securely, but are then only 
asked subsequently whether a match has been achieved 
to the template data in a later situation.
The following sections deal with novel and emerging tech-
nologies per se and do not consider the ways in which 
they could be interfaced with an information barrier. That 
remains outside the scope of this paper.
6. Non-Destructive Assay technologies for 
nuclear warhead dismantlement verification
In this specific area, the ESARDA NA/NT Sub-Group has 
collected together a list of emerging technologies with po-
tential use for disarmament verification inspectors, who will 
have to deal with the classified objects, and containerised 
components described in earlier sections of this paper. 
The following table is a list of non-destructive assay tech-
nologies that the author is aware of, either because they 
are being worked on now as possible tools for future verifi-
cation, or because they appear as development ideas in 
the historical literature from START-3 preparation or from 
US-Soviet-IAEA Trilateral Initiative days 12,13. The tech-
niques are grouped by the type of radiation detection they 
use. Finally, some examples which are non-radiometric are 
included.
As an attempt to capture what is known, by whom, and 
at what stage of development some of these technolo-
gies sit, the development of a collection of Data Sheets 
has begun. A prototype example of one such datasheet 
appears in the information box below, illustrating the im-
portant items of information such a datasheet should 
hold. This boils down to a description; an indication of 
the personnel involved who can supply more details; as-
sessments of the maturity of development as applied to 
the problem of warhead dismantlement verification; and 
the complexity of operation required to achieve useable 
results.
12 Shea T; Report on the Trilateral Initiative: IAEA verification of weapon-origin ma-
terial in the Russian federation & the United States, IAEA Bulletin, pp. 49-53.
13 Shea T; The Trilateral Initiative: A model for the future? http://www.armscontrol.
org/act/2008-05/PersboShea.asp%2523SidebarI.
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The datasheets initiative was another topic discussed at 
the 2012 special meeting of members of the NA/NT Work-
ing Group and other parties concerned with nuclear weap-
ons dismantlement verification, at JRC Ispra.
It is proposed that the Data Sheets, once developed under 
a funded work-stream, could be held on behalf of the NA/
NT Subgroup, subject to on-going maintenance and up-
dating. They will thus constitute an information resource, 
or knowledge library, specifically for newer technologies as 
applied to nuclear disarmament verification. 
Passive techniques using gamma emission detection
1 Identification of specific isotope presence by gamma spectrometry – (Ortec and Canberra HPGe)
2 Identification of specific isotope presence by calorimetric gamma spectrometry
3 Isotopic ratio determination (Pu) by gamma spectrometry
4 Isotopic ratio determination (U) by gamma spectrometry
5 Imaging of size and shape of radioactive component by gamma camera (commercially-available)
6 Imaging of size and shape of radioactive component by gamma auto-radiography (with pinhole?)
Passive techniques using neutron emission detection
7 Mass estimation (Pu/U) by direct neutron multiplicity counting – (e.g. fission meter by Ortec)
8 Mass estimation (Pu/U) by neutron time-correlation assay /Feynman Analysis etc. of multiplicity 
9 Identification of fissile material by neutron spectrometry
10 Estimation of organic material thickness by attenuation neutron counting
11 Imaging of size and shape of radioactive components by neutron auto-radiography with pinhole
12 Imaging of size and shape of radioactive components by “neutron camera”
13 Estimation of organic material thickness by time-correlated neutron assay/decay series time constant measurement
Passive techniques using two or more types of radiation measurement
14 Determination of shielding configuration by gamma spectrum modelling with data fusion
15 Scintillation counting of gamma and neutron emissions
Techniques using ‘active’ irradiation of the presented object
16 Active methods – LINAC beam on and off - Die-away analysis
17 Identification of fissile material type and mass by Time-of-flight neutron assay (NMIS)
18 Neutron time of flight imaging of internal structures (3-D Imaging NMIS)
Techniques using sample collection from facility environments
19 Identification of Pu isotopics in the area by near-field environmental particle sampling
20 Identification of U isotopics (U) in process area by near-field environmental particle sampling
Techniques not employing measurement of ionising radiation from the warhead/component
21 Identification of fissile heat source by thermal imaging
22 Imaging of high-Z materials by muon detectors
23 Xe detection in the warhead storage or processing area
24 Stand-off detection of processes by emissions from facilities (e.g. using hyper-spectral infrared imaging). 
Table 1: NDA technologies for consideration
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DATA SHEET EXAMPLE - Quantum Calorimeter Gamma Ray Detector for verification measurements  
1. Illustration of the System
1. A Brief Description
This claims to be a higher resolution gamma-ray spectrometer than any yet available, based on quantum calorimeters, aimed 
at better nuclear safeguards measurements. The authors specifically suggest that the most promising applications include 
passive, non-destructive assay of nuclear materials such as plutonium isotopic mixtures and spent uranium fuel assemblies 
(as well as precise determination of the Lamb shift in heavy hydrogen-like atoms).Small, transition-edge thermometers, made 
of Mo/Cu superconductor crystals, cryogenically-cooled, represent the sensitive volume. Instead of electrical pulses ana-
lysed by a Pulse height Analyser and then displayed as No. of pulses in a series of energy bins (as in convention High Reso-
lution Gamma Spectrometry) this approach uses temperature pulses in the sensitive volume to derive the gamma ray energy 
spectrum. It is proposed by the developers that an array of these sensitive volumes will be constructed, towards achieving a 
workable spectrometer.
This is a multi-collaborator project, involving US university and National Laboratory input and has been supported by the US 
Department of Energy’s NNSA organisation, amongst others.
2. Technology Readiness Level = {3}
3. Complexity of Operation Level = {Inventor}
4. Who is developing this technology (give key references)?: Barry L. Zink, Dept. of Physics & Astronomy, Universi-
ty of Denver. Collaborators: NIST, LANL, DOE/NNSA.
Array-Compatible transition-edge sensor microcalorimeter gamma-ray detector with 42 eV energy resolution at 103 keV, B L 
Zink, J N Ullom, J A Beall, K D Irwin, W B Doriese, W D Duncan, L Ferreira, G C Hilton, R. D. Horansky1, C D Reintsema and 
L. R. Vale1, Appl. Phys. Lett. 89, 124101 (2006).
5. Discussion of data interpretation – is modelling required?
Not known, but likely to be amenable to the same modelling approaches as conventional HRGS.
6. Is it available to buy and how much would the technology cost to obtain?
Only one manufacturer: the inventor/developer. Cost unknown.
7.  Other known fields of application?
Proposed for non-proliferation work. Also, according to the developers: This technology yields a higher resolution gamma-
ray detector than before, offering reduced peak overlaps, better peak-to-background ratios, more accurate measurements of 
age & enrichment of uranium, more accurate measurements of plutonium isotopic mixes, and better determination of mass 
of plutonium in spent uranium fuel.
8. Is it possible to certify this technology (i.e. for use in radiation or explosives areas?
This system should be deployable directly for safeguards applications, once developed further. It is a cryogenically operated 
system, so liquid nitrogen coolant is required. 
As it is similar to conventional HRGS, but more accurate and sensitive, it would undoubtedly require an information barrier in 
a nuclear arms control treaty scenario. However, the same information barrier could potentially be used for this as for con-
ventional HRGS.
10. Data Sheet last updated by whom and when?: David Keir, VERTIC, London, 16th October 2012.
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7. Conclusion
A variety of relevant technologies exist, many available 
commercially. A considerable amount of work has also 
been completed in the development of scientific models, 
and software, for the interpretation of measurements 
made with these instruments.
However, in the special case of nuclear warheads and their 
components, the level of detail that would be revealed by 
these techniques would also, if revealed to a NNWS in-
spector, constitute a breach of Articles One and Two of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The challenge remains to 
devise information barriers that are sufficiently well-de-
signed to bridge this gap.
There is also a requirement that the technologies them-
selves are fit for the purpose. In the context of nuclear war-
head dismantlement verification, this will mean there are 
physical limits on use, such as time constraints and person-
nel limits. Thus, it is important to understand what level of 
expertise is required to effectively operate NDA equipment 
and the time needed to obtain useful results. To try to ac-
commodate the requirements of prospective users and de-
velopers, it is proposed that a series of data sheets be pre-
pared by the NA/NT WG and held as up-datable items of 
information, a knowledge library specifically for newer tech-
nologies as applied to nuclear disarmament verification. 
Each of these datasheets will include an assessed Technol-
ogy Readiness Level (TRL) and Complexity of Operation 
Level (COL) as described in Appendix A and Appendix B.
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Appendix A, NASA Technology Readiness Levels 
In the research and development world, all new technologies must pass through a number of stages before they are ac-
cepted as a viable tool. At NASA these stages have been formalised and called ‘technology readiness levels’, or TRLs. 
Each TRL represents the evolution of an idea from a thought, perhaps written on the back of an envelope, to the full de-
ployment of a product in the marketplace.
 Various modified scales have been developed; by the US DoD, DOE and by ESA, but here we will use the current-day 
NASA approach. The figure below is a schematic of the NASA TRL scale14.
Figure A1: NASA Technology Readiness Diagram15
Technology Readiness Level Description
1. Basic principles observed and 
reported
This is the lowest “level” of technology maturation. At this level, scientific research begins to be 
translated into applied research and development.
2. Technology concept and/or 
application formulated
Once basic physical principles are observed, then at the next level of maturation, practical 
applications of those characteristics can be ‘invented’ or identified. At this level, the application 
is still speculative: there is not experimental proof or detailed analysis to support the conjec-
ture.
3. Analytical and experimental 
critical function and/or characteristic 
proof of concept
At this step in the maturation process, active research and development (R&D) is initiated. This 
must include both analytical studies to set the technology into an appropriate context and 
laboratory-based studies to physically validate that the analytical predictions are correct. These 
studies and experiments should constitute “proof-of-concept” validation of the applications/
concepts formulated at TRL 2.
4. Component and/or breadboard 
validation in laboratory environment
Following successful “proof-of-concept” work, basic technological elements must be integrat-
ed to establish that the “pieces” will work together to achieve concept-enabling levels of 
performance for a component and/or breadboard. This validation must be devised to support 
the concept that was formulated earlier, and should also be consistent with the requirements of 
potential system applications. The validation is “low-fidelity” compared to the eventual system: 
it could be composed of ad hoc discrete components in a laboratory.
14 http://esto.nasa.gov/files/trl_definitions.pdf , for the definition of Technology Readiness Levels.
15 http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/trl/trlchrt.pdf.
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5. Component and/or breadboard 
validation in relevant environment
At this level, the fidelity of the component and/or breadboard being tested has to increase 
significantly. The basic technological elements must be integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so that the total applications (component-level, sub-system level, or 
system-level) can be tested in a ‘simulated’ or somewhat realistic environment.
6. System/subsystem model or 
prototype demonstration in a 
relevant environment (ground or 
space)
A major step in the level of fidelity of the technology demonstration follows the completion of 
TRL 5. At TRL 6, a representative model or prototype system or system - which would go well 
beyond ad hoc, ‘patch-cord’ or discrete component level breadboarding - would be tested in a 
relevant environment. At this level, if the only ‘relevant environment’ is the environment of 
space, then the model/prototype must be demonstrated in space.
7. System prototype demonstration 
in a space environment
TRL 7 is a significant step beyond TRL 6, requiring an actual system prototype demonstration 
in a space environment. The prototype should be near or at the scale of the planned opera-
tional system and the demonstration must take place in space.
8. Actual system completed and 
‘flight qualified’ through test and 
demonstration (ground or space)
In almost all cases, this level is the end of true ‘system development’ for most technology 
elements. This might include integration of new technology into an existing system.
9. Actual system ‘flight proven’ 
through successful mission 
operations
In almost all cases, the end of last ‘bug fixing’ aspects of true ‘system development’. This 
might include integration of new technology into an existing system. This TRL does not include 
planned product improvement of on-going or reusable systems.
Appendix B, Complexity of Operation Level (COL) - i.e. the level of expertise required
In order to judge the practicability of a system, specifically for arms control applications, where the deployment scenario 
would be somewhat restricted, a proposed additional classification, to accompany the TRL, is proposed. In the absence 
of anything else, the author proposes a simple descriptive classification, as follows:
INVENTOR = Only the inventor or his/her immediate team can make the system work for appropriate measurements. 
Several days of setup and calibration may be required prior to measurement.
SPECIALIST = A small group of post-graduate scientists with relevant experience, training and telephone “reach-back” 
can follow manual instructions and get useful results in a few days.
TECHNICAL = A small group of graduate scientists can, with a manual and technician support, achieve useful results in a 
day or two.
LAYMAN = A single, competent lay person with minimal training can push a button and retrieve useful results on a first 
try, and consistently thereafter for the length of a measurement campaign.
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Abstract:
One of the key factors in the verification of future nuclear 
disarmament treaties will be the confirmation, by a moni-
toring party, that declared treaty limited items (TLIs) are 
consistent with the declaration made by the host country.A 
significant part of this confirmation may be supplied by a 
radiation measurement system that confirms the declared 
radiation characteristics of the TLI. These radiation meas-
urements can take the form of measuring declared char-
acteristics (or attributes) of the TLI, comparing declared 
TLIs with a pre-existing template, or some combination of 
the two techniques. Treaties covering TLI dismantlement 
form an important subset of general disarmament treaties. 
In a dismantlement scenario, the confirmation radiation 
measurements can be performed either before or after the 
TLI is dismantled (or at both times). Pre-dismantlement 
measurement may generate additional confidence that the 
item is truly a TLI but may be technically challenging, while 
post-dismantlement measurement can offer additional 
confidence that the dismantled item was truly the declared 
TLI. Since repeated measurement increases monitoring 
party confidence and there are technical advantages to 
both measurement times, a combination of pre-dismantle-
ment and post-dismantlement measurement will lead to 
the highest overall confidence. The relative importance of 
the two types of measurement is directly dependent on 
the specifics of the treaty under discussion.
Keywords: nuclear; disarmament; attribute; template; 
dismantlement
1. Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaties
Most treaty monitoring situations can be reduced to two 
requirements, one for the owner of the nuclear material or 
item (the host) and one for the organization confirming the 
treaty declarations (the monitor):
• The host party makes a declaration concerning a treaty-
limited item (or TLI) and/or its disposition to the monitor-
ing party.
• The monitoring party must confirm this declaration with-
out observing any sensitive information. By sensitive in-
formation, we mean classified information that the two 
parties do not intend to share.
The crux of this treaty-monitoring measurement challenge 
lies with the phrase “without observing any sensitive infor-
mation.” Traditional nondestructive assay techniques, 
based on gamma-ray detection, neutron detection, or cal-
orimetry, are widely and successfully used in numerous 
scenarios (e.g., waste assay and spent fuel monitoring) 
that do not involve classified information. [1]
Nuclear arms reduction treaties in force today are general-
ly based on counting or limiting the number of delivery ve-
hicles. [2] The use of radiation detection in the verification 
of these treaties is limited to confirming that items are not 
weapons — lack of radiation levels above background is 
taken as evidence that an item is not a nuclear weapon. 
However, it is possible that future monitoring regimes will 
include warhead confirmation and/or confirmation that 
warheads have been dismantled (monitored dismantle-
ment). In both cases, it is necessary to confirm that a de-
clared TLI is indeed a warhead. In the remainder of this 
paper, we address some of the issues surrounding war-
head confirmation in a monitored dismantlement scenario.
The host party must trust the measurement system — the 
process of host trust-building is termed certification. One 
aspect of certification is that the host must trust that the 
measurement will not reveal sensitive information. The cer-
tification challenges associated with allowing a monitor to 
confirm that an item is a warhead are much more complex 
than those associated with confirming that an item is not a 
warhead. In particular, warhead confirmation potentially in-
cludes declaring characteristics of sensitive nuclear items 
and performing radiation measurements on these items, 
both of which could reveal sensitive information. 
Similarly, the monitoring party is responsible for all steps 
required to build monitoring party confidence in the meas-
urement system and its use within the monitoring regime; 
this process is generally termed authentication. The con-
straints imposed on the monitoring party by the need for 
simultaneous certification make it more difficult for the 
monitoring party to maintain confidence in the monitoring 
regime and its results.
Although many of the specific examples in the remainder 
of this paper refer to the monitored dismantlement scenar-
io, the concepts, and in particular the measurement con-
cepts, apply more generally to treaties involving warhead 
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of a potential dismantlement regime identifying four options for warhead confirmation measurements. 
The dismantlement process is shown as a black box because it is anticipated that the host country will consider the details of this process 
to be sensitive.
(as opposed to delivery vehicle) confirmation. In sections 2 
and 3, we will review dismantlement and measurement 
concepts while in section 4 we move on to a discussion of 
the timing of confirmation measurements.
2. Dismantlement Treaty Verification
As noted above, verification of arms control treaties gener-
ally involves confirmation that TLIs meet the declarations 
and/or confirmation that the TLIs have been disposed of 
as declared. Within a monitored warhead dismantlement 
treaty, these two confirmation steps are known as war-
head confirmation and dismantlement confirmation. 
For the purposes of this discussion, dismantlement of a 
nuclear weapon is defined as the separation of fissile ma-
terial (FM) from high explosive (HE). Given this definition, 
dismantlement confirmation can be achieved by demon-
strating (1) FM presence as well as the absence of HE in 
the declared FM container and (2) absence of FM in the 
dismantlement area and other containers. If HE were 
tracked, similar confidence could be achieved by confirm-
ing presence of HE as well as the absence of FM in the 
declared HE container and no HE elsewhere — however, 
“no HE elsewhere” is very difficult to confirm practically. It 
is easier to detect and track undeclared FM in containers 
and large areas. Dismantlement confirmation, regardless 
of method, obviously must occur “post-dismantlement.”
As described above, a combination of presence and ab-
sence measurements can be used to confirm that a nucle-
ar item has been dismantled. Confirming that that a de-
clared item is a nuclear warhead is the more difficult to the 
two confirmation challenges. As shown in Figure 1, there 
are four points at which confirmation measurements might 
be performed on a declared warhead: (1) upon entering 
the monitoring regime, (2) somewhere within the regime 
where chain of custody (CoC) of the declared item has 
been maintained, (3) immediately before dismantlement, or 
(4) immediately after dismantlement. We will discuss each 
of the options for when to perform warhead confirmation 
measurements and the influence of other aspects of the 
monitoring regime (such as the requirement to maintain 
CoC) on these timing choices (and vice-versa). Warhead 
confirmation measurements are important not only to con-
firm that the item being monitored is indeed a warhead, 
but also to confirm that the item that is dismantled was in-
deed a warhead.
3. Confirmatory Measurements
We have identified three primary methods to warhead con-
firmation. These are:
• Attribute measurements: Are the characteristics of 
the declared item consistent with it being a warhead?
• Template comparison: Is the item consistent with oth-
er items known or believed to be warheads? 
• Provenance: Has the item undergone movements or 
come from a location consistent with being a warhead? 
The first two methods are measurement-based and are 
described in detail below. The third approach is to use the 
provenance of the item as evidence that it is a warhead, 
and to maintain CoC of the item throughout the remainder 
of the monitoring regime. Even if any particular one of 
these methods produces relatively low assurance, all three 
can be used in combination to increase monitor confi-
dence. The host’s definition of “sensitive information” limits 
all three techniques, but each is limited in a different way. 
In this paper, we focus on measurement methods (both at-
tribute and template) and mention provenance only in pass-
ing, even though provenance may be an important source 
of confidence and can be used in conjunction with the war-
head confirmation measurements discussed here. [3]
3.1 Information Barriers
Confirmatory measurements often involve the collection 
of sensitive data. In order to maintain certification, the 
measurement system must report the non-sensitive re-
sults, while simultaneously protecting any intermediate 
data required for the measurements. A key component 
of these confirmation measurement systems is the 
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of an information barrier (IB) for a generic measurement system. All potentially sensitive information 
(contained in parts of the system shown in red) is contained within the IB (blue) while the monitors (green) are outside of the IB. In an at-
tribute measurement system the IB prevents the release of any information other than the attribute results. In a template comparison 
system, the IB prevents the release of any information other than positive or negative results of a successful comparison.
information barrier or IB. [4] The IB is a series of controls 
that ensures that no sensitive information is released 
during a measurement and, simultaneously, that the 
monitoring party is able to independently confirm the 
host’s declaration concerning the measured TLI. 
A conceptual drawing of a generic certifiable measure-
ment system incorporating an IB is shown in Figure 2. In 
practice, the IB would not be the single shell shown be-
low — a practical IB includes layers of hardware, soft-
ware, and procedural protection to provide a barrier sys-
tem that, as a whole, are fault resistant and the 
components of which are fault tolerant. 
Unfortunately, the same IB system that excels at protecting 
the host party’s sensitive information also excels at “pro-
tecting” the monitoring party from any information that 
could be used to confirm the host party’s declaration. At-
tribute measurement (discussed in section 3.2) and tem-
plate comparison (discussed in section 3.3) are both ways 
of presenting useful non-sensitive results based on poten-
tially sensitive data.
3.2 Attribute Measurement
One approach to confirming that an item is consistent with 
a warhead with a carefully controlled release of information 
about the TLI is to use an attribute measurement system 
or AMS. [5] Attribute measurement, as defined here, re-
sults in a non-sensitive indication of potentially sensitive 
measurement results. Potentially sensitive data can be 
made into a non-sensitive display by comparing the data 
with a mutually-agreed threshold, i.e., the display repre-
sents “quantity above threshold.” Potential attributes dis-
plays include:
• the presence of nuclear material, 
• having a nuclear material mass above a threshold, 
• having a plutonium isotopic ratio below a threshold, or 
• having a uranium enrichment above a threshold.
In any fielded implementation of an AMS, the host and 
monitoring parties would agree on the attributes to be 
measured (as well as the details of the AMS itself). The 
confidence generated by an AMS is only as high as the 
confidence that the chosen attributes uniquely define a 
warhead. The choice of attributes is very important — not 
only must the attribute display be non-sensitive, but the 
reason for choosing that attribute must also be non-sensi-
tive. Thus, negotiated attributes are often bounded by sen-
sitivity concerns and may not be capable of providing a 
high level of confidence in warhead identity. 
A number of AMSs have been built and demonstrated for 
international audiences in the last 15 years. Three signifi-
cant examples are: 
• Trilateral Initiative Demonstration system – Designed and 
built in the U.S.; this system measured three attributes, 
was demonstrated for IAEA and Russian representa-
tives, and focused on information barrier capability. [6]
• Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration 
(FMTTD) – Designed and built in the U.S.; this AMS meas-
ured six attributes; was demonstrated to Russian and 
U.S. government representatives, and focused on certifi-
cation and information security. This is the only AMS dem-
onstration where a classified weapon component was 
measured in front of an uncleared audience. [7]
• Attribute Verification system for Neutrons and Gammas 
(AVNG) – This trilaterally designed (VNIIEF, IAEA, and 
LANL/LLNL) designed AMS was jointly developed by 
VNIIEF, LANL, and LLNL and built in Russia. The AVNG 
measured three attributes, was demonstrated for a U.S. 
audience, and focused on Russian certification. [8]
An AMS performs independent measurements on each 
item. Thus, the confirmation (or lack thereof) of each de-
clared item is completely independent of measurements 
on other items. Since each measurement stands alone, 
no long-term storage of potentially classified information 
119
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 50, December 2013
is required. As long as the same attributes are declared 
in each case, the measurement system can be used with 
several types of TLI or the same TLI in different contain-
ers. Finally, there can be a good match between the de-
clared characteristics of the TLI and what is actually 
measured. 
3.3 Template Comparison
Another approach to the challenge of generating monitor 
confidence is to use template matching. In this case, a po-
tentially sensitive signature [typically (but not exclusively) a 
radiation signature] from a declared TLI is compared with a 
similar signature from an item known to be a TLI. This 
comparison can generate a high level of confidence that 
two items are identical or that a given item is unchanged. 
Since the template and individual results are not shown to 
the monitoring party, the template itself may (but is not re-
quired to — see for example ref. [9]) contain sensitive 
information.
Several template-matching demonstrations occurred over 
the same 15-year time frame as the AMS development 
discussed above. Of note are:
• Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS) was a U.S. 
developed system designed to provide a means to use 
low-resolution gamma-ray spectral measurements from 
sodium iodide (NaI) detectors to confirm the identity of 
declared material. TRIS compares the radiation signa-
ture of an inspected item with a known standard for a 
weapon or component of the same type. [10]
• A template-matching demonstration with classified 
canned subassemblies in containers was held in the 
U.S. in 1999. In this demonstration reference signatures 
were acquired for two containers with different items 
with the Russian delegation present. The signature was 
obtained for a third item in the third container and it was 
shown to match one of the reference signatures. This 
comparison was displayed on the computer screen for 
viewing by a Russian delegation with the ordinate scram-
bled. (As with the FMTTD, this demonstration required 
host certification.) 
• A similar template-matching demonstration was per-
formed with three classified plutonium metal parts in 
containers at VNIIEF for a US delegation with the same 
display of the ratio of signatures with the ordinate scram-
bled. (As with AVNG, this demonstration required Rus-
sian certification.)
In a template comparison, two items can be compared 
without ever releasing the template itself. The major advan-
tage of this is that a template can incorporate a broad 
range of potentially sensitive radiation signatures (or other 
item features) and can result in high confidence that two 
items are nominally identical. However, template compari-
sons may require long-term jointly controlled storage of 
sensitive information. 
Since template comparison can result in high confidence 
that two items are identical, templates have a large poten-
tial role in maintaining CoC. [11] However, for the purpose 
of warhead confirmation, confidence in a template-based 
confirmation is only as high as confidence that the com-
parison item is legitimate. In addition, whereas attribute 
measurements result in independent confidence levels for 
each warhead, template comparisons result in correlated 
confidence levels for each item. Confidence (or lack there-
of) in the legitimacy of the comparison copy automatically 
transfers to the level of confidence in the accuracy of war-
head confirmation for an entire series of items. 
4.  Timing of Warhead Confirmation 
Measurements
As illustrated in Figure 1, warhead confirmatory meas-
urement can be performed at four different times within 
the dismantlement process. As described below, each 
of these times has specific advantages and disadvan-
tages from the monitoring party’s point of view. The dif-
ferent approaches to warhead confirmation (templates, 
attributes, provenancing or a combination thereof) offer 
different levels of authentication confidence at different 
times; thus, the details of a warhead confirmation meas-
urement w i l l  in f luence opt imum t iming of  that 
measurement. 
The timing of a confirmation measurement can also result 
in a trade-off between measurement complexity and the 
complexity of maintaining CoC. The availability of CoC 
tools and item provenance must be taken into account 
when determining the optimum times to perform war-
head confirmation measurements. CoC can be main-
tained during storage and transportation using a combi-
nation of visual observation and tags and seals. 
Maintaining CoC throughout the dismantlement process 
requires more elaborate measures such as the “room 
within a room” discussed in another paper at this confer-
ence. [12]
4.1  Pre-dismantlement – Entry into Monitoring Regime
We define entry into the monitoring regime as the time 
when the monitoring party has the option to begin main-
taining CoC on the item. We do not assume that war-
head confirmation measurements are necessary to “ini-
tialize” an item into the monitoring regime but that this 
entry time is one potential time to perform confirmation 
measurements. Confirmation measurements could be 
based on attribute measurement or template compari-
son or both.
Performing confirmation measurements upon entry into 
the monitoring regime provides the monitor with immedi-
ate confidence that an item is consistent with the host’s 
declaration. Otherwise, an item may be present (and 
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Figure 3: Ramification on CoC for performing warhead confirmation measurements upon entry into the monitoring regime. If there is only 
one set of warhead confirmation measurements, CoC between those measurements and dismantlement confirmation is extremely impor-
tant. If the confirmation measurements are performed upon entry into the monitoring regime, there may be a relatively long amount of time 
(up to years) between the warhead confirmation and dismantlement. 
potentially tracked) within the monitoring regime for many 
years before achieving confidence that it is a TLI. In addi-
tion, if the item has a known useful provenance (in this 
case, useful means that the provenance provides evi-
dence that the item is a warhead), then immediate war-
head confirmation measurements together with the prov-
enance may be the best way to provide strong 
confidence that the item is as declared.
The timing of the warhead confirmation measurements 
has ramifications for the importance of maintaining CoC. If 
confirmation upon entry into the monitoring regime is the 
only warhead confirmation measurement prior to disman-
tlement, then CoC between entry into the regime and dis-
mantlement is extremely important. If, on the other hand, 
the item does not have a useful provenance and if the 
movements within the regime are not useful for confirming 
that the item is a warhead, then it may not be as important 
to perform warhead confirmation measurements at entry 
into the monitoring regime; in this case, the importance of 
CoC at any time prior to the first warhead confirmation 
measurements is minimized.
Confirmation made upon entry into the regime has the 
strongest tie to warhead provenance but requires long-
term CoC within the regime to connect this confirmation 
with eventual dismantlement, which may occur many years 
later. In addition, confirmation at this time involves the rela-
tively difficult technical challenge of measuring assembled 
weapons where nuclear signatures may be shielded by ex-
plosive material and/or the casing of the weapon itself. In-
formation security concerns may also be heightened for 
measurements of an assembled weapon.
4.2  Pre-dismantlement – Immediately 
Pre-dismantlement
Another potential time for warhead confirmation meas-
urements is immediately prior to dismantlement. Such a 
measurement may or may not represent the first set of 
confirmation measurements made on the declared TLI. 
Confirmation measurements made immediately prior to 
dismantlement provide added confidence that the item 
entering the dismantlement process is truly a warhead. 
The more time that elapses between the most recent 
warhead confirmation measurement and the dismantle-
ment process, the more difficult it will be to maintain 
CoC. 
If the confirmation measurements are only performed im-
mediately pre-dismantlement, then maintaining CoC prior 
to this first set of measurements is only valuable if one is 
relying on provenance and/or movement of the item is a 
source of confidence in item legitimacy.
Dismantlement SNMAttributes or 
Template
Dismantlement 
Confirmation
E.g. storage & 
transportation
CoC only important if provenance 
or item movement contributes to 
warhead confirmation
CoC very 
important
Figure 4: Ramifications on CoC for attribute measurements pre-dismantlement only. If the provenance or item movement is a source of 
confidence, then CoC prior to the first warhead measurement is very important. If provenance and item movement do not provide confi-
dence, then the value of maintaining CoC prior to confirmation measurements is questionable.
121
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 50, December 2013
If confirmation is made immediately prior to dismantle-
ment, the tie to dismantlement is much stronger, but the 
link to the original declaration, and entry into the regime, 
requires extensive CoC. As the warhead is still assembled 
at this point in time, the measurement challenge is proba-
bly no different than that described in section 4.1.
4.3  Pre-dismantlement – During transportation and 
storage
Warhead confirmation could also occur at any time dur-
ing the pre-dismantlement storage and transportation. 
For the most part, the strengths and trade-offs inherent 
in such a measurement time fall on a sliding scale be-
tween the “Entry into Regime” described in section 4.1 
and the “Immediately Pre-Dismantlement” described in 
section 4.2. However, the one significant exception is that 
a robust CoC connection is now required for linking to 
both end points — the direct tie to either provenance or 
dismantlement has been lost with no specific compen-
sating gain. For this reason, all else being equal, we 
would advocate making the primary confirmation meas-
urements at one end or the other, and not at an interme-
diate position.
However, all else is seldom equal. If the CoC regime can 
begin on the delivery vehicle itself, practical and access 
limitations may prevent the warhead confirmation meas-
urement from being made at this time. In this case, per-
forming a confirmation measurement as soon as possible 
following entry into the CoC regime may increase monitor 
confidence.
In addition, random “challenge” measurements during 
transportation and storage can increase the monitoring 
party’s confidence that the TLI remains as declared 
throughout the process. These intermediate measure-
ments would not replace the confirmation measurements, 
but would increase confidence that the item being tracked 
remains a TLI. Even if attribute measurements and/or prov-
enance are used for initial confirmation, a template com-
parison may be the most effective way to perform these 
challenge measurements.
Another use of “intermediate” confirmation measurements 
is to re-establish CoC on an item if CoC has been lost at 
some point during the transportation and storage opera-
tions. It is never the intention to lose CoC, but it is impor-
tant to have a recovery mechanism, such as re-confirma-
tion, in case such a loss occurs. In addition, the access 
constraints discussed further in section 4.5 may have a 
significant impact on confirmation timing.
4.4 Post-dismantlement
There are two potential types of confirmation measure-
ment that may take place post-dismantlement. The first, 
and most obvious, is to confirm that an item is dismantled, 
i.e., that the HE and the FM are separate. Although the dis-
mantlement confirmation itself presents challenges (as 
touched upon in section 2), the timing of dismantlement 
confirmation is not in doubt.
Following dismantlement, the TLI confirmation measure-
ment is significantly changed and may be simplified. How-
ever, some of the critical characteristics that “make a 
weapon a weapon” may be lost in the dismantlement 
process:
• By definition, the shielding effects of HE need no longer 
be considered post-dismantlement. In addition, since 
the FM is no longer part of a warhead, the storage and 
packaging requirements will be changed. If the relevant 
characteristics are primarily nuclear, like the attribute ex-
amples given above, then the reduction in shielding may 
make nuclear measurements faster, more effective, and 
more discriminating. 
• However, if other characteristics, such as relative FM and 
HE geometry, are important in the definition of a war-
head, then post-dismantlement confirmation adds little 
or no confidence to an attribute measurement. The ef-
fectiveness of this type of warhead confirmation de-
pends explicitly of the declared characteristics of the 
warhead and the mix of attribute measurement, template 
comparison and provenance used to make this 
confirmation. 
The CoC requirements for confirmation that a declared 
item has been dismantled are essentially non-existent as 
warhead confirmation and dismantlement confirmation are 
occurring simultaneously (or nearly so). Conversely the 
CoC requirements for tying the dismantled TLI to the origi-
nally declared TLI become more extreme — in particular, 
the required CoC link now passes though the dismantle-
ment “black box.”
4.5 Comparisons and Analysis
All four potential times for performing warhead confirma-
tion measurements illustrated in Figure 1 have advantages 
and disadvantages for authentication — some of which 
have been discussed above. The determination of which 
confirmation timing is most suitable will depend directly on 
the details of the particular treaty being confirmed. Two 
limiting examples can illustrate this concept:
• If a treaty is purely concerned with item dismantlement, 
then post-dismantlement confirmation provides the 
strongest link between the item and the dismantlement 
process. In this extreme, CoC prior to dismantlement 
becomes less important as the link to regime entry is not 
a major goal.
• Conversely, if a treaty is purely concerned with keeping 
track of warheads within a monitoring regime, then con-
firmation upon entry into the regime provides the strong-
est, and most timely, tie to the warheads themselves.
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In practice, it seems unlikely that a monitored dismantle-
ment treaty would fall into either of these extremes cases. 
Some of the factors used in determining the most effective 
times to perform warhead confirmation measurements 
are: (1) the treaty importance of accepting warheads into 
the regime, (2) whether a useful provenance of the war-
head is available, (3) whether the movements of the item 
through the monitoring regime provide additional confi-
dence that the item is a warhead, (4) the relative confi-
dence in CoC during different stages of the monitoring re-
gime, (5) the planned types of warhead confirmation 
measurements (templates or attributes), (6) practical con-
siderations such as the measurement difficulty due to 
amount of shielding around the item at different points in 
the monitoring regime, (7) the degree of host sensitivity 
concerning the container details and/or geometry of the 
item at different points in the monitoring regime, (8) safety 
requirements for measuring the item at different points in 
the monitoring regime, and (9) accessibility of the item, 
measurement equipment and/or radiation test sources at 
different points in the monitoring regime.
As regime acceptance (1) becomes more important in 
treaty verification, warhead confirmation at entry into the 
monitoring regime also becomes more important. If item 
provenance (2) is used as a source of confidence that the 
dismantled item was indeed a warhead, then it is neces-
sary to maintain CoC continuously from entry into the 
monitoring regime to post dismantlement regardless of 
when warhead confirmation measurements are per-
formed. Similarly, if item movements (3) through the moni-
toring regime add confidence in item legitimacy, then CoC 
must be maintained continuously starting before the 
movements until after dismantlement. The optimum timing 
of confirmation measurements may still be influenced by 
confidence in CoC (as discussed below) but may be dom-
inated by considerations of measurement ability, safety 
and security.
If item provenance and movements provide only limited 
confidence and must be supplemented with confirmation 
measurements, then the timing of warhead confirmation 
greatly influences (and is influenced by) the type of CoC (4) 
required during different phases of the monitoring regime. 
The availability of CoC tools influences the optimum timing 
of warhead confirmation measurements, and maintaining 
CoC during dismantlement is relatively more difficult than 
maintaining CoC during storage and transportation. 
A good example of a trade-off between CoC and confir-
mation timing results from the differences of performing 
confirmation measurements either before or after disman-
tlement. Regardless of timing, maintaining CoC between 
the most recent warhead confirmation measurements and 
post-dismantlement is necessary in order to confirm that 
the item that is dismantled does (or did) meet warhead 
confirmation criteria. If the warhead confirmation 
measurements are performed before dismantlement, then 
CoC must be maintained through the dismantlement pro-
cess. Performing warhead confirmation measurements 
post-dismantlement avoids the relatively difficult task of 
maintaining CoC during dismantlement. 
There is interplay between the timing of different types of 
warhead confirmation measurements (5). In particular, a 
template comparison may be best performed prior to dis-
mantlement due to the changes in radiation signatures that 
accompany dismantlement. Although the attribute exam-
ples given in this paper can be measured either before or 
after dismantlement, some other potential attributes, such 
as ones based on relative geometry of FM and HE, could 
only be performed before dismantlement. Attributes that 
must, by their nature, be performed before dismantlement 
may provide a stronger indication that an item is a war-
head. However, such attributes could also be more sensi-
tive and have not been used in measurement systems to 
date.
There are practical (6) and security (7) ramifications of 
measuring assembled weapons pre-dismantlement or 
components post-dismantlement. Before dismantlement, 
the assembled item may have more shielding, thus compli-
cating the technical ability to make the measurement and 
the geometry of the assembled weapon may be more sen-
sitive than the geometry of the disassembled components 
increasing security concerns. The safety (8) ramifications 
depend on the item and the facility. An assembled weapon 
is usually in a highly stable (and safe) state and it may be 
easier to perform confirmation measurements on an as-
sembled weapon than on a disassembled component 
containing HE. On the other hand, confirmation measure-
ments on a disassembled FM component may have fewer 
safety considerations than measurements on an assem-
bled system containing HE. Safety considerations will influ-
ence access (and in particular the required distance be-
tween detectors and TLI) to the item for the measurement 
equipment.
The accessibility (9) of an item through the various stages 
of monitored dismantlement can have a very direct influ-
ence on the optimum confirmation timing. Measurement 
techniques such as neutron multiplicity counting and im-
age generation can require large detectors, which are 
physically incompatible with some locations. 
Perhaps the best combination (from an authentication 
point of view) of measurement strengths, CoC strengths, 
and efficiency would be achieved by performing war-
head confirmation upon entry into the regime (or as 
soon as practical), immediately pre-dismantlement, and 
post-dismantlement, with a monitoring party option to 
perform confirmation measurements at various points 
during the storage and transportation phases. Steps 
back from this ideal would be made after considering 
123
ESARDA BULLETIN, No. 50, December 2013
the nine factors described above. One possible way to 
decrease the measurement burden while maintaining 
monitor confidence would be to give the monitoring par-
ty the option of performing measurements at any of 
these times while still requiring that the confirmation 
measurements be performed a certain percentage of 
the time.
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During the ESARDA Symposium 2013, a panel discussion 
on dismantlement verification took place, where techno-
logical and political issues were debated. As specified in 
this article, the major discussion points were the benefit of 
multinational, in particular European, technical engage-
ment and correspondingly possible implications and future 
work that could be done in the context of ESARDA. The 
discussion was hosted by the ESARDA Novel Approaches 
/ Novel Technologies and Verification Technologies and 
Methodologies Working Groups as well as the German 
Network for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (see www.
disarmament-verification.org)
The purpose of this discussion was to promote a Europe-
an debate on dismantlement verification. It was found de-
sirable to create a dialogue between the European arms 
control and technical communities. Given the diversity of 
national perspectives within Europe on these issues, the 
question was what could be jointly done. The panelists 
represented a heterogeneous group from those nations 
which are currently major stakeholders in this debate. 
Among the panelists were Mona Dreicer (US, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory), David Keir (UK, VERTIC, 
formerly Atomic Weapons Establishment), Ole Reistad 
(Norway, Institute for Energy Technology), Annette Schap-
er (Germany, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt) and Ser-
gey Zykov (Russia, IAEA). The panel was moderated by 
Götz Neuneck (Germany, Institute for Peace Research and 
Security Policy). 
Discussions on the Panel
The panelists stressed that international engagement be-
tween the potential actors should be promoted as the way 
to find solutions to verification development challenges. If 
methods and tools were developed unilaterally, how could 
the other party trust them? Joint research and develop-
ment was proposed as a way to enable maximum trust in 
the functionality by all involved parties. The panelists found 
that one must strive for balances and compromises here. 
In particular, according to the Nonproliferation Treaty’s Ar-
ticles I and II, no proliferative information may be disclosed 
to non-nuclear weapon states. Further reasons such as 
national security and others further limit the amount of in-
formation the host party is willing to give. The inspecting 
party would therefore have incomplete knowledge about 
the verification situation which makes the development of 
methods and tools more difficult. The inspecting state 
would therefore be interested in a maximum of (non-prolif-
erative) information. This dilemma must be solved cooper-
atively for joint research and development to succeed. This 
might require a change of attitudes on both sides through 
understanding the other’s needs: Nuclear weapon states 
could revisit if helpful non-proliferative information could 
possibly be declassified. Non-nuclear weapon states must 
accept that not all information can be given to them and 
that sometimes explaining why access to certain informa-
tion is denied cannot be given.
The main question of the discussion was then how to trig-
ger such engagement that would enable such joint activi-
ties – as a capacity - and confidence-building measure in 
its initial state. Keeping in mind the European focus, en-
gagement was largely discussed in the context of nuclear 
weapon state – non-nuclear weapon state cooperation, 
though noting that initiatives among nuclear weapon states 
are also valuable, such as the Trilateral Initiative between 
the US, Russia and the IAEA. A strong European prece-
dence for such cooperation is the UK-Norway-Initiative, 
which continues to look into relevant issues such as the 
development of an information barrier for warhead authen-
tication as well as managed access of inspectors in a high 
security host facility. While Norway is a key player in this 
regard, some other non-nuclear weapon states appear to 
be silent, though this issue could be more relevant to them 
because of the Nonproliferation Treaty’s Article XI calling 
for disarmament “under strict and international control”. 
One panelist asked that – given there are few such initia-
tives - how to convince non-nuclear weapon states that 
verification is “for them”. How can academia play a part? 
The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency was 
also discussed, finding that in particular in the past, the 
Agency was rather committed to this topic through the Tri-
lateral Initiative and that there could be a future role. In re-
gard to getting more states involved, it was stressed that 
inclusion requires careful discussions without mirror-imag-
ing, i.e. assuming that the other states’ interests would be 
the same.
Everybody agreed that a good start would be informal or 
formal cooperation at a scientific or technical level. Many 
verification issues are of hard scientific nature. It was 
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stressed that meaningful research can be conducted with-
out access to classified information through working on 
principal issues of measurement technology or managed 
access. The benefit of technical collaboration would not 
only be the research results, but furthermore that the re-
spective research communities are often linked to political 
decision-makers which could become convinced of the 
importance of this topic. Scientific engagement could have 
the form of international exercises and workshops; one 
participant advocated a “nuclear disarmament laboratory” 
including purpose-made research programs. 
Besides scientific collaboration, the panelists agreed that 
political needs should be discussed and analyzed. One 
participant raised the question of what level of intrusive 
verification is expected and what political boundary condi-
tions must be considered. How much verification is 
enough? Another participant argued that one should step 
back and analyze risk paths to find out where verification 
must be the strongest, somewhat like the Safeguards 
state-level approach discussed in the IAEA. 
An overriding problem identified during the discussion 
was the lack of funding. Some panelists criticized that 
funding is often only made available when there is an im-
mediate need for verification solutions, for example be-
cause of on-going treaty negotiations and that there are 
only few actors who currently perceive the need for im-
mediate action. The panelists agreed though that re-
search need for arms control verification is indeed imme-
diate, given that problems have a sincere complexity both 
from a technical and an implementation point of view, 
therefore requiring much research and development. Ef-
forts should therefore be strengthened now so that solu-
tions would be avai lable unti l pol it ical ly desired. 
Precedence of such an approach is the Group of Scien-
tific Experts that researched monitoring technologies and 
data analysis methods relevant for the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty verification long before treaty negotia-
tions. Furthermore, one participant argued that the easi-
est way to hide warheads was now, so that dismantle-
ment verification could become relevant much sooner 
than Global Zero. All in all, the participants saw a sincere 
lack of needed funding for such activities, especially in 
non-nuclear weapon states.
Potential Engagement for ESARDA
According to the panelists, ESARDA would be an excellent 
forum for further deliberations on dismantlement verifica-
tion. Firstly, ESARDA participants have the needed exper-
tise, ranging from nuclear detection and Safeguards ex-
perts to researchers with an interdisciplinary orientation, 
emphasizing that much expertise from Safeguards are 
helpful to develop dismantlement verification methods and 
tools. Secondly, ESARDA provides a heterogeneous inter-
national (European) forum consisting of both nuclear 
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. Therefore, it ap-
pears that ESARDA could be a good platform to broaden 
efforts and to encourage experts with relevant expertise to 
start thinking about this topic. Already now, the Novel Ap-
proaches / Novel Technologies and the Verification Tech-
nologies and Methodologies Working Groups have dis-
mantlement verification on their agenda and plan to 
continue to work on that subject. Efforts like this could 
mark the beginning of a more comprehensive European 
engagement with dismantlement verification which should 
be supported given the wealth of technical expertise that 
already exists within Europe.
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Focused Working Group Activities on 
the Subject of Measurement Uncertainties 
and Reference Material Needs
J. Tushingham
In November 2011, the ESARDA Working Group on Stand-
ards and Techniques for Destructive Analysis (WG DA), in 
close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), held a dedicated workshop on ‘Uncertain-
ties in Nuclear Measurements’. The workshop facilitated an 
exchange on the concepts and methods of measurement 
uncertainty estimation among reference material institutes, 
safeguards laboratories, nuclear and environmental material 
analysts and, in particular, operators on estimation of meas-
urement uncertainty in nuclear measurements. Plenary lec-
tures on fundamental metrological concepts for the estima-
tion of uncertainty in nuclear measurements; and 
measurement uncertainty in material balance verification 
were followed by sessions on nuclear material analysis – for 
both accountancy and non-accountancy purposes – and 
environmental swipe sample analysis. A number of impor-
tant recommendations were made on conclusion of the 
workshop, including a proposal to hold a dedicated work-
shop involving the ESARDA WG DA; the Working Group on 
Techniques and Standards for Non-Destructive Analysis 
(WG NDA); and the Working Group on Novel Approaches/
Novel Technologies (WG NA/NT).
The three Working Groups WG DA, WG NDA and WG NA/
NT subsequently held a joint workshop in March 2013. The 
workshop addressed the needs for standards/reference 
materials supporting DA and NDA instrument metrology 
and conformity assessment, and their application in esti-
mation of measurement uncertainty, including uncertainty 
in nuclear data in view of new approaches in safeguards 
and needs for improvement of accuracy of existing DA and 
NDA techniques. A plenary lecture on Euratom safeguards 
was followed by sessions on inspections and evaluations, 
destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis and novel 
technologies. The findings and points of discussion from 
these sessions were formulated into a series of recom-
mendations including priority needs for reference materi-
als, strengthening the understanding of metrological prin-
ciples, compliance with international standards and the 
need to address the requirements of traceability at the out-
set of measurement development. A particular outcome of 
this workshop was that all participants recognised the 
need and the benefit of intensifying cooperation and ex-
change between safeguards; operators; research; and 
metrology communities, and follow-up activities were 
suggested. 
Two detailed reports, providing summaries of the discus-
sions held during the workshops and recommendations 
arising from the workshops, are now available. The ab-
stracts are presented on the following pages, whilst the full 
reports may be downloaded from the ESARDA website:
https://esarda.jrc.ec.europa.eu
The Chairs of the Working Groups involved anticipate fur-
ther collaboration in the future, with a joint meeting cur-
rently under discussion for Luxembourg 2014. Meanwhile, 
the Working Group Chairs take this opportunity to express 
their appreciation to all participants of the 2011 and 2013 
workshops, and to the IAEA and DG Energy, respectively, 
for hosting the workshops.
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Abstract:
The ESARDA Working Group on Standards and Tech-
niques for Destructive Analysis (WG DA), in close collabo-
ration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
organised a dedicated workshop on ‘Uncertainties in Nu-
clear Measurements’. The workshop was held in con-
junction with the annual working group meeting at the 
IAEA Safeguards Analytical Services (IAEA-SGAS) Seib-
ersdorf Laboratories (SAL), Austria, on 8-9 November 
2011. The focus of the workshop was to exchange con-
cepts and methods of measurement uncertainty estima-
tion among reference measurement institutes, safe-
guards laboratories, nuclear and environmental material 
analysts and, in particular, operators on estimation of 
measurement uncertainty in nuclear measurements. Par-
ticipation was open to ESARDA WG DA members and to 
a limited number of invited participants from expert and 
research institutes. Forty-eight representatives from the 
main European and international nuclear safeguards or-
ganisations, nuclear measurement laboratories, nuclear 
industry and experts from environmental sciences insti-
tutes, participated in this workshop. Fundamental metro-
logical concepts for the estimation of uncertainty in 
nuclear measurements were presented by Roger Wellum, 
retired from Institute for Reference Materials and Meas-
urements (IRMM) in the first plenary lecture. The second 
plenary lecture was given by Claude Norman from the 
IAEA on measurement uncertainty in material balance 
verification. The plenary lectures were followed by three 
sessions, the first on nuclear material analysis for ac-
countancy purposes, the second on nuclear material 
analysis for non-accountancy purposes, and the third 
session was dedicated to Environmental Swipe Sample 
Analysis. The findings and points of discussion from 
these sessions were further discussed in a working 
group using the ‘World-Café’ approach around three se-
lected topics, ensuring that all participants could benefit 
from the ‘collective intelligence’. This report is a summary 
of the points of discussion raised during the sessions and 
in the working group, with main emphasis on the recom-
mendations for the topics of approaches to uncertainty, 
sources of uncertainty, and knowledge of uncertainty. As 
in previous workshops organised by the ESARDA WGDA, 
all participants recognised the need and the benefit of in-
tensifying cooperation between the nuclear safeguards 
and nuclear forensics communities, nuclear industry and 
environmental sciences institutes. 
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Abstract
The ESARDA Working Groups on Techniques and Stand-
ards for Destructive Analysis (WG DA); on Techniques and 
Standards for Non-Destructive Analysis (WG NDA); and on 
Novel Approaches/Novel Technologies (WG NA/NT) or-
ganised a dedicated workshop on ‘Reference material 
needs and evaluation of measurement uncertainties in De-
structive (DA) and Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA)’. This 
workshop was hosted by the European Commission Di-
rectorate General Energy (DGENER) Nuclear Safeguards in 
Luxembourg from 5-7 March 2013. The workshop ad-
dressed the needs for standards/reference materials sup-
porting DA and NDA instrument metrology and conformity 
assessment, and their application in estimation of meas-
urement uncertainty including also uncertainty in nuclear 
data in view of new approaches in safeguards and needs 
for improvement of accuracy of existing DA and NDA tech-
niques. The focus was to establish a regular exchange on 
these topics relevant to all three working groups with a 
special emphasis on supporting the needs of safeguards 
inspectors and evaluators. Participation was open to 
members and observers of the three ESARDA WGs, to 
DGENER and to a limited number of invited participants 
from expert and research institutes. Forty-nine representa-
tives from the main European and international nuclear 
safeguards organisations, reference measurement insti-
tutes, metrology institutes, nuclear measurement laborato-
ries, nuclear industry and from environmental sciences in-
stitutes participated in this workshop. The plenary lecture 
on ‘Euratom safeguards – inspections – evaluations’ given 
by DGENER was followed by four sessions, the first on 
‘Safeguards – Inspections and Evaluations’, the second on 
‘Destructive Analysis’, the third on ‘Non-Destructive Analy-
sis’, and the fourth session on ‘Novel Technologies’. The 
findings and points of discussion from these sessions 
were further discussed in a working group using the 
‘World-Café’ approach around five selected topics, ensur-
ing that all participants could benefit from the ‘collective in-
telligence’. This report is a summary of the points of dis-
cussion raised during the sessions and in the working 
group. The WS participants proposed recommendations 
for setting priorities on needs of reference materials in DA 
and NDA, for strengthening the understanding based on 
metrological principles and the Guide to the expression of 
uncertainty in measurement (GUM) between different ap-
proaches in uncertainty estimation for DA/NDA, and in the 
evaluation of reported results. Furthermore recommenda-
tions were given in view of compliance with international 
standards and the implementation of quality systems. Re-
search and development towards new methods, new in-
struments, novel technologies, and modelling should be 
carried out having in mind right from the outset the re-
quirements of feasibility, transparency, traceability and ac-
curacy of measurement results. A particular outcome of 
this workshop was that all participants recognised the 
need and the benefit of intensifying cooperation and ex-
change between the safeguards; operators; research; and 
metrology communities, and follow-up activities were 
suggested. 

